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# ***CENTRAL EURASIA***



# FBIS Report: Central Eurasia

FBIS-USR-92-143

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### West's Differences Over Aid for Former USSR Viewed

PM3010145392 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian  
27 Oct 92 Morning Edition p 4

[Vladimir Mikheyev report: "George Bush Has Transferred \$12 Billion to the IMF, but It Is Unlikely To End Up in the Financial Aid Package for Russia"]

[Text] The ill-tempered dispute between optimists and skeptics over whether Russia is going to receive \$24 billion in aid from the West went up a semitone in pitch last Sunday. The former hold up the law just signed by U.S. President Bush, the latter put their money on the alarmist statements made by Jacques Attali, head of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, in Paris and by Russian Vice Premier Aleksandr Shokhin in Tolyatti.

George Bush has given his blessing to the allocation of \$410 million to the CIS for humanitarian purposes, meaning thereby not just the improvement of the whole system of food distribution and social provision but also the simultaneous enhancement of nuclear reactor safety and environmental protection. A separate paragraph of the law speaks of "assistance" in effecting nuclear disarmament and transferring the defense industry to a civilian footing. The law also envisages a \$12-billion increase in the U.S. contribution to the IMF.

Although these resources are intended to set up a market economy not just "in the former Soviet Union," but also "throughout the world," the head of the Washington administration solemnly stated: "We should continue to support the reformists in Russia, Ukraine, Armenia, and the other newly formed states."

It should be noted that Bush signed this bill during his election swing through the state of Montana. He had most likely not had time to learn about Jacques Attali's condemnation of the "G-7's" big-sounding commitments to support the Russian reforms materially." Since the Munich meeting Russia has not yet received a single cent, according to him. Attali described this as a "tragedy," because "the Russians had thought that they would receive this money."

As if with his sights on the American president, he ascribed the absence of the \$24 billion to the fact that the promises were merely "part of an election campaign." Bush has described the U.S. donations to the IMF as "adequate resources" to lay the foundations of a "free market" in the virgin soil of the CIS. However, Jacques Attali, continuing to pour salt on the wounds, cited by way of example his own experience in trying to prise out funds to modernize nuclear power stations in Russia over the year: "I have managed to collect \$200 million," whereas \$3 billion are required. Clearly, Attali argues, allocations for Russian nuclear stations have no impact on Western politicians' popularity.

The unusual cutting edge to Attali's comments proved in keeping with Aleksandr Shokhin's opinion. The person in charge of our collaboration with the IMF in Gaydar's government asked himself a far from rhetorical question: Will the IMF keep to the figures? After all, the IMF demand that Russia curb increases in living costs and reduce them to a single digit is cited as a condition for infusions of finance. "If, instead of an inflation figure of 9.9 percent per month, it settles at the level of 12 percent, will that serve as a reason to refuse the money?"—Shokhin asks.

The question is not a trivial or individual one. In the broad context we are talking here about a principled approach by the IMF to the Russian reforms, according to the vice premier, as otherwise "Communists will have the chance to prove the correctness of their assurances that cooperation with the IMF is leading the country into an impasse." And then every bit of ammunition will be used, including Attali's self-critical remark that "the international community's hypocrisy is enormous."

But even if a stream of token credit, coupled with nonrepayable humanitarian aid, does flow, according to Jacques Attali's calculations, the IMF's reputation will suffer: Billions are required, whereas only millions are being doled out at intervals. Against the background of the calls made the week before last by American senators exhorting the IMF not to be obstinate pedants and insist on their demands and in the light of the manifest anxiety felt by the Russian Government, as expressed by Shokhin, the IMF leadership faces a tough dilemma: Either it waives its principles for the sake of the long-term survival of the Yeltsin-Gaydar government or it insists on having its own way, but in that case it must be ready to share the blame for the unpredictable consequences of the deepening crisis in Russia.

### Debut of Former USSR Republics at UN General Assembly Examined

934C0102A Kiev NEZAVISIMOST in Russian  
2 Oct 92 p 4

[Special article for NEZAVISIMOST by P. Baranyuk under the rubric "Topical": "Hello, New York: Our Own Sovereign Sleigh"]

[Text] The general discussion sets the tone at every regular session of the UN General Assembly. It is during the first 2 or 3 weeks, during the presentations by heads of state and government, that the positions of states on the main international problems are stated and the main focuses for the session are defined. This year all 15 republics of the former Soviet Union are taking part as sovereign states in the session for the first time.

And so, we do in fact have something like a parade of sovereignties. In the first week Russia, Belarus, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Latvia and Georgia spoke during the debate. The sovereign states shared their ideas on the future world order and told about problems with which they were counting on the UN to help them.



Oaths of allegiance to democracy occupied a prominent place in the addresses of all these countries. The barricades around Russia's White House, constitutions still to be written and other, no-less-important proof of this was cited. Armenian President Ter-Petrosyan's brief address was typical. It was more in the form of a report on successes achieved on the path to democracy and a market economy. The outside world was brought in only to the extent that it dealt with the Karabakh problem. In this matter, however, the president demonstrated enviable restraint and diplomatic tact, retaining complete freedom of maneuver. Azerbaijan's Minister of Foreign Affairs Tofik Gassimov, however, declared Armenia the aggressor and accused it of trying to dismember Azerbaijan. Only Eduard Shevardnadze, chairman of Georgia's Supreme Council, and Belarusian Minister of Foreign Affairs Petr Kravchenko attempted to define the place of their states in the changing world and to interpret the changes occurring in it. The head of Belarus' foreign policy department extremely soberly assessed prospects for the integration of the new sovereign states into the world economy. He noted that it would take 10-15 years before their integration into the European Common Market could be seriously considered. He also provided an analysis of prospects for Belarussian neutrality in the real, and not the imaginary, European context. He also gave a most comprehensive assessment of the European situation: "Internal tensions on the continent are growing."

Eduard Shevardnadze took on the thankless task of performing a postmortem examination of what caused the death of the USSR and openly admitted that many of the problems with which the sovereign states are having to deal today are a result of its rapid and uncontrolled disintegration. It is the Georgian leader's opinion that had this process been more civilized, the extremes could perfectly well have been avoided. Ever the prophet, Shevardnadze predicted upheavals on a world scale unless the economic situation in the CIS changes, and a turnabout in public opinion in the Commonwealth countries from support for democracy to a desire to see a "strong individual" in power. Eduard Ambrosiyevich appealed to the UN members in his own words for a "small and weak country." Even in this new capacity, however, he surprised those listening by showering them with a salvo of proposals and initiatives. They included such exotic ideas as the establishment of a "blue-helmeted interpol" to combat the illegal weapons trade.

While Shevardnadze's address sounded like that of the minister of foreign affairs of an influential and prestigious power, Russian Minister Andrey Kozyrev limited himself to the most general of statements in his analysis of international problems. At the same time he devoted an extraordinary amount of attention to problems on the "immediate borders." This was the part of his speech which was distinguished by maximum specificity of formulations and flight of imagination. Declaring "aggressive nationalism" to be the new threat to peace

today, the minister underscored the fact that Russia is particularly concerned about the "discriminatory treatment of Russians, Ukrainians and Jews and all other nonindigenous nationalities" which has appeared in a number of states of the former Soviet Union. So that we now have nothing to worry about. Russia will protect our compatriots abroad, and we can continue to build a sovereign state. But what if Russia is incapable of all that? In this case, in the minister's opinion, the UN's guardianship system, which has died a quiet death, could come in handy. A. Kozyrev suggests that it might be revived for purposes of protecting national minorities. And why not? Russia could take on the protection of Ukrainians and Jews, for example. Ukraine could protect the Yakuts, while Armenia could stand up for the small peoples of the Far East.

From the speaker's platform in the General Assembly Russia affirmed its determination to play the role of "first among equals" in the expanses of the former Union, prepared, if necessary, to use force to separate warring parties and protect human rights, and to provide humanitarian aid through missions. This position is not much to the liking of the Baltic states, let us say. Proof of this was the issue of the "complete withdrawal of foreign armed forces from the territory of the Baltic states" placed on the agenda of the UN General Assembly at their request.

Andrey Kozyrev named the all-around strengthening of the CIS and the "strategic partnership" with Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan and all the other states which have emerged in place of the former Union as one of the basic tenets of Russia's national foreign policy. It appears that the proposed partners are not prepared to go very far in this direction. Belarus, for example, views the CIS mainly as a means of economic survival and a framework within which to "grow" to the point of integration into the European Community. In addition, it has made a cautious statement of its own political role within the former union, offering its services as a mediator and peacemaker.

All of the participants in the general discussion attempted to find a way to resolve the conflict between the interests of the national states and those of the minorities residing therein. Not one of the proposed solutions could be deemed totally acceptable, however, particularly from the standpoint of the minorities. The open discussion of these problems in the UN is a good sign in and of itself, though. The existence of problems has to be recognized before they can be resolved.

We know that UN membership not only provides certain advantages, but also imposes a number of obligations—primarily financial. Having grown accustomed to the idea that they are "poor" according to the standards of surfeited Western Europe, the republics of the former Union have discovered to their surprise that there are countries in far poorer condition. With these objective criteria in mind, the Committee for Membership Dues recommended, among other things, that the amount of Belarus' contribution to the organization's budget be

increased. Strong indignation over the matter was clearly apparent in the general context of the speech by the head of the Belarussian delegation. Now everyone will be pulling his own sovereign sleigh on his own.

The general discussion in the General Assembly is a mirror in which the world can see its true self once a year. The debut of the formed republics may evoke various reactions, but all of them were trying to find their own place within the United Nations.

### Soviet Military Intelligence Activities Abroad

#### GRU Agent on Trial in Germany

92UM1508A Moscow *NOVOYE VREMYA* in Russian  
No 36, Sep 92 p 21

[Article by Boris Lysenko, personal correspondent (Berlin): "A Colonel from the 'Aquarium' Is in the Dock; Could a Russian Military Intelligence Officer in Germany Not Speak German?"]

[Text] A Russian Army colonel was arrested at night near the old city of Wernigerode in the picturesque Harz mountains on 18 November last year.

He put up so much resistance that the Germans had to handcuff him. He was identified at a nearby police station. He turned out to be, according to the German newspapers, "the chief of the intelligence center of the Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) of the former Soviet Army in Magdeburg, 46-year-old Colonel Viktor Zherdev."

The trial of the Russian colonel began in August in the First Appellate Court of Berlin. He had been charged with "using his administrative office to engage in espionage against the Bundeswehr and the NATO troops stationed in the Federal Republic of Germany."

Viktor Zherdev refused to testify or even to relate any personal information at the hearing, but the prosecution believes that it has enough evidence to convict the colonel.

The indictment says that Zherdev "was engaged in espionage from 1980 until the time of his arrest." In addition to recruiting foreign agents in Berlin and Magdeburg, he is supposed to have "bribed officials." The prosecution said that Viktor Zherdev arrived in East Berlin in 1980 as an operational intelligence officer after undergoing special training. He was ordered to "find enemy military-strategic complexes and recruit foreign agents."

In 1987 he was transferred to Riga, to the headquarters of the Baltic Military District, where he headed the German intelligence division.

In April 1989 he returned to the GDR and became the chief of the "Magdeburg GRU center," with a base of operations stretching from Stendal in the north to Muehlhausen in the south. The indictment says that

Viktor Zherdev had around 45 people under his command, including 15 operational intelligence officers, each of whom was working with two recruited foreign agents. How had the colonel aroused the attention of German counterintelligence?

Along with other Russian intelligence officers, Viktor Zherdev had tried to recruit a police officer from Sachsen-Anhalt, who reported the proposition to counterintelligence.

According to *BERLINER ZEITUNG*, the foreign agents under Colonel Zherdev's supervision were also engaged in espionage in a French military unit and on one of the airfields of the British forces in Germany.

During the trial there was a report that Berndt Schmidbauer, state minister in the federal chancellery, had gone to Moscow to persuade the Russian leadership to stop the work of the secret services in Germany. The colonel's trial had grown into a serious political issue.

My attempts to get some kind of information about the colonel in the headquarters of the Western Group of Russian forces were unsuccessful.

Oddly enough, at the trial it became obvious that the colonel spoke German badly. How had he managed to recruit and work with German informers for so many years?

#### Former KGB Official Interviewed

92UM1508B Moscow *NOVOYE VREMYA* in Russian  
No 36, Sep 92 p 21

[Interview with Vitaliy Chernyavskiy, former chief of the Fourth Foreign Intelligence Department of the USSR KGB, by *NOVOYE VREMYA* correspondents; date and place not given: "An Army Intelligence Officer's Mistakes Are Forgivable"]

[Text] Vitaliy Chernyavskiy, the former chief of the Fourth Foreign Intelligence Department of the USSR KGB, spoke with *NOVOYE VREMYA* correspondents.

[*NOVOYE VREMYA*] A Russian intelligence chief in Germany who speaks German badly? What is this—evidence of the deterioration of military intelligence? After all, the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Russian Army's General Staff was once considered to be the strongest military intelligence service in the world, and some people even believed that the GRU was more professional and more proficient than the CIA and KGB....

[Chernyavskiy] Colonel Viktor Zherdev, who was arrested in Germany, worked for army intelligence, and not for the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Russian Army's General Staff. He worked for an intelligence service on a lower level, operational intelligence. Consequently, its personnel requirements were also lower. They did not necessarily have to speak the language, because they could communicate with foreign agents

through interpreters. The GRU was not connected with this. This is an autonomous intelligence division of the Western Group of Forces. The GRU is engaged in strategic intelligence, while army intelligence has less important duties: It gathers information about the state of affairs in the small and large military units with which Russian Army units might come into direct contact.

[NOVOYE VREMYA] In recent years much has been written about the hatred military intelligence officers feel for KGB personnel, who watch over them and treat the GRU with condescension. Does your own experience corroborate these observations?

[Chernyavskiy] It is true that political intelligence has always felt somewhat superior to military intelligence, but we have never been treated with hatred or animosity by our military "neighbors." Our relations have been businesslike and friendly. Of course, there has been some rivalry and competition. Everyone wanted to be the first to report important information to superiors in the CPSU Central Committee. When there were arguments between the two intelligence services, the chiefs in Old Square usually took Lubyanka's side. This is how we got some of the foreign agents we wanted from the GRU. I, for example, worked with several first-rate spies we got from our military "neighbors."

[NOVOYE VREMYA] Did the military object?

[Chernyavskiy] I cannot remember any objections. You have to remember that military intelligence was overseen by political intelligence from the very beginning. After the war this oversight was probably relaxed slightly, but state security personnel retained the role of supervisors and overseers, especially in view of the fact that the counterintelligence support of the GRU and other military intelligence agencies was always provided by state security personnel.

#### GRU Officer Interviewed

92UM1508C Moscow NOVOYE VREMYA in Russian  
No 36, Sep 92 pp 22-24

[Interview with Maj. Gen. Vitaliy Nikolskiy, retired professional military intelligence officer, by Leonid Mlechin and Tatyana Chernova; date and place not given: "The 'Aquarium' and Lubyanka: Neighbor-Rivals"]

[Text] The state security service has always wanted to keep army intelligence under its control, ever since Stalin suspected his own marshals of plotting a coup.

The rivalry between the GRU and KGB has always been overestimated. In fact, military intelligence officers simply had no opportunity to oppose the KGB, which oversaw everything in the country, including the Main Intelligence Directorate. The special sections in the armed forces were and are part of the state security network.

Major General Vitaliy Nikolskiy, retired professional military intelligence officer, answered NOVOYE VREMYA's questions.

[Mlechin and Chernova] You worked for the military intelligence service for 30 years. In your opinion, is the GRU inferior to the KGB foreign intelligence service?

[Nikolskiy] In the professional sense? No.

[Mlechin and Chernova] In what sense is it inferior?

[Nikolskiy] We did not have the same status. They were part of an omnipotent system that was suspicious of everyone and everything, and we were the ones they felt entitled to suspect.

[Mlechin and Chernova] What kind of relationship did you have with the state security network?

[Nikolskiy] Even when I first started working as an intelligence officer, the problem with our service was that anyone who had been abroad was automatically suspect and was consequently under state security scrutiny.

[Mlechin and Chernova] Were there people from the state security service in military intelligence?

[Nikolskiy] There were representatives of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs. They occasionally spoke at our meetings—about the need to be more vigilant and observe the rules of secrecy. One of these comrades once invited me to a safe house near the Novodevichiy Monastery. After lunch and a few drinks, he said: "Come work for us. You will not regret it." I said: "But I am already working in intelligence." Then he told me, in a confiding tone: "We have a different job to do. We have to expose internal enemies." In short, he tried to recruit me as an informer, but I managed to change the subject. This kind of job was not for me.

[Mlechin and Chernova] Were these official representatives still there after the war?

[Nikolskiy] People from the KGB were still there. They kept an eye on us. We always knew who our custodians were. But quite frankly, I had no interest in what these individuals managed to do in the sphere of intradepartmental intelligence—recruiting some people and persuading others to collaborate with them.

[Mlechin and Chernova] Did the intelligence officers ever talk about the actions of their "neighbors"?

[Nikolskiy] We did not see anything extraordinary about them. Counterintelligence, after all, was fairly autonomous. In principle, it was supposed to infiltrate enemy intelligence and counterintelligence agencies, recruit agents there, and learn what kind of plots our enemies were hatching against us.

[Mlechin and Chernova] Military intelligence officers were supposed to be just as trustworthy as the state



security personnel, but for some reason you were not trusted anyway. Did this make you angry?

[Nikolskiy] It aroused what you might describe as mild displeasure. Who would be pleased to know that he is being denounced? In reality, it all depended on the specific individual, and there were always many decent people among the lower-echelon personnel. There were not that many officious swine. I always tried to remember that the counterintelligence agent had their own job to do. Sometimes they even helped us.

[Mlechin and Chernova] Can you give us an example?

[Nikolskiy] Right after the war, for instance, I was serving in Austria, and I had what I thought was an extremely helpful foreign agent. He worked for the West German intelligence service and gave me wonderful information about the German Army that was then being reassembled. I paid him well. We almost exchanged kisses when we said goodbye. Then I received a surprise call from future Chairman of the USSR KGB Vitaliy Fedorchuk. At that time he was the deputy chief of military counterintelligence of our occupation forces in Austria. Fedorchuk told me: "Get rid of that agent right away. He is an absolute swine. After each meeting with you, he writes a detailed report to his superiors and even adds some personal comments of his own." I learned that the "neighbors" had recruited one of my informer's superiors.... In this way, Fedorchuk kept me from making a major blunder.

[Mlechin and Chernova] Are you saying that the suspicions of the counterintelligence service were not always unfounded?

[Nikolskiy] Unfortunately, it was not that rare for military intelligence officers to go over to the West. When I was in Austria, the Americans recruited Officer Popov. He was exposed later, when he had returned from his overseas assignment and was thriving as a member of the central GRU staff.

[Mlechin and Chernova] The GRU regards Colonel Oleg Penkovskiy as its biggest failure....

[Nikolskiy] It was because of him that my best Swedish contact, Defense Staff Colonel Stig Wennerstroem, disappeared and I had to leave Stockholm in a hurry.

[Mlechin and Chernova] Did you know Penkovskiy?

[Nikolskiy] I saw him several times at the academy where I worked after I returned from Sweden.

[Mlechin and Chernova] Was Penkovskiy a career GRU officer?

[Nikolskiy] Yes, he worked in the Scandinavian offices and then in the station chief's office in Turkey. Toward the end of his career he was working in military-technical intelligence. He read the reports our residents throughout the world were getting about new weapons,

and he helped the American and British intelligence services apprehend our agents who had access to the secret information.

[Mlechin and Chernova] As far as you know, did the GRU suffer other failures of this magnitude?

[Nikolskiy] Yes.

[Mlechin and Chernova] Did the GRU have as many failures as the KGB?

[Nikolskiy] It is one of the unpleasant features of our work that we try to minimize our own failures and exaggerate our successes. It seems to me that the KGB had more failures and more defectors, but they also had a much larger staff than the military intelligence network.

[Mlechin and Chernova] Would you say that you got along well with the "neighbors"?

[Nikolskiy] Above all, I tried to defend my own team. After all, the KGB was trying to "strip" the military, to appropriate our foreign contacts, and to take the credit for our achievements. This happened to us often: Our "neighbors" were skilled at snatching things away from us at the last minute.

[Mlechin and Chernova] How did they do this?

[Nikolskiy] The GRU and KGB residents cooperated with each other. For example, I would work for a long time with a person who could have been quite useful to us. We would establish a friendship and I would sense that he was ready to be recruited. Before I could formalize this relationship, however, I would report my progress to the "neighbors." In any case, I had to be certain that he was not in their files. I would go to see the KGB foreign intelligence resident, who would look surprised and exclaim: "But we have been working with this man for two years!" It would be clear that my "neighbor" was simply bluffing. He would want to recruit the man himself, especially now that all of the preparatory work had been done. This kind of behavior—this tendency to usurp and take over—was irritating.

[Mlechin and Chernova] Were you on the losing end in this unhealthy rivalry?

[Nikolskiy] The KGB usually got its way. We were in an unfair position. They were the first to report to the upper echelon. The procedure from the very beginning was that military intelligence officers would receive their assignments and then report not only to their own intelligence directorate, but also to political intelligence. After the war there were some attempts to change this procedure. They set up the Information Committee of the USSR Council of Ministers, combining the GRU with the Ministry of State Security's intelligence service. In this committee we were on equal terms, but it did not last long. Soon we were split up among different departments again. The GRU leaders put themselves in a subordinate position.

[Mlechin and Chernova] Maybe they felt insecure because they were replaced so frequently.

[Nikolskiy] Yes, for some reason no one stayed in this position for long. Each new boss wanted to change everything. Before the war there were several hundred members of the central staff of the intelligence directorate, but there were endless reorganizations during the war and afterward: Sections were merged and then separated once again, and the staff was constantly reduced and then quickly built up again. Experienced personnel were dismissed and inexperienced people were hired. We have our own academy, and it does not take long to fill vacancies there, but any kind of reorganization can create major problems for an intelligence service. Our new superiors, however, never seemed to care. They were always outsiders, line or staff officers, or anyone else, but never a professional intelligence officer. It was assumed, believe it or not, that an intelligence director did not need any special knowledge or experience.

[Mlechin and Chernova] Did this apply only to top-level administrators?

[Nikolskiy] If only it had! I once had a wonderful foreign contact in the FRG, a Bundestag deputy. One day we had an appointment in a safe house in East Berlin. He arrived and typed up everything he could tell me about the situation in the Bundeswehr, and then we sat down to a snack. Before the meeting my superior had warned me that he would drop in on us to take a look at the agent. He did come, with a gloomy and annoyed look on his face. Without a single word of greeting, he sat down, crossed his legs, looked at us, muttered something about how I should be more careful, and left. I said to the deputy: "You will have to excuse my superior. He has a terrible toothache." The deputy grinned and replied: "Forget it. You don't have to make up excuses. I grew up in a small town where everyone spoke Polish, so I understood everything he said." I had to blush for my general.

[Mlechin and Chernova] But intelligence is a craft like any other. It can be learned.

[Nikolskiy] Yes, but instead of trying to master their new craft, many of our administrators were preoccupied with reorganization and with trying to look busy. This took up all of their time and energy. Ivan Ilyichev saw everyone who had returned from abroad as a potential traitor. Serov, who came to us from the KGB, simply did not like military intelligence. Incidentally, General Ivashutin, who headed the GRU until recently, had been the deputy chairman of the KGB. Matvey Zakharov was memorable because of the privileges he got for us—quicker promotions and high salaries.

[Mlechin and Chernova] When Zhukov was Khrushchev's minister of defense, did he not try to make his intelligence service more influential, put it on an equal level with the KGB, and thereby strengthen his own position and the authority of the army?

[Nikolskiy] I do not think the KGB ever gave up any of its influence.

[Mlechin and Chernova] "The Aquarium," the novel by one of your junior GRU colleagues who defected to the West and used the pseudonym "Viktor Suvorov," made a great impression on our reading public. In general, the GRU should forgive the defector for all of his past sins: This novel was a genuine advertisement.... Did his account have anything in common with the facts? Did he invent the whole thing? Does the GRU really warn new personnel that they will be burned alive for traitorous actions?

[Nikolskiy] Nonsense. We signed a pledge to keep military and state secrets. We knew that we would be put on trial for violating the pledge. In earlier years we might even have been punished without a trial, but threats of being burned alive? God forbid! We were never intimidated in any way at all.

[Mlechin and Chernova] Was the GRU really more clandestine than the KGB?

[Nikolskiy] It obviously was not. Everyone in the military knew the name of our service and its functions. I have to repeat that we could never have competed with the KGB in any area.

[Mlechin and Chernova] You once headed a department in the special academy. How do people become part of the military intelligence network?

[Nikolskiy] Here is how it is usually done: Two or three people are sent to the district headquarters. They report to the commander as candidates for training in the special academy. The commander requests career personnel to choose the most suitable candidates. They read their personnel records, consult the superiors of those who seem to meet the requirements, and then conduct a final interview with the candidates.

[Mlechin and Chernova] Do you remember anyone refusing to apply to the academy?

[Nikolskiy] This was extremely rare. Studying in Moscow created opportunities for professional advancement in itself, and joining the intelligence service meant a chance to go abroad.

[Mlechin and Chernova] If you were to meet a colleague of the same rank but, for instance, from the Operational Directorate of the General Staff, which of you would have felt more successful in terms of your career?

[Nikolskiy] The line and staff officers always occupied more prominent positions, their careers were more secure, and they were promoted more quickly.

[Mlechin and Chernova] Did people leave the GRU to take jobs in headquarters or to occupy command positions?



[Nikolskiy] People did leave, but usually not by choice. They were usually let go because they had made mistakes.

[Mlechin and Chernova] Were the future intelligence officers taught the rules of etiquette, as the author of "The Aquarium" wrote?

[Nikolskiy] Instructors in special subjects certainly might have mentioned that it is not nice to pick one's nose, but they were more likely to train students in operational skills, the techniques of clandestine work, and the use of special equipment than to teach good manners. Our students were people who already had a higher military education, and they came from all branches of the military.

[Mlechin and Chernova] Just so that our readers will not be disillusioned, please tell us it is true that the future inhabitants of the "aquarium" were taught to jump off moving trains and shoot with both hands.

[Nikolskiy] The only thing they taught us was parachute jumping. Later even this was eliminated from the special training program. Why would an intelligence officer have to learn all of these stunts? No one is being sent out to direct partisan brigades these days. The only thing the intelligence officer had to do was to learn how to use a camera.

In spite of various minor problems, Soviet military intelligence did its work successfully, and most of the credit for this has to be given to our lower-echelon personnel.

**CIS Economic Activity, Jan-Jul 92**

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18 Sep 92 p 7

[Report by the Committee for Statistics of the Commonwealth of Independent States: "The Economy of the Commonwealth of Independent States in January-July 1992"]

[Text] For the Commonwealth, July produced a sharp decline in industrial production—by 23 percent as compared with July of last year (in May and June the decline in the total volume amounted to 15 percent); a decline in the production of meat at agricultural enterprises, as

compared with June of this year—by eight percent, and of milk—by 18 percent; wholesale price increases at industrial enterprises—by 21 percent as compared with the previous month (but in June and May of this year they increased by 32 percent) and higher retail prices of goods (including city markets)—by 11 percent (as compared with 14 percent in June and May); and an increased—by 7.5 percent—volume of retail turnover. During the month the number of people looking for a job increased by 100,000.

The data showing the changes in the basic economic indicators of the Commonwealth countries in January-July of this year, as compared with the corresponding period last year, are as follows (in percents):

	Produced National Income	Total Volume of Industrial Production	Wholesale Price Index of Industrial Enterprises	Monetary Income of the Population (Not Counting 40-Percent Compensation)	Retail Turnover		
						n actual prices	n comparable prices
Azerbaijan	78 <sup>1</sup>	78.2 <sup>1</sup>	12.62 times <sup>1</sup>	-	-	294.7*	34.3*
Armenia	54.4	48.4	973	178.9	190.5	176.2	27.2
Belarus	86.0	86.6	1,652	576.8/465.8 <sup>2</sup>	567.2	573.8	70.6
Kazakhstan	78.6	87.0	1,799	399.01	351.1 <sup>1</sup>	410.1	58.7
Kyrgyzstan	75.0	79.7	1,784	310.5	279.2	307.6	36.4
Moldova	75.3	72.5	1,156	387.7	353.8	390	44.2
Russia	82.0	85.2	1,569	615.8/478.7	528.7	546.0	60.3
Tajikistan	-	83.5	1,412	266.0 <sup>1</sup>	269.5 <sup>1</sup>	274.4	33.9
Turkmenistan	92.7	81.5	788	446.0/437.7	329.8	363.4	63.1
Uzbekistan	77.2	90.8	1,011	313.7/277.5	313.4	320.3	56.7
Ukraine <sup>3</sup>	85 <sup>1</sup>	87.7 <sup>1</sup>	-	-	-	583.7	74.6
Total CIS*	81.9	85.0	16.3 times	5.9 times/4.8 times	5 times	523.0	62.0

<sup>1</sup> January-June

<sup>2</sup> The numerator—without 40-percent compensation added in July 1991 to savings deposits in the Savings Bank in connection with the April retail price increases, the denominator—with compensation

<sup>3</sup> Here and further on—data derived from estimates and bilateral information exchange

The volume of foreign trade operations of the Commonwealth countries (not counting intra-Commonwealth shipments) in January-July is estimated at \$47.1 billion, including \$22.5 billion in exports and \$24.6 billion in imports. As compared with the corresponding period of last year, the volume of foreign trade declined by 29.2 percent, of export—by 35.5 percent, and of import—by 22.3 percent.

The trade balance deficit during this period in the Commonwealth as a whole amounted to \$2.1 billion. Russia had a negative foreign trade balance (\$725.9 million), while a positive balance was posted by Belarus (\$233.8 million), Kazakhstan (\$314.5 million), Kyrgyzstan (\$1.3 million), Moldova (\$11.6 million), and Uzbekistan (\$72.6 million).

Targets established for the first half year for producing goods for export in January-June have been met by

enterprises of Belarus, Moldova, Russia, and Tajikistan. Kyrgyzstan enterprises lagged in the delivery of goods for export, creating a 10-million-ruble [R] shortfall in domestic prices (deliveries amounted to 99 percent of those stipulated by agreements for the first half of the year); Turkmenistan's shortfall was R4.8 billion worth (41 percent), and Uzbekistan's—R52 million worth (99 percent).

Profits earned by enterprises and organizations have decreased as compared with last year because of preemptive wholesale price increases (in the circumstances of declining production). In January-May 1992 in Turkmenistan, profits rose by a factor of 15.2 (in January-May 1991—by a factor of 1.8), in Kazakhstan—ninefold (by a factor of 1.6), in Russia—by a factor of 8.5 (1.7), Uzbekistan—by a factor of 7.6 (1.4), in Belarus—sevenfold (by a factor of 1.9), in Azerbaijan—by a factor of 6.2 (2.2), and in Armenia—by a factor of 3.1 (1.2).

In January-June the total volume of industrial production declined by 15 percent as compared with the corresponding period of last year in comparable prices, and the average daily production—by 15.6 percent (this year in January-July there were two working days more than last year).

The level of wholesale prices set by enterprises in January-July exceeded that for the corresponding period of last year on average for the Commonwealth by a factor of 16.3. Wholesale prices increased 30-fold in July as compared with December of last year.

Oil production fell by 13 percent as compared with January-July of last year; in Russia, it fell by 14 percent. At the same time in Uzbekistan, it increased by 15 percent, and in Kazakhstan it was somewhat higher than last year. The production of natural gas in Russia remained practically on the level of the seven months of last year; in Uzbekistan it exceeded that level by two percent, while in Turkmenistan it declined by 30 percent. The production of coal declined by three percent in Russia and by five percent in Kazakhstan.

The production of finished rolled ferrous metals declined by 14 percent. The production of many types of machine building output shrunk: tractors—by 24 percent (in Russia by 29 percent, in Kazakhstan—by half); metal lathes—by 22 percent (in Kazakhstan—by 33 percent, in Armenia—by 47 percent); and drop forges—by 21 percent (in Russia—by 22 percent).

The production of calcinated soda, and chemical fibers and filaments in Russia fell by nine percent; of sulphuric acid, synthetic resins, and plastic materials—by 13 percent; mineral fertilizer—by 16 percent. In Turkmenistan 40 percent less of mineral fertilizer was produced than last year, in Kazakhstan—34 percent less, and in Belarus—27 percent less.

The production of paper fell by 18 percent in the Commonwealth as a whole; the output of cement fell by 16 percent.

The output of consumer goods in the Commonwealth state fell on average by 16 percent, including a 20-percent decline in Kazakhstan, 22-percent decline in Tajikistan, and a 23-percent decline in Kyrgyzstan.

The production of food products—first and foremost of meat and whole-milk products—declined substantially. In Russia, the production of meat fell by 27 percent, in Kazakhstan—by 32 percent, and in Uzbekistan—by 33 percent; the decline in the production of whole-milk products was 48 percent, 22 percent, and 26 percent, respectively. There was also a decline in the output of flour, cereals, commercial edible fish products, and vegetable oil.

The output of all types of fabrics in the Commonwealth declined by 19 percent (in Russia—by 21 percent, in Tajikistan—by 23 percent); of footwear—by 22 percent (in Russia—by 26 percent); of television sets—by 20 percent; and of washing machines—by 27 percent.

The harvesting of agricultural crops is in progress in the fields of all Commonwealth countries. On the whole in the Commonwealth, by 31 August grain and leguminous crops have been harvested on 56.0 million hectares (59 percent of the sown area), including 4.5 million hectares during the past week (24-31 August). Last year as of 2 September grain and leguminous crops had been mowed on 74.3 million hectares, which is 18.3 million hectares (33 percent) more than in the current year. In terms of the pace and volume of harvesting, the lag in relation to last year was registered on the farms in Russia (25 percent less mowed) and Kazakhstan (52 percent less).

The data showing the progress of grain and leguminous crops harvesting (without corn) in the Commonwealth states is shown below (as of 31 August, in millions of hectares):

	Total Area Mowed	As a Percentage of the Sown Area	1992 as a Percentage of 1991	Threshed	As a Percentage of Mowed Area
Azerbaijan*	0.6	98	97	0.6	100
Armenia*	0.0	75	44	0.0	100
Belarus	2.4	99.1	102	2.4	99.9
Kazakhstan	5.6	26	48	4.6	82
Kyrgyzstan	0.4	75	105	0.4	99.9
Moldova*	0.4	95	86	0.4	99.6
Russia	34.2	60	75	31.8	93
Tajikistan	0.1	71	104	0.1	97
Turkmenistan	0.3	99.0	153	0.3	100
Uzbekistan	0.8	98	113	0.8	99.6
Ukraine	-	-	-	-	-

Overall, in all Commonwealth countries by 31 August, grain and leguminous crops have been threshed on 52.5 million hectares (94 percent of mowed area). The threshed yield from this area amounted to 123.7 million

tonnes of grain in initial book weight, or on average 23.5 quintals per hectare. Last year by 2 September there were 125.6 million tonnes threshed, or 18.0 quintals per hectare of threshed area.

In all Commonwealth states (except Tajikistan) average threshed yield of grain by the end of August was higher than last year. The highest threshed yield was in Moldova—33.9 quintals, Belarus—31.0, and Kyrgyzstan—27.3 quintals per hectare of threshed area. In Russia on average the grain yield was 21.7 quintals per hectare, which is 4.5 quintals more than by this time last year.

Based on the area of winter and spring crops and emerging threshed yield per hectare in the Commonwealth countries, one may expect that the total harvest this year will amount to approximately 175 million tonnes (in weight after additional processing), that is, on the level of 1988. In Russia the production of grain is expected to be 93-96 million tonnes, in Ukraine—38-40

million, in Kazakhstan—24-26 million, in Belarus—approximately 5 million, and in Moldova—about 3 million tonnes.

As of 31 August overall in the Commonwealth 27 million tonnes of grain was procured for state reserves, which is four percent less than last year. The procured grain comprises 22 percent of the total threshed yield, as compared with 23 percent by this time last year and 35 percent on average during 1986-1990. During the week (24-31 August) 2.6 million tonnes of grain was delivered to procurement centers, of which 1.8 million tonnes was delivered in Russia. Below is the data on grain procurement in the Commonwealth states (as of 31 August, in thousands of tonnes):

	Grain Threshed (in initial book weight)	Grain Delivered to Procurement Centers		Share of Procured Grain of the Total Threshed Volume, Percent	Reference: Procured Grain as a Percentage of the Total Threshed Yield as of 2 September 1991
		Total	In One Week (24-31 August)		
Azerbaijan*	1,245	276	6	23	22
Armenia	43	31.5	8.5	74	44
Belarus	7,340	1,346	68	21	15
Kazakhstan	5,569	1,199	196	22	13
Kyrgyzstan	1,006	76	13	8	7
Moldova	1,399	255	4	18	14
Russia	68,977	13,482	1,840	20	22
Tajikistan*	159	7	0.6	4	9
Turkmenistan	519	182	4	35	17
Uzbekistan*	1,244	520	19	42	15
Ukraine	-	-	-	-	-

Overall in the Commonwealth as of 24 August, procurement of potatoes amounted to 335,000 tonnes, and of vegetables—2,597,000 tonnes, which is below the volume of these products' procurement as of this date last year by 266,000 tonnes, or 44 percent, and by 1,198,000 tonnes, or 32 percent, respectively. The procurement of potatoes exceeded last year's level only in Belarus (by six percent) and in Turkmenistan (by 10 percent). A considerable decline in the volume of potato procurement was registered in Russia (by 60 percent) and Kazakhstan (by 56 percent); and that of vegetables in Moldova (by 55 percent), Tajikistan (by 53 percent), Kazakhstan (by 52 percent), Kyrgyzstan (by 50 percent), and Russia (by 43 percent).

Laying in fodder is underway everywhere; however, the protracted drought had a negative effect on the results of this work. By 31 August, agricultural enterprises in

Russia laid in 27 percent less fodder (calculated in feed units) than by that date last year; in Tajikistan—29 percent less, and in Belarus—22 percent less. As of that date, there has been only 8.5 quintals of feed units laid in per absolute head of cattle in Russia (last year—10.3 quintals); in Tajikistan—5.0 quintals (8.0); and in Belarus—8.6 quintals (11.0).

In most Commonwealth countries in July, the volume of output of animal husbandry products continued to decline. Overall in the Commonwealth, the agricultural enterprises this July produced 23 percent less meat, seven percent less milk, and 21 percent fewer eggs than in July of last year.

The output of animal husbandry products during the past seven months in the Commonwealth states is shown by the following data:

	Meat (Cattle and Fowl) Sold for Slaughter in Live Weight		Milk		Eggs	
	Thousands of Tonnes	As a Percentage of January-July of 1991	Thousands of Tonnes	As a Percentage of January-July of 1991	Millions of Units	As a Percentage of January-July of 1991
Azerbaijan*	40	65	130	70	140	80
Armenia	8.1	47	8.9	61	70	37
Belarus	662	79	2,683	82	1,223	93
Kazakhstan	580	73	1,694	77	1,351	84
Kyrgyzstan	60	78	230	72	212	87
Moldova	118	68	535	85	329	73
Russia	4,107	77	20,294	84	18,700	88
Tajikistan	29	70	136	81	165	65
Turkmenistan	44	81	114	98	117	91
Uzbekistan	142	75	520	91	593	66
Ukraine	1,900	80	8,500	78	4,700	80
Total CIS	7,690	77	34,845	82	27,600	86

The procurement of animal husbandry products has declined. During the past seven months overall in the Commonwealth states, state procurement amounted to 7 million tonnes of cattle and fowl (in live weight), 29.2 million tonnes of milk, and 20 billion units of eggs. This is less than the quantities procured in January-July of last year: cattle and fowl—by 2.8 million tonnes, or 28 percent; milk—by 10.4 million tonnes (26 percent); and eggs—by 7.1 billion units (26 percent). A decline in the volume of procurement of animal husbandry products has been registered in all Commonwealth states.

In the Commonwealth countries, finished construction of residential housing and social-cultural facilities is mainly performed (61-95 percent) by state enterprises and organizations. In January-July they put into operation residential housing with a total living area of 16 million square meters, general education schools to accommodate 110,000 students, preschool facilities with a capacity for 55,000 children, hospitals with 5,000 beds, and outpatient and polyclinic facilities with a capacity for 25,000 visits per shift.

As compared with January-July of last year, the volume of finished housing construction in Russia has declined by 30 percent, in Kyrgyzstan—by 33 percent, and in Belarus—by 28 percent; that of preschool facilities—by 33 percent, 30 percent, and three percent, respectively; of hospitals—by 46 percent, 65 percent, and 76 percent, and of polyclinics—by 40 percent, 36 percent, and 53 percent, respectively. Construction of general education schools in Russia declined by 24 percent, and in Kyrgyzstan—by 55 percent; in Belarus it increased by a factor of 1.6.

In January-July, the volume of loaded cargo on general use railroads amounted to 1.768 billion tonnes (103 percent of the railroads' total target volume). As compared with the corresponding period of last year, the total load declined by 14 percent, or by 291 million tonnes. The seven-month targets have not been met by the railroads in Armenia (61 percent); Turkmenistan (91 percent), and Uzbekistan (97 percent); somewhat below targets were the railroads in Azerbaijan (99.6 percent) and Kazakhstan (99.8 percent). In July the total load amounted to 236 million tonnes—a 19-percent decline as compared with July of last year, although the monthly target was fulfilled by 102 percent overall by all railroads of the Commonwealth countries taken as a whole.

In July in all Commonwealth countries, the decline of physical volume of retail turnover continued, while at the same time in terms of value, the volume has increased. Overall in the Commonwealth in July, the physical volume of trade turnover fell by 31.4 percent, or by R19 billion as compared with July of last year, while as expressed in monetary value it increased by a factor of 6.6 (by R337.6 billion). Thus, the entire increase of the value-based volume of trade turnover was caused by retail price increases.

During January-July the volume of trade turnover in the Commonwealth amounted to R1.7602 trillion and has exceeded the level of the same period of last year in actual prices by R1.4237 trillion (by a factor of 5.2). At the same time, R1.5517 trillion worth of trade turnover (88.2 percent) was the result of higher prices; in comparable prices, trade turnover declined by R128 billion (by 38 percent).

The data on the retail turnover in state and cooperative trade in January-July of this year in the Commonwealth states is shown on following page.



	Billions of Rubles, in Current Prices		As a Percentage of Corresponding Period of 1991			
	January-July	July	in actual prices		in comparable prices	
			January-July	July	January-July	July
Azerbaijan*	13.9	3.0	295	402	34	37
Armenia	5.9	1.1	176	193	27.2	28.9
Belarus	87.0	21.2	574	767	70.6	80.1
Kazakhstan	69.3	15.1	410	505	58.7	59.2
Kyrgyzstan	10.0	1.7	308	297	36.4	32.8
Moldova	19.3	3.8	390	380	44.2	49.3
Russia	1,132.1	241.0	546	652	60.3	67.4
Tajikistan	8.1	1.4	274	290	33.9	28.1
Turkmenistan	10.2	2.0	363	423	63.1	63.7
Uzbekistan	43.7	8.7	320	400	56.7	72.5
Ukraine	354	98	584	851	75	81

Many goods continue to be in short supply. Among food products these include sugar, fish products, rye flour, wheat bread, and relatively low-priced pasta products; in a number of regions they include meat, butter, and vegetable oil. There is a continuing shortage of many wardrobe items: leather shoes, clothing, and hosiery.

As of 1 August of this year, the retail trade had R579.6 billion worth of inventory. The total inventory was equal (calculated on the basis of July daily turnover) to 50 shopping days' supply, as compared with 31 days in the beginning of the current year and 59 days as of 1 July.

In January-July the volume of *paid services* amounted to R190.7 billion, or, in actual prices, 3.9 times more than last year. In physical volume, however, the volume of services declined by 40 percent, since almost 85 percent (more than 88 percent in July) of their volume was generated through increased prices and fees for services.

According to a selective survey conducted by statistical organs of Russia, in July of this year tailor and cobbler shops, as well as public baths and hair salons, lost about

one-third of their clientele as compared with July of last year because of high prices; enterprises engaged in repairs of housing, television and radio equipment, and appliances lost more than one-half of their clientele.

In July retail prices on consumer goods continued to rise in all Commonwealth countries; as compared with July of last year, prices have increased on average by a factor of 9.6, and overall for January-July as compared with the same period of last year—by a factor of 8.4.

In a number of states in July the greatest increases were registered in prices for food products. For instance, in Azerbaijan the price index on food products was 138 percent as compared with June, while on nonfood products it was 112 percent; in Belarus—117 percent and 108 percent, respectively; in Kazakhstan—116 percent, and 111 percent; and in Kyrgyzstan—111 percent and 108 percent. In Russia during July prices rose almost equally with respect to both food and nonfood items—by 7.4-7.9 percent.

The dynamics of retail trade prices is shown below (in percents):

	January-July of 1992 as Compared With January-July of 1991	July of 1992 as Compared With	
		July 1991	June 1992
Azerbaijan*	859	1,074	123.5
Armenia	692	729	110.0
Belarus	777	957	112.5
Kazakhstan	690	853	113.9
Kyrgyzstan	829	988	109.0
Moldova	907	865	100.6
Russia	891	967	107.7
Tajikistan	667	1,011	113.0
Turkmenistan	595	665	102.7
Uzbekistan	558	556	106.7
Ukraine	796	1,054	129.5

At the city markets in July there was a seasonal decline in prices: As compared with June, prices in the Commonwealth on average declined by nine percent, but were higher than those in July of last year by a factor of 5.3. In Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan, Azerbaijan, and Turkmenistan July prices at city markets were four to 10 percent lower than those during the preceding month; in Russia—by 13 percent; in Armenia, Moldova, and Uzbekistan—by 25-27 percent; at the same time, prices at city markets in Tajikistan rose by seven percent, and in Belarus—by 16 percent.

As compared with June, in July of this year the range of increases in prices and fees for paid services was as low as by a factor of 3.8 in Turkmenistan and as high as by a factor of 12.4 in Armenia.

In the Commonwealth states the pace of the increase of the *nominal monetary income of the populace* lags behind that of *increases in prices that consumers pay for goods and services* (calculated on the basis of changes in the cost of the family consumer basket), which is supported by the data for the first six months of this year (as compared with the first half of 1991, by a factor of):

	Consumer prices <sup>a</sup>	Per Capita Monetary Income	Wage per One Working Person	Pensions	Stipends	Ratio Between Price Increases and Increases of			
						Monetary Income	Wages	Pensions	Stipends
Azerbaijan	8.1	2.6	4.4	2.3	4.2	3.1	1.8	3.5	1.9
Armenia	—	1.8	3.0	2.3	-	-	-	-	-
Belarus	8.7	5.3	7.4	4.7	6.1	1.6	1.2	1.9	1.4
Kazakhstan	6.8	4.0	6.4	3.2	5.8	1.7	1.1	2.1	1.2
Kyrgyzstan	9.0	3.1	4.0	2.6	3.0	2.9	2.3	3.5	3.0
Moldova	11.2	3.7	6.1	4.6	4.4	3.0	1.9	2.4	2.5
Russia	11.4	5.6	8.1	4.9	4.4	2.0	1.4	2.3	2.6
Tajikistan	7.8	2.7	4.6	3.4	-	2.9	1.7	2.3	-
Turkmenistan	6.6	4.3	4.8	3.6	3.8	1.5	1.4	1.8	1.7
Uzbekistan	5.1	3.3	4.3	3.6	4.6	1.6	1.2	1.4	1.1
Ukraine	-	7.0	-	4.6	3.9	-	-	-	-

In June, as compared with January 1992, wages (including financial assistance, social benefits, and dividends)

in the Commonwealth countries rose on average three-fold; the dynamics are characterized by the following:

	Average Monthly Wages Per Worker, in Rubles					As a Percentage of the Corresponding Period of 1991		
	January-March	April-June	Including			January-March	April-June	June
			April	May	June			
Azerbaijan	780	1,330	-	1,009	1,767	467	425	552
Armenia	569	1,150	794	853	1,206	261	309	240
Belarus	1,863	3,710	2,775	3,674	4,679	621	824	914
Kazakhstan	1,421	2,887	2,096	2,709	3,689	516	732	751
Kyrgyzstan	882	1,322	1,093	1,191	1,641	356	433	506
Moldova	1,360	2,342	1,780	2,538	2,642	489	708	688
Russia	2,193	4,256	3,181	3,803	5,428	658	930	1,016
Tajikistan	808	1,411	1,045	1,327	1,955	385	506	560
Turkmenistan	1,288	1,502	-	-	-	528	439	-
Uzbekistan	793	1,438	1,229	1,388	1,708	371	480	550
Ukraine	2,042	4,275	-	-	-	785	1,188	-
Total CIS	1,970	3,870	-	-	-	649	916	-

The gap between the maximum (Russia) and minimum (Armenia) value of average wage was a ratio of 3.8:1 in the first quarter, and 4.5:1 in June.

In all the states the wage level in the social infrastructure sectors is noticeably lower (by a factor of 1.5-2.5) than in basic industries.

As compared with the corresponding period of last year, in January-July 1992 *monetary income of the population* (without counting the 40-percent compensation on deposits in savings banks in connection with the April 1991 retail price increases) increased as little as 1.8-fold in Armenia to as much as 5.8-fold in Belarus and 6.2-fold in Russia. Taking into account the aforementioned compensation, this increase ranged from 2.8-fold in Uzbekistan to 4.7-4.8-fold in Belarus and Russia.

The population's expenditures on purchases of goods and services, as compared with January-July of last year, increased as little as 1.9-fold in Armenia to as much as 5.2-fold in Russia and 5.6-fold in Belarus.

The cash part of the population's income, as compared with January-July of 1991, increased faster than the part consisting of savings in the form of deposits, bonds, and other securities. For instance, in Russia the rate of increase of the former changed from 6.5 percent to 23.8 percent,

and in Belarus—from 2.4 percent to 10.3 percent; at the same time, the rate of increase of savings in the form of deposits, bonds, and other securities declined from 28.6 percent to 4.5 percent, and from 30.8 percent to 8.4 percent, respectively.

The total cash in the hands of the population in January-July fluctuated from R3.3 billion in Moldova and Armenia, R10.4 billion in Turkmenistan, and R13.5 billion in Belarus, to R461.6 billion in Russia. Overall in the Commonwealth, the total cash in the hands of the population was estimated to be R774.5 billion.

As of 1 August 1992, savings banks' branches in the Commonwealth states attracted R147.8 billion in *individual deposits*, or twice as much as during the corresponding period of last year. The largest increase of deposits was registered in Ukraine (2.9-fold) and Kazakhstan (2.2-fold).

By the end of July, 1.3 million *people searching for work* were registered in the Commonwealth states. Of them, about 350,000 were qualified as unemployed; 200,000 were receiving unemployment benefits.

An increase in the number of unemployed in the current year is noticeable in practically all Commonwealth states, which can be seen from the following data:

	January	February	March	April	May	June	July
Azerbaijan	4.9	5.5	7.0	7.9	7.2	7.2	6.8
Belarus	2.6	3.4	4.2	5.1	5.8	7.1	9.7
Kazakhstan	4.5	6.7	9.2	11.8	13.6	15.8	19.6
Kyrgyzstan	0.2	0.3	0.5	0.7	0.8	0.8	1.1
Moldova	-	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.6	0.9
Russia	69.2	93.1	118.4	151.0	176.5	202.9	248.0
Tajikistan	-	-	-	0.5	1.3	3.5	3.6

The main source of increases in the ranks of the unemployed are workers and office workers laid off due to reductions in force at enterprises and organizations. In Russia, for instance, by the end of July, 100,000 people laid off from enterprises for the reason of reducing excess labor force received the status of unemployed (in the beginning of the year there were 24,000); in Belarus, the figures were 5,800 (1,100) people. The number of persons receiving the status of unemployed is increasing equally fast on the account of those laid off at enterprises in Moldova and Kazakhstan.

In addition, a common practice in some industry sectors is to send employees on a forced leave without (or with partial) pay, as well as transferring employees to a part-time work schedule. According to a survey conducted at enterprises and organizations of the Russian Federation, in June there were about 1 million such "nonworking employees."

Enterprises' need for labor declared with the employment service is declining:

	January	February	March	April	May	June	July
Azerbaijan	16.1	13.6	13.1	11.8	11.0	12.7	12.0
Belarus	50.4	40.2	33.4	29.5	29.7	31.4	26.8
Kazakhstan	58.1	48.7	45.3	50.6	52.8	55.0	51.9
Kyrgyzstan	5.7	4.3	3.3	3.5	4.0	4.6	4.7
Moldova	-	3.4	2.9	2.9	2.6	1.8	1.6
Russia	570.1	489.6	450.6	408.4	400.2	397.9	376.7
Tajikistan	0.8	1.5	3.1	2.2	2.2	3.0	2.6

It is expected that by the end of 1992 the number of those registered with the employment services in the Commonwealth states will exceed 1 million, while their total number (including those not registered with the aforementioned services) will approach 4 million.

**Explanation of notations: \* CIS Committee for Statistics' estimate - data not available (not submitted)**

**CIS Committee for Statistics**

**The telephone number for contacting the CIS Committee for Statistics is (095) 207-42-37. This number may be used to order statistical reviews, compendiums, and reference materials on the topics of interest; also available is an ongoing contract service that provides access to automated statistical information databases.**

## POLITICAL AFFAIRS

**Smena Leader on Prospects for Congress**

934C0190A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 28 Oct 92 p 2

[Article by A. Z.: "Smena Has Buried Gaydar"]

[Text] According to Andrey Golovin, leader of the Smena parliamentary faction, amendments to the current Russian Federation Constitution should become the main issue of the coming Russian congress. This is especially true with respect to the part describing the relations between the Supreme Soviet and the government. The new law on government that has not yet been in fact passed by the parliament should, according to Golovin, become the basis for such amendments. The Smena faction leaders see the resignation of the current cabinet of Yegor Gaydar as a fait accompli. "This government has no moral reasons to remain in power," said Andrey Golovin yesterday at a news conference given by his faction. However, it was clarified later that the pronouncement referred primarily to the structure of the government but to "some key figures" only. According to the faction leaders who represent the interests of the Civic Union in the Russian Supreme Soviet, these ministers will either resign voluntarily or will be fired by the congress. The faction members do not exclude the possibility of the president himself firing some of the cabinet members; they even find this idea most preferable.

Golovin thinks that the congress will discuss as the second issue (which follows from the first) the possibility of forming a coalition government. In the event the president and major opposition forces manage to come to an agreement at the congress, the only thing to do will be to approve the new prime minister. The rest will be completed by the Supreme Soviet.

Smena coordinator Igor Muravyev called the rumors of a possible "soft dismantling" of the Supreme Soviet and of the congress a provocation "aimed at scaring the parliament." "If the president and some others decide to do this," said Valeriy Shuynov, faction coordinator for security, "such a step will be unequivocally understood as a coup-d'etat."

**Aksyuchits on Course, Role of RCDM**

933C0168A Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English  
No 34, 23-30 Aug 92 p 14

[Interview with Viktor Aksyuchits, Chairman of the Duma (Council) of the RCDM, by Tatyana Mikhailskaya]

[Text] The Russian Christian Democratic Movement (RCDM) subscribes to the ideology of "enlightened patriotism." Mass consciousness, however, does not go deep into ideological subtleties and simply divides political players into "democrats" and "patriots." Viktor

Aksyuchits is a figure prominent on the "patriotic" flank, although here he enjoys the reputation of being "very moderate." Perhaps for some this sounds like a compliment, but only for those who are not "true patriots." In their eyes, the Russian People's Assembly (RPA), born of the alliance of Kadets (Constitutional Democrats) and Demochristians, looks like an unreliable movement, to put it mildly: in the past—discrediting ties with Democratic Russia, at present—estrangement from the actions of the Ostankino-confrontation type, in future—who knows...

The future, incidentally, is a matter for special consideration. Because the minimum programme—"down with the existing regime!"—which its countdown must begin with, tends to reconcile all differences in the opposition camp. And no matter how far the "enlightened" should try to keep aloof from the "less enlightened," today they are marching side by side. But who will forge ahead tomorrow?

[MOSCOW NEWS] You keep emphasizing that the RCDM and the RPA hold a special place in the political spectrum. What does this consist of?

[Aksyuchits] First and foremost, it is the fact that neither the RCDM nor the RPA is genetically connected with any structures inherited from the old regime. Nearly all the parties—Travkin's, Ruskoi's, the republican, etc.—have in one way or another grown out of the CPSU, which cannot be said about us. Secondly, the RCDM is a party more deeply rooted than all the others in traditional guidelines and ideals. It has always advocated the rebirth of the traditions of Russian statehood and has therefore worked and is working for a future Russia. The present regime has done all it could for the bulk of the population to be impoverished. This is excellent soil for the spread of ultra-right and ultra-left ideologies. We, historians, political scientists and philosophers who have set up the RCDM, are trying to counter this danger with the alternative of reviving national statehood.

[MOSCOW NEWS] And still, in what way do you differ, for example, from Sterligov's Russian National Sobor (RNS)?

[Aksyuchits] Again it's a genetic difference. Sterligov is a major-general of the KGB and his idea of a sobor amounts to yet another attempt at parasitizing on patriotic ideals. What is there in common between sobornost and his idea about the transfer of power to Soviets at all levels? This is Bolshevism pure and simple. As is, incidentally, the establishment of a Worker Guard. Properly speaking, they have borrowed our terminology—Duma, Sobor, etc.—and are using it to designate their structures and objectives which have nothing in common with traditional statehood. We do not want to have anything to do either with Anpilov, who acts as a front for the personnel, finances and structures of the CPSU, or with Sterligov because this is also neo-Bolshevism under national-patriotic slogans.



[MOSCOW NEWS] Nevertheless you have repeatedly said that you are in favour of joint action with communists. And the Russian Unity parliamentary bloc, bringing "left" and "right" deputies together, was set up on your initiative.

[Aksyuchits] This is normal. Today communists also represent the opposition which the ruling regime has deprived of the freedom of speech and the press. And as a convinced democrat, I shall fight for the freedom of speech not only for myself but also for my political opponents.

[MOSCOW NEWS] Honestly, the opposition's claims of having been denied the freedom of speech seem somewhat exaggerated if one remembers the number of fully legal and mass opposition newspapers, including PRAVDA, SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, DEN, etc. The RCDM, incidentally, also has its own newspaper and its own magazine.

[Aksyuchits] The circulation of our newspaper PUT is only 20,000 copies. It does not pay its way and local bodies have made it impossible for readers to subscribe to this newspaper, whereas Rospechat (the official press distribution agency) has refused to circulate it.

[MOSCOW NEWS] The same problems confront all newspapers. As far as circulations are concerned, in the past, as I remember, the publications not favoured by the authorities were circulated from hand to hand in xeroxed copies. Today, however, they are all sold freely in kiosks and underground passages.

[Aksyuchits] You forget that our state wants to become democratic and is for the first time perhaps in a position to give a start to a multiparty system. Yeltsin has even promised to allot part of the CPSU's finances for the development of this system. Where is this money? At best, it has gone to the parties which have grown out of the CPSU. We, however, still have no office of our own, although the RCDM is not a marginal force and is represented in parliament. In the rest of the world it is this that serves as a criterion for rendering state aid to parties.

[MOSCOW NEWS] Do you know the number of your followers?

[Aksyuchits] It is easier to name the number of participants—12,000 persons. But it is difficult to judge about followers because we live in a state of information blockade. In any democratic country state-owned television grants an hour or two a day to the opposition. It is only with great difficulties, however, that we have been able to secure an hour once a week. Broad strata of society are simply unaware of our programme.

[MOSCOW NEWS] The use of state TV channels by the opposition is at least a moot point if it doesn't come to an election campaign. But let's return to your supporters. Are you sure that they follow you, subscribing to the

ideas of Christian democracy and "enlightened patriotism" and not merely the slogan of "down with the bad government?"

[Aksyuchits] Your apprehensions are not groundless. Social discontent keeps mounting, and we see our task in not letting it assume uncivilized forms. There is a need to intercept the initiative from extremist forces.

[MOSCOW NEWS] You were not very successful in doing this at the Congress of Civil and Patriotic Forces when the Russian People's Assembly was set up.

[Aksyuchits] As I have already said, since we have no genetic roots in old structures, we have neither political personnel nor material facilities and finances. And it is more difficult for us to organize an activity than it is, say, for Travkin or Rutsnoi. What happened at the Congress? Democrat Murashev refused to provide protection. As a result, Pamyat staged a provocation and tried to throw us from the rostrum. We were compelled to give the floor to Vasilyev so that his supporters would leave the hall. I must say, however, that all that time such a forum could not proceed without a certain breakdown. Because that was the first attempt at giving vent to the ideological doctrine of reviving national statehood which is, in effect, still underground.

[MOSCOW NEWS] Today the RPA is calling for the resignation of the government and the President, whereas the RCDM intends you as a candidate to the main post in the state. How do you visualize the process of power being changed?

[Aksyuchits] The rebirth of Russian traditions also spells a renunciation of the revolutionary, violent methods of political struggle. It is the Congress that must make the President resign. And it is also up to the Congress to form an emergency body for running the country—like a national conciliation government, a national salvation committee or a state council—for the period until all disputed issues have been decided. Only after this will it be possible to hold general elections in which I will be prepared to run for the presidency.

[MOSCOW NEWS] But what if the Congress is reluctant to send Yeltsin into retirement?

[Aksyuchits] We shall do everything in our power to help it make this step. The situation is such that a social explosion is inevitable in the autumn or winter. And it is most frightening if it assumes "wild" forms. Therefore, we shall initiate mass demonstrations at the Kremlin during the Congress and try to intercept the initiative. We are in a position to wield influence on the strike movement as well.

[MOSCOW NEWS] That is, you are already preparing to arouse people for mass protests, aren't you? Don't you think that thereby you are revoking a social explosion?

[Aksyuchits] No, we simply see that this process will start rolling in one way or another. But if its leadership has been taken over by Anpilov, this will bring about colossal destructions.

[MOSCOW NEWS] But Anpilov will, after all, stand next to you. And so will Sterligov. The "street" will go to topple the government, not drawing a line between the "clean" and the "unclean." But will it support you when it comes to the distribution of authority?

[Aksyuchits] This is already Yeltsin's headache—it is his policy that has resulted in the ideas of communist revenge being popular in society. And we are the only ones who represent a force which has put up a real fight against those advocating the restoration of the totalitarian regime. Moreover, the "street" can topple the government, but it doesn't form it. We want the Congress to adopt the necessary decisions precisely because there are no extremists and revenge-seekers at this level of policy.

[MOSCOW NEWS] How do you intend to act upon coming to power?

[Aksyuchits] Today I can only speak about the actions of that emergency body which must extricate the country from catastrophe. Of course, the methods it will use will be tough. It will not be able to do without imposing an emergency economic situation. All attempts at revising borders will be cut short with legitimate yet strong measures to avoid a state when everyone is at war with everyone else. With the republics which have left Russia, there will be a need to go over to world prices in trade and establish borders and customs houses. For those who are still geared to Russia, it will become necessary to arrive at integration first in the economy and culture, and only then in the political field.

[MOSCOW NEWS] Is it possible to speak about integration while offering a tough policy to neighbours?

[Aksyuchits] When blood is being shed, tough measures are the most humane ones. The ring of war is already tightening around Moscow. And without a strong state, this one-sixth of the globe will fall into a black hole.

[MOSCOW NEWS] The RPA includes representatives from all the Cossack armies. These are people with weapons in hand. Aren't you afraid that today these weapons will be used against the existing authorities, but tomorrow they may be turned against you?

[Aksyuchits] Unless the emergency measures I have spoken about have been adopted, these weapons will definitely be put to use both against the government and in intestine strife. As regards the future, why should these weapons be turned against us if we offer an acceptable policy?

[MOSCOW NEWS] But still, why don't you act hand in glove with the Civil Union with which you have so much

in common, but play dangerous games with those who are not particularly worried about whether their actions are civilized?

[Aksyuchits] This is a very touchy question. Of course, in a purely human way, it would be more desirable to have to deal with centrists instead of communists. But, regrettably, our centrists are being guided not by the interests of national statehood, but by political ambitions. Before the 6th Congress, we came to understand that we had to go into the opposition to the existing regime, but neither Rutskoi nor Travkin supported us. I remember Travkin telling me: "You are using the government's weaknesses to score points." Today he himself repeats almost word for word our claims about the regime. But the latter has already managed to make such a mess that it is becoming increasingly difficult to stop it. Our centrists, however, refuse to accept any dialogue with us.

[MOSCOW NEWS] In the 1970s, you were a dissident. today too you act against the authorities. What is it—a trait of your character, or has nothing changed in our world?

[Aksyuchits] I think it's a trait of the epoch. I came to politics not in order to be a dissident, and I would be glad to serve the President if he faithfully served the Motherland. Last August, I defended him at the Russian Federation building. But it is the second echelon of the nomenklatura, undemocratic and mercenary as it is, that has come to power under the flag of democracy. Today it is engaged in the pursuit of an antistate and antinational policy. As an honest person I cannot be loyal to it.

#### MN FILE

Viktor Vladimirovich Aksyuchits was born in 1949 in Western Byelorussia. He graduated from a nautical school and served in the Navy. In 1971, he joined the CPSU but quit the party in 1972 for ideological reasons. Also, at that time, he entered the preparatory course of Moscow University and then joined its department of philosophy. There he took interest in Christianity. He was admitted to the postgraduate course, from which he was expelled a year later for political motives. He worked as a seasonal worker in Siberia and the Soviet Far East. In the late 1970s, he was actively busy with "samizdat." Since September 1987, he has brought out, along with Gleb Anishchenko, a poet and literary critic, the religious-philosophic magazine VYBOR (Choice) around which the RCDM has been formed. In 1990, he was elected a people's deputy of the Russian Federation. He is a member of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet's Committee on Religious Liberty, Creed, Mercy and Charity; he was nominated to the post of Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation. He heads publishing activities at the PUICO Russian-American joint venture and has printed works in all European languages.

**Commentary on Draft Version of 'Civic Union' Political Program**

934C0150A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 20 Oct 92 p 1

[Commentary by Vladimir Todres: "Is 'Civic Union' Making Promises on the Eve of Coming to Power?"]

[Text] Up to now the political program of "Civic Union" has been a "document not for publication"; the text, which existed in less than ten copies, was in the possession of only the top persons of this bloc. Even now it cannot be considered as officially published; the draft which was distributed on Saturday to quite a large circle of the bloc's functionaries is still subject to discussion.

This declaration on the bloc's strategic plans, moreover, is not marked by any particular innovation. Brief but completely programmatic statements by the GS ["Civic Union"] regarding various aspects of Russian life have been appearing until very recently just about every week. And they frequently just state the indisputable fact that it is better to be rich and healthy than poor and ill. The new document has attracted attention primarily by its scale and scope.

The GS program designates the following as its principal goals: "completing the construction of a democratic system," "making the transition to a market-type economy and integrating it with the world economy," "unconditionally preserving Russia's integrity" and its "active, consolidating role within the CIS." The GS reaffirms its own partiality for the "parliamentary-presidential" form of rule and the land principle for structuring the Russian Federation. Citing the liquidation of the USSR as the "greatest miscalculation of Russia's present-day leadership," and the post-Soviet spaces—Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan—as the principal whales, the program insists on strengthening the Community, i.e., the CIS, on a confederative basis. (However, the GS has to stipulate that a confederation can only be created by those who want one.)

As to world policy, the GS advocates a "multipolar world" and does not particularly like the "present-day situation in which the United States has come close to exercising a political monopoly."

As usual, the "Civic Union" says little or nothing about the specific routes to the Promised Land described by it. Moreover, it seems that in the present case this is not even necessary. The present political distribution compels us to assume that the supporters of GS—one way or another—will have a majority in the Deputies' Congress to be held in December. The program, which—in all likelihood—will be published just before the Congress, will be most alike a last pre-election speech—with a full assortment of candidates' promises....

On Saturday the Board of the Democratic Party of Russia had already approved the ideology of the draft and advised that work be continued on the latter; it

seemed to the DPR [Democratic Party of Russia] people that the draft contained too few specifics. However, it looks as though the Travkin people will not be too recalcitrant when the time comes to adopt the program in its final form. And there is no doubt that this must be done very soon: The GS member-organizations are not inclined to support the president in his desire to postpone the Congress. "Nothing dreadful will occur at this Congress," one of the leading DPR politicians told your NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA correspondent. "According to our information, the GS controls a majority in the Supreme Soviet and at the Congress."

Meanwhile, the "Civic Union" assumes that it is capable of "maintaining" the situation in Russia even without those measures to strengthen the presidential power vertically—measures to which President Yeltsin is more and more inclined and which are supported in the "government camp." As stated in the draft program, "the need to adopt a constitution as soon as possible cannot serve as a justification for actions threatening to revive the authoritarian regime." And the DPR Board, after reminding the president that the time period until the end of 1992—on which a moratorium was proclaimed on elections—is about to expire, demanded that he call elections for the local soviets and the heads of local administrations as soon as possible.

**SDPR Chairman Orlov Responds to Criticism of Party Founder**

934C0129A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 15 Oct 92 p 2

[Article by Boris Orlov, chairman of the Social Democratic Party of Russia (SDPR): "Reply to Oleg Rumyantsev: It's a Bit Early To Bury the Social Democrats"]

[Text]

**There Is Such a Party**

Since one of the founders of the SDPR, Oleg Rumyantsev, has seen fit to deal with internal problems of the Russian Social Democrats on the pages of NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, it might be of interest to its readers to know how these problems are viewed by the SDPR chairman.

I would remind you of a well-known fact—that we have all worn coats of totalitarian cloth cut in the Bolshevik style. Three generations of Russians were unable to comprehend a political system operating under conditions of democracy. Nor has there been any underground movement in which political leaders might have been formed, so as to be ready, willing, and able to develop democratic processes once the totalitarian regime started to collapse. Truly democratic parties had to be created under most difficult conditions of opposition or rank indifference on the part of the new people in power. Energy and daring as well as ability were required to contend with an array of obstacles. The qualities of a charismatic leader were needed to create a following

among the people. All of these qualities were possessed by O. G. Rumyantsev as he applied his prodigious efforts to recreate in Russia the Social Democratic Party. Thanks initially to his efforts alone, one faction of the Moscow club "Perestroyka" was transformed into a party that now has more than a hundred regional organizations and about 350 Social Democrats in executive and legislative bodies at various levels, including the Russian government and the Russian parliament. Until May 1992 the party had three co-chairmen, but everybody knew that the "thrust" of the party was that of Oleg Rumyantsev.

Time passed, and the party grew as it gathered experience. Gradually, out of a group following its leader a genuine party began to emerge—that is, an organization living by its own rules, with centralized direction, with a mechanism for gaining feedback, and with a more complicated but at the same time more democratic means of reaching decisions through group discussion and deliberation. In effect, it was in the process of becoming a normal democratic organization, facing the task at the political level of addressing the interests of certain social groups in accordance with certain values, principles, and methods of operation characteristic of the Social Democrats.

Then we went through a period of what may be called "growing pains." Our recognized leader, preoccupied with the affairs of the parliamentary Constitutional Commission, while taking on additional responsibilities (including the problem of the Kurile Islands, internecine strife in Yugoslavia, and other hot spots), overlooked these new processes going on in the SDPR. As in the past, he thought himself capable of launching vital initiatives without prior approval of the party (such as a countersuit charging unconstitutional actions by the CPSU in the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation). Most important in my judgment, his opinions about the future of Russia began to reflect the policies of the power-holders of the right-wing conservative camp as opposed to those of the Social Democrats. In accordance with our platform, we stand for a social and democratic Russia with due regard for the rights of the individual as well as the rights of peoples and nationalities to self-determination.

All these factors together precipitated the situation that arose at the 16th Plenum of the SDPR when O. G. Rumyantsev, upon a motion by the chairman, was relieved of his duties as one of the party deputies.

What effect will this have on the future of our party? Only time will tell for certain the expediency of the decision that was taken. But in my judgment the party found the courage to transform itself to a new state of existence. The SDPR has now set for itself its future line of conduct—not in the blind pursuit of a leader but rather in strengthening that "web of party affiliation" at every level of society which O. G. Rumyantsev views as the shortcoming of the SDPR. Incidentally, other parties

have been unable to avoid this situation wherein the party image is associated in the public mind only with the names of its leaders.

O. G. Rumyantsev poses in his article a number of fundamentally important issues, one of which follows: Will these parties—the parties of the Liberals, the Christian Democrats, and the Social Democrats—"work" or "not work" in Russia? That is, are they viable? Or is it true, as he writes, that "the basic lines of differentiation among us in no way comparable to the above-mentioned labels but are conditioned by 'deep fissures' in our social outlook."

The thought expressed is a bit ambiguous, but let us try to analyze it; for the choice presented to us is almost Hamlet-like—to be imitators of the West or to be on our own. Let us acknowledge, first of all, that the names of the three political movements are not simply "labels"; for each of them represents more than a century of growth in determining its own values and ways of deciding things. The question is, are these values acceptable to us?

Let us take the Social Democrats. The pivotal idea of the party—social justice—runs throughout Russian history. The Bolsheviks tried to achieve it by first changing the base of society, but that is another matter. The Social Democrats propose to implement this idea by a method of achieving reform through compromise with due regard for the interests of disparate social groups. And what about the values of the Christian Democrats? Are they not deeply rooted here in the traditions of the Christian Orthodox Church, which have had a perceptible influence on the intellectual life of Russian society? Unfortunately, we see today exemplars of the Christian nationalist parties taking the place of the Christian Democrats. There is hope that this regressive tendency will be offset by those who should be guided by the Biblical dictum that "there is neither Jew nor Gentile."

Moreover, our Liberals have not had much success. Yet our unique circumstances—marked by a divergence of opinion between the value of liberty [svoboda] and its distinctively Russian interpretation as license [volya]—have been studied by the best Russian minds, whose deliberations have contributed to the establishment of a law-governed Russian state. I am thinking particularly of Verdanskiy. The effort originating in certain offices of the KGB to identify Liberals with charlatans has also been offset. Ultimately, Russia should be just as free as any other democratic nation without adulterants of any kind to make it "anything less than pure."

What other values could O. G. Rumyantsev have had in mind that reflect "deep fissures" in our social outlook? I should really like to know them. He maintains that it is his intention to undertake the daily tasks of government—as he puts it—for the health and well-being of Russia. But those who lay claim to leadership in this party with its intrinsic values are pledged to undertake this type of activity in conformity with the basic party



guidelines. It is easy to see in this regard that "the idea of statehood" is subject to different interpretations by democrats and militant nationalists.

Let me give you a specific example. O. G. Rummyantsev proposes to resolve problems of statehood on a territorial basis. This approach appeals to me. But the fact is that many peoples who have lived since time immemorial on Russian territory now want to acquire state sovereignty. What should be done about it? The position of the Social Democrats, as derived from its basic policy guidelines, is one of unfailing recognition of the rights of the individual, while at the same time assuring the right of each people to self-determination. The task is to realize these two demands through the administration of democratic policies. It is only realistic, however, to try to assess what sort of latent forces are influencing the course of events. Upon what grounds, for example, will relations be built with Tatarstan and the Chechen Republic, which have already declared their sovereignty, and with the other republics that have decided to go in that direction? The desired formula for establishing national statehood cannot be derived from the magic incantation of the word "federation" and federation alone. The art of politics lies not in immobilizing events but rather in working in advance of events, so as to turn them in the direction desired, while being acutely aware of the alternatives at one's disposal. Yeltsin's admonition "Take only as much sovereignty as you can control" held out the possibility of building the Russian state with due regard for existing diversity. It is extremely regrettable that it should have repudiated, as appears to be the case. Experience will nevertheless force us to return to it, if only under worsened circumstances.

The key to Rummyantsev's position, as he has worked it out, lies in integrating the values of democracy and patriotism. This is an important conclusion for our times. Yet here, once again, questions arise. What is meant by patriotism? What does it mean to love the people? And what people? Russians only or all the peoples living in Russia? From the standpoint of the interests of all peoples living in Russia, what problems require resolution? O. G. Rummyantsev views the Kuriles problem as the "focal point of all conflicts in the life of the new Russia." In my view, the Kuriles problem has been artificially inflated and belongs in the background by comparison with another problem, which is truly of extraordinary importance; it is also an extraordinarily explosive problem, requiring special attention on the part of all people who profess to love Russia. This is the problem of Russians and other Russian-speaking peoples who have begun in increasing numbers to leave areas of national conflict in neighboring countries. Let us not forget that there are on the order of 25 million of these people. What will happen if even half of them return to this country? Who will provide housing for these desperate people? Who will give them work? It is necessary to work out a trans-national program "Return" and our participation in carrying out, so that all of these people may feel that they are returning to the

motherland of their ancestors and that a warm reception awaits them. That, in my view, is a tangible manifestation of patriotism.

Another expression of patriotism would be to seek and find ways to resolve our paramount problem, which is the problem of Russia itself. For almost a century this country has been stuck in a morass of totalitarianism. How can we bring it back as rapidly as possible to the level of modern civilization? O. G. Rummyantsev supposes that we can come to terms with this problem "without shamefully begging at the doorstep of the International Monetary Fund or from the Japanese." At first impression, this may seem to be a proud assertion. But it is utterly divorced from reality and therefore not in the interests of Russia. In this same newspaper NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA I cited statistics of the former German Democratic Republic, where Western Germans, in an effort to put it back on its feet, were said to be investing 150 billion marks annually. On a more recent trip to Germany, which took place at the end of September, I learned of a revised figure—not 150 but 203 billion marks annually. Moreover, the GDR is no bigger than Moscow Oblast, and the level of its development cannot be compared with ours. In such a situation, one must not beg; still, it would be wise to make use of any opportunities that present themselves, including developing relations heretofore frozen with Japan, a great country in all respects, which, incidentally, demonstrates how to preserve a sense of national identity in an age of high technology. He who would play the "Kurile card," in a manner of speaking, is simply playing the fool. Such strategic ploys are at the level of parlor games.

At a meeting with German political scientists recently, I was asked to single out, of all the problems besetting us, the principal one that faces Russia today. After thinking it over, I replied: The absence of a competent elite, capable of functioning under the conditions of a market economy and representative democracy. We are confronted with the task of extricating ourselves from the morass of totalitarianism by relying for the most part on the economic nomenklatura and former CPSU members. It is therefore all the more encouraging to witness the arrival of a new generation of people who may be called politicians in the fullest sense of the word. One of the most outstanding and brilliant of these is O. G. Rummyantsev. He epitomizes the new type of political figure in Russia with all the pluses and minuses, which may be clearly seen in his article. Whatever path he may choose in the future is for him to choose. But he cannot succeed as a statesman without making clear the fundamental principles for which he stands.

As for the Russian Social Democrats, it is a little early to put them to rest. The party is just beginning to stand on its own feet. Moreover, its future is assured, and not because of the will of any one person, but because Russia, at last, fully intends to achieve the ends of social justice by civilized means: realistically, under democratic conditions, on the basis of compromise in reconciling disparate interests, while preserving our hopes for



a brighter future. This, I submit, is what lies at the heart of the principles and methods that O. G. Rumyantsev has seen fit to advocate in his article.

### **Reason for Nationalities Official Departure Disputed**

934C0190B Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 21 Oct 92 p 1

[Article by Radik Batyrshin: "The Goskomnats Chairman Is Leaving, but Problems Remain"]

[Text] The resignation of Valeriy Tishkov from his post could be viewed as absolutely unexpected if not... for his post. It seems that the State Committee on Nationalities [Goskomnats] was conceived to serve as a damper on ethnic differences in Russia. Besides, with the appearance of the Goskomnats those in power obtained a perfect "whipping boy" for such occasions when the government machine made an "ethnic" slip. But the committee ex-chairman started to want more, namely to have his ministry participate in all the decisions of the federal government concerning any aspect of ethnic policies. But there is no issue in Russia that does not have an ethnic coloration... So, the new minister who was responsible for everything but had neither any real powers nor even an adequate accommodation for the state committee, was practically doomed. Now we can sum up the results of his brief rule: For the first time an attempt was made to create a conceptual model of ethnic policy in Russia (we can argue about its quality); it was based on the amalgamation of state and ethnic/cultural autonomy institutions, while the "white collars" from the institute headed by Tishkov stood next to the helm of the real politics. Tishkov also supported the desire of former autonomies to enter into additional agreements with the federal government which were viewed as the logical continuation of the Federation agreement. As a result of all this he considerably raised his prestige among the leaders of the Russian republics.

The theory provided by ITAR-TASS states that his resignation was caused by his "failure" to resolve the problems of Russia's Germans. In spite of this theory, he was conducting negotiations related to these problems yesterday, acting as cochairman of the Russian-German commission.

### **Khasbulatov-Poltoranin Spar Over IZVESTIYA Dispute**

934C0124A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 13 Oct 92 p 1

[Article by Natalya Gorodetskaya based on ITAR-TASS reports: "Khasbulatov Vs. Poltoranin: The Struggle of the 'Giants of Democracy' Is About To Culminate"]

[Text]

### **Scandal**

The smooth progress of a meeting of the Presidium of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet was disrupted by Speaker Ruslan Khasbulatov, who stated that he had sent an official letter to President Boris Yeltsin demanding that Deputy Prime Minister Mikhail Poltoranin, minister of the press and mass media, be dismissed.

As Poltoranin commented in Bishkek on Friday on Khasbulatov's proposal to assume control over the newspaper IZVESTIYA, he called it a "fuse," a "detonator" which may trigger an explosion of the situation in Russia.

In Khasbulatov's opinion, the nature of Poltoranin's attacks against him in the press is "provocative and instigatory."

In response, Mikhail Poltoranin said that "they have always reciprocated," and that in his opinion "the voluntary resignation promised by the speaker would be more in line with the interests of Russia."

Poltoranin noted in a written statement to the press: "This is not an altercation. Faced with a profound crisis, all of us have a duty to pull together... Only a blind man will fail to discern the planned tactic aimed at weakening democratic institutions and reinforcing personal power behind the eccentric actions of Ruslan Khasbulatov... I would like to be mistaken, but it will be too late to discourse about anything if the Second Coming of Stalin happens."

Acting Chairman of the Government Yegor Gaydar refused to comment on the events. Gaydar said: "Given that Ruslan Khasbulatov sent a letter to the president, we should give the president an opportunity to make a decision first."

### **Security Ministry Operation Hits Flow of Contraband**

934C0124B Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA  
in Russian 16 Oct 92 p 2

[Article by KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA correspondent A. Nechayev: "Ministry of Security Warns: Peaceful 'TRAWLers' Are Tracking"]

[Text] Samara—Recently a report was made about yet another success of the Samara Administration of the Ministry of Security. A TU-154, board number 85750, which attempted to carry 12 tonnes of butter to Yerevan without a license, was apprehended. To be sure, it did not say that on the same day yet another plane leaving for Kutaisi was "caught." Vitaliy Khoroshanin, chief of the public liaison group of the Ministry of Security Administration sadly laid out before me a memorandum on the progress of operation "Trawl": "So much for you journalists. This is not what you should be writing about." There was everything in this memorandum—

Armenia, Georgia, Ukraine, Estonia, many tonnes of foodstuffs and tonnes of nickel, all of this coming from the half-starved Samara.

Perhaps we should be writing about what is not working out for them, the "Ministry of Security people."

The trampling of soldiers silently dashing forward, whose breathing merges into one, whose every move is endowed with menacing force by the objective set, is absent from their operations. Indeed, everything is simpler in this case, I would say, more civilized. Economic methods are used, but this makes it much more difficult. They are up against big money, and not only money.

So, the Volgoneft-145 [tanker] sailed little by little during a hot summer. Functionaries of the economic security service inquired at the shipping line: "Where are we sailing?" The answer was: "To Novorossiysk, in keeping with a contract with the small enterprise Ladya." The "Ministry of Security people" warned: "We know that this small enterprise from Samara has a contract to deliver fuel to Feodosiya (read: abroad), but it does not have a license." The answer was: "This cannot be," but a telegram to the vessel about "the impermissibility of unloading at a port other than that of the destination" was sent. Captain F. Klish grumbled: "This is an insult. I have been sailing for 15 years." And the ship sailed on.

This is how it sailed to the entrance to the Black Sea and stopped to ponder. Novorossiysk was four sailing hours away to the left, and Feodosiya four hours away to the right. This happened at the worst time in the morning—about 0400. The captain did not notice in the dark how he turned right although he had wanted to turn left, to be sure, not for political considerations. In Feodosiya they were welcomed with a gift of bread and lard. P. Ignatyev, representative of the small enterprise Inkas, came aboard, along with a bonus of 50,000 coupons.

The shipping line demanded: "Report the availability of the quota; do not unload." "Sure, we are waiting," responded the captain. Actually, he was only waiting for his turn behind the motor ship Veleko. General Director of the shipping line N. Strokin personally ordered: "Immediately raise anchor and proceed to Novorossiysk." At this very moment the tanker began to pump out fuel. On 22 June 1992: "Proceeding to Kerch with respect." See you later, guys. Even if the captain was maliciously sarcastic, he was entitled to it.

No criminal charges have been filed against him to this day, four months later. They cannot find the commercial director of the small enterprise Ladya. Nor would V. Merzlikin, general director of the same small enterprise and vice president of the Samara People's Consortium, ever have been held accountable for either the tanker or two trains of fuel sent to Ukraine under a forged license, or for anything at all, had it not been for, actually, chance. It is precisely the point that these people figure out the security of their "commercial" operations

soberly and accurately. All funds immediately disappeared from the account of the small enterprise Ladya, and there was nothing to collect from them. Yet, had the tax enforcers collected 420 million rubles [R] from the Volgotanker, the shipping line would have ground to a standstill. There would have been nothing to sail, and in the absence of wages, no crew either. They had to collect the fine in installments. So, who was punished? As usual, those who did not steal—honest river craft personnel and peaceful citizens.

So, why is the security service losing? They are failing to actually reconcile, with any degree of logic, edicts signed en route, on the gangway of a plane or on a tennis court, to at least somehow plug up the loopholes which have been either left or created in laws by crafty officials. Generally this is not their business; however, in the absence of this the dangerous work of many people becomes pointless.

Here is the last example. The Volgotanker got itself a rich client, the AND company from Moscow, which asked to carry as much as 50,000 tonnes of diesel fuel. The people from Samara, wised up after bitter experiences in the market, agreed to carry 4,500 tonnes in one tanker for starters. Kaliningrad was the destination. However, there was a small detail: The Volgoneft-215 was to sail only to St. Petersburg, and "transload to a floating vessel" there. This is where they began to hit snags.

The Latvian tanker Auseklis turned out to be the "floating vessel." It did not enter the port, but instead asked that the Volgoneft-215 join it at the outer roadstead. However, customs did not allow the Russian tanker out without documents, all the more so because pumping oil across on high seas is risky; it may be spilled. MBR [Ministry of Security of Russia] functionaries suggested: "Far-away countries are waiting for this fuel." An assistant said: "Show them a contract with Kaliningrad and sail on in peace." Representatives of the AND company answered: "Right away!"

They searched for it in their pockets for about two weeks and—what a miracle!—a contract was found. The Kaliningrad Administration of the Refrigerator Fleet got lucky, and cheaply. Everyone heaved a sigh of relief. The Volgoneft-215 unloaded and went home. Customs did not even proceed to collect from the AND R50 million—the mortgage value of the cargo—and the Kaliningradskiy Neftyanik went to the roadstead of the port of Baltiysk to meet up with Auseklis.

A golden fish swam up to him and asked, toying with oil slicks on the water: "What do you need, old man? Pay \$178 per tonne to me, and the fuel will be yours." The people from Kaliningrad pleaded: "Have mercy. Mistress Fish! We have agreed on a payment in rubles, and one five times smaller at that." The fish said nothing, just wagged her tail and swam on to the North Sea. Customs grew alarmed: "Just where are you going? This is Russian fuel, our fuel." The Auseklis gave a reasonable answer to customs: "It was yours, and it has become

ours, and we are the territory of another state." To add insult to injury, the Russian diesel fuel was close to Amsterdam on the anniversary of the nonexistent Constitution of the nonexistent state.

What about fines, sanctions, and laws? Do they not apply to the Moscow company AND? The company does not give a damn about them, or you and me. Unfortunately, this is the most reliable way to build a reputation as a "respectable company" in Soviet "business."

At present, yet another tanker is sailing toward Kaliningrad. MBR functionaries are trying to read the diesel-fuel tea leaves to determine whether it will get there, because they know what kind of pressure the captain is under, and how many digits there are in the amounts he is being offered. The economic struggle is not any more merciful than class struggle, the difference being that in the former it is every man for himself, whereas the MBR functionaries are, for some reason, for the state. They are for the very state from which many are in a hurry to separate, and yet they work for that state. This word has even been removed from the name of their organization. Yet they naively believe that there still is a state.

#### Shootout Victim Interviewed

934C0189A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 27 Oct 92 p 2

[Article by Svetlana Shevchenko under the rubric "Information About the Details": "Murder Near the Kremlin: A Three-Minute Interview With a Man Shot With Five Bullets"]

[Text] It is common knowledge that an extraordinary event took place on 20 October. This event has given rise to innumerable and most improbable speculations, but so far only one fact has remained reliable: On the evening in question there was shooting on Bolshoy Cherkasskiy Lane, near the Kremlin. Some White House guards fell victim to the shooting: One of them was killed, another wounded, one more was detained.

The main drift of all the stories relating to this in the press has a political coloring: Russian Khasbulatov's armed force is raging and terrorizing peaceful citizens. Khasbulatov's "force" is the moniker for the Administration for the Defense of Sites of Higher State Power and Administration of Russia. Our newspaper described its true purpose on 20 October of this year.

Newspaper stories provide varying versions of the event, each one more improbable than the others. In general, they can be summarized as follows. Three men in civilian clothes (from the White House guards), who were not quite sober, detained and searched a man. They went through his pockets and beat him up; then a policeman showed up who gave a warning shot into the air and then practically emptied his gun at the guards.

Here is what the victim says. Vladimir Nikitin, one of the guards, was buried 23 October. Boris Markin,

another guard, is in the hospital of the Institute imeni Sklifosofskiy with multiple gunshot wounds. As soon as he regained consciousness he gave his consent to tell our newspaper about the events.

Because his condition is very serious I was allowed to see him for only three minutes, and not allowed to ask "unnecessary" questions. I talked to him in the presence of the security guards who were guarding his room from any uninvited visitors (on 22 October a huge, 6-foot drunken character tried to barge into his room). The victim had trouble speaking. To gain a better understanding of the events I have provided some explanations in parentheses.

"Me and my two colleagues (Trofimov and Nikitin) went to the cafeteria to have some supper after work (it is located on Bolshoy Cherkasskiy Lane). We turned in our guns when we finished work. In the cafeteria a man approached us (Ermekev). He was holding a package in his hand and he wanted to sell us some "grass." My friend said to him: "Get away from here." He started walking around the cafeteria, going to various other tables and offering grass to everyone. Then my friends went out into the glassed-in entryway and called for me. They said that the "seller" did not have his package any more and that he must have sold the grass. I came into the entryway, took this man (Ermekev) by the hand and said: "Come with me." I showed him my ID and did an external search, without looking into his pockets. At this time Nikitin started a conversation with an unknown man (Zykov, militia master sergeant) outside. I left the seller (Ermekev) with my other colleague (Trofimov) and went out to Nikitin. When he saw me, this man (Zykov) started running. He was stumbling and I thought he was not quite sober. Then he slipped and fell. We ran up to him and started helping him get up. Then he began shooting at us point-blank, without warning. First, he shot once or twice at my friend (Nikitin) who fell down (he died quickly). He immediately started shooting point-blank at me until his gun misfired. I fell down also and I saw the man (Zykov) replace the clip in his gun. At this time Trofimov came out and shouted: "What are you doing? Shooting at your own?" As it turned out, it was a militiaman (Zykov) who was shooting at us, but he did not have his cap on and was wearing a top jacket, so I did not see right away who he was. The man who did the shooting ran away. Trofimov called for an ambulance and the militia.

"I did not see anything else. Later, I found myself here. The doctor told me after the operation that I had been hit with five bullets; he counted nine gunshot wounds and four perforating wounds."

This is all of the story I could get in three minutes. It describes the situation differently from the way it was presented by our colleagues. In any case, this information came from someone who was a direct participant in the events, although it also raises a lot of questions. But they will probably be asked by the investigators now. The Baumanskiy Rayon Procuracy has started criminal proceedings.

We will keep you informed of any further developments in the case.

### **'Concern' Voiced at Servicemen's Involvement in Politics**

PM2710220392 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA  
in Russian 27 Oct 92 p 3

[Oleg Odnokolenko and Boris Soldatenko report: "Moscow Seems To Have Gotten Tired of Demonstrations"]

[Text] As was announced beforehand, last Saturday [24 October] was a day of rallies in Russia. According to Federation of Independent Trade Unions press service data, rallies and demonstrations took place in 60 cities in 55 of the country's regions on 24 October. The quite wide geographical spread of the all-Russian protest day organized by the trade unions is probably better evidence of the moods in society than any statistics. But, contrary to expectations, the largest mass actions did not take place in Moscow by a long shot. The rally in Krasnodar mustered 40,000 participants, and 10,000 people took to the streets in Novorossiysk and Tambov each.

According to data of the capital's Internal Affairs Main Administration public relations center, the nationwide assembly in Moscow organized by the Russian Communist Workers Party mustered no more than 5,000 people, who had with them 100 scarlet flags and 40 antigovernment placards. The assembly's aim, one of the 450,000 leaflets posted up said, is to express no confidence in Boris Yeltsin and approve the draft socialist constitution prepared by Russian Federation People's Deputy Yuriy Slobodkin. By the middle of the day no more than 150,000 people remained in Oktyabrskaya Square, who created no problems for the law and order organs. According to data of the Moscow Internal Affairs Main Administration, the White House defenders rally announced as an alternative rally was even smaller, which is why it did not make the summary reports at all.

The same day saw the public appearance of a new sociopolitical organization—the National Salvation Front—to whose colors, it was announced, both "red" and "white" are being called. Addressing the delegates, Lieutenant Colonel Stanislav Terekhov, member of the National Salvation Front Organizing Committee and chairman of the Union of Russian Officers, indicated three stages of the National Salvation Front's activity. In his opinion, the first stage—before 1 December—should be "to form the National Salvation Front's administrative structures." The second stage should be "to set about organizing work, to forge contacts with directors and the military, and to hold two or three press campaigns." "As regards the third stage, I will not talk about it," Stanislav Terekhov said. "The third stage will be resolved by methods of force, that much is clear." In his opinion, this third stage will come in a few months' time....

The previous day a decision on this organization's collective admission to the National Salvation Front was made during the assembly of regional representatives of the Union of Officers. Just in itself this fact cannot fail to cause concern—in any case, the attempts to involve servicemen in politics are continuing.

## **ECONOMIC & SOCIAL AFFAIRS**

### **Yeltsin Edict on Far East Development Criticized**

934C0208A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA  
in Russian 29 Oct 92 p 1

[Article by I. Kots, KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA special correspondent: "Concerning Impracticable Measures for the Development Desired"]

[Text] Will cheap oil appear in Ussuriysk if an edict on changing the name of the Far East to the Near East is issued?

It is not known who equipped this vessel; however, the president cast off the mooring lines. A toy paper ship: "Develop and adopt a Far East state regional program during the first half of 1993;" set sail on the spaciousness of the Pacific Ocean basin during the height of the fall political cyclones.

Only the most crestfallen of local newsmen did not make fun of it. The previous Far East state regional program was weak because it was not correct—in its parasitical essence. It allocated the role of a homeless person in the Council of Ministers parvis to a kray with an unprecedented potential. The program vigilantly protected the departments' monopoly, the severely criticized residual principle and the distribution of everything and everyone through the center. It was impractical and was ignominiously forgotten after revolutionary August—you already understand that the subject concerns another, "Gorbachev," program which was hastily imposed six years ago during the visit of the general secretary, the reformer, to the region.

President Yeltsin's present edict entitled "On Measures for the Development and State Support of the Far East's and Transbaykal's Economy" is strikingly close in spirit.

It is as if you were looking the wrong way through binoculars: Very close frontiers are extremely remote from common sense. It was necessary to establish an "administration" in the local areas to prepare the document in a month's time, the preconditions for the "necessary social and living conditions for highly qualified cadre" in three months' time and a full and complete rescue program in nine months' time—the fourth in post-October history which would, of course, provide for "state support for projects contributing to the shift to the new type of management." Again, each paragraph



talks about the region's "self-development," "priority avenues," and economic independence. The only market point: retain for the territories budget deductions from income under the terms of a tax credit, was ruthlessly stricken from the edict's draft.

It is logical: Otherwise, it would have been necessary to strike out everything else—everything, because the territories, unfortunately, are too diverse here. They—Amur water, Magadan stone, Chukot ice, and the flames of Kamchatka volcanoes—come together only on paper with a presidential seal. In real life, the concept of a "Far East economic complex" is just as much a myth as "party adherence to principles" or "the indestructible friendship of peoples." It is easier for the Amur oblast soy-bean growers to come to an agreement with the Ryazan people than with their neighbors, the BAM [Baykal-Amur Mainline] workers. Sakhalin businessmen have much more in common with the rich Japanese than with the poor unfortunate creatures, the Kuril people. The interests of the region monster disturbs them little. It was only in the films of the Fifties that Komsomol volunteers proudly declared: We, they say, are Far Easterners. Respecting themselves, the old-timers were specific: I am a maritime province person..., a Shikotanets..., a Khabarov person.... Well, listen, what inhabitant of St. Petersburg is called—a northwesterner?

The president has fallen into the same trap that his predecessor did. Let us call it, for the sake of mildness, a geographic one. In the opinion of economists, the development of the new program will again come down to a feverish compiling of financial and economic requests from local areas: snatch, dislodge, get, and intercept more from one's neighbor. They understand that there is not enough for everyone and they do not count on this. As V. Kuznetsov, the chief of the Maritime administration, said to me, the program is deliberately impractical; however, it will be possible to solve private matters "under it." What is the sense of all this? None, the local leaders are indignant. However, they are setting up the required commissions, enlisting scientific forces, reporting on inventing....

It is interesting—will, for example, cheap gasoline appear in Ussuriysk if an edict is issued to change the name of the Far East into the Near East?

#### **Situation of Poor in Kursk Oblast Viewed**

934C0208B Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA  
in Russian 29 Oct 92 p 1

[Article by S. Tsvetkov, SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA correspondent: "Soup for the Poor: Today, Every Third Kursk Oblast Inhabitant Needs It"]

[Text] Kursk—This elderly woman now experiences hunger often. She came with a dear friend to the Kursk City Administration for the Population's Social Protection to get a coupon for free food. Neonila Nikolayevna Venkovskaya had already been given such coupons during the summer and she had gone for a month, once

a day, to a dining room with them. In October, they did not promise them to her. Neonila Nikolayevna would have liked this support to be permanent but A. Kacherigis, the chief of the administration, could in no way promise this to her—there are many needy and, moreover, he does not decide alone who should be fed with free dinners. Primarily, they assist those who are in a very disastrous condition.

This—free dinners—is humiliating. Despite this, however, Neonila Nikolayevna, who endured the terrors of a fascist concentration camp and the burdens of the postwar period, prizes a bowl of free soup. She remembers with sadness recent times when she lived pretty well on her 100-ruble pension—it was enough for both food and clothing.

Neonila Nikolayevna realizes that she cannot count on exclusive attention from the administration for social protection: She is not the only one in such a disastrous condition. For example, the woman, who went with her at the same time to ask for help, was quite young but the same sense of hopelessness possessed her. She is a hairdresser but, since people now go to the hairdresser's much less frequently, the amount of work has been reduced to a point where this young woman's average monthly salary recently reached 461 rubles. This is clear from the official information required by the administration. There is nothing on which to live and nothing with which to pay for keeping children in a kindergarten. The fee for the kindergarten exceeds the young mother's wages by quite a bit. The administration decided to meet the family, which was living in poverty, half way; it will pay for two months. What then? The chief of the administration does not know.

Neonila Nikolayevna has many competitors: According to information from the oblast council's Commission for the Population's Social Protection, the oblast has approximately 400,000 people whose total income does not exceed 1,350 rubles. How can it protect them from the procession of reforms? The oblast council adopted an appropriate program in January of this year. The oblast, Kursk, city, and rayon funds for the social protection of the population's indigent layers were combined. A multitude of all-possible measures piled up but the poor people practically did not observe any return. For example, approximately, 1,250 people enjoy free food in the oblast: this is trifling few with such a number of poor people. Material assistance is being provided to approximately 17,000 Kursk people and approximately 33,000 unfortunate ones are being favored with humanitarian aid.

There are not enough assets for more since the sources for replenishing the social protection fund are not especially dependable. One-tenth of the income from privatization (and this is not taking place especially animatedly in the oblast) and one-fourth of the assets received from the re-evaluation of goods as a result of the increase in prices are at its disposal. During the first seven months, the rayon and oblast funds received a little more

than 300 million rubles. Divide them by the 400,000 people—it does not turn out to be even 1,000 per person. That is why the organizers of social protection must maneuver, somehow helping some and forgetting others. Teachers threatened a strike on the eve of the academic year. Looking at them, the medical workers also began to think about the same thing.

Prices for bread jumped sharply again in October; a loaf of bread now costs 24 rubles. In warning about this event, O. Amelyanchik, the chairman of the oblast council's Commission for the Population's Social Protection, says that the oblast council decided at the end of September to support needy people and allotted 165 rubles a month per person. Today, one cannot even buy seven loaves of bread with them. No one is talking about how to compensate the needy for the extra costs of other basic food items. This is the entire social protection. It is no wonder that people do not believe in it.

For a complete picture, it is necessary to add that several insurance companies and the Zabota Association, which is operating in one of Kursk's rayons, are engaged in charitable work. However, this does not change the total picture since their capabilities are modest.

I recently had an occasion to see an announcement that the oblast administration's Committee for Social Protection is operating. Someone had introduced a substantial clarification by hand into it: The preposition "from" had been placed before the word "administration." It had become the Committee for Social Protection from the Oblast Administration. Yes, the authorities are now such that one must really defend oneself against them.

### **Rutskoy Views on Land, Peasant Farming**

#### **Land Relations, Sugar Supplies**

934A0157A Moscow *TORGOVAYA GAZETA*  
in Russian 10 Oct 92 p 2

[Interview with Vice President Aleksandr Rutskoy by Tamara Zamyatina, TASS-Exclusive for *TORGOVAYA GAZETA*, in Moscow; date not given: "Aleksandr Rutskoy—A Man of Action"]

[Text] The Kremlin office of Vice President Aleksandr Rutskoy, where he gave me this interview, was occupied under the tsarist government by Prime Minister of Russia Petr Stolypin. "By an irony of fate," says Aleksandr Rutskoy, "I am continuing the land reform started by Petr Arkadyevich."

The vice president of Russia does not like to dwell on subsequent masters of Office No. 49—Lavrentiy Beria and Gennadiy Yanayev among them: they came to a sad end—as did Stolypin, as a matter of fact.

This name has inspired Aleksandr Rutskoy to write a voluminous book—*The Agrarian Reform of Russia*—an advance copy of which is on his desk now: "I studied land reform in our country since the time serfdom was

abolished in 1861. I accumulated piles of notes, manuscripts. Then members of the Council for Land Agro-Industrial Reform, which I set up, told me: All this needs to be put to use for the benefit of all. Hence the idea of a book."

The author sent an advance copy to former U.S. President Richard Nixon. While visiting Moscow, the American came to see Rutskoy: "I read your book," he said, "and could not believe that you were an air force pilot. I made it a point to come and see you. Your ideas are great, and I intend to help you." And he does, adds Aleksandr Rutskoy—he has already put together an international food consortium with a billion dollars of investment.

With respect to implementation of land reform, Aleksandr Rutskoy works according to the following formula: identify the task, appraise the situation, make a decision. "Of course," he explains, "this is the formula of the armed forces' command and control, but let someone else to come up with something better." By the way, adds Aleksandr Rutskoy, "Spanish Prime Minister Gonzales supported me with respect to this strategy. He told me: 'Listen, Aleksandr (they do not have patronymics), you are doing everything right: First you have to identify the task; then evaluate what you are able to do and what reserves you have, and then make a decision and develop a mechanism for carrying it out, and make sure that it envisages a system for monitoring it.'"

In his analysis of past agrarian reforms, Aleksandr Rutskoy came to the conclusion that their goal is "not to create a certain number of farms but rather to fill up the stores with foodstuffs, clothing, and medicines, as 60-80 percent of the content of all three is made up of agricultural raw materials."

Using this goal as a base, the vice president is developing a set of tasks and actions aimed at achieving it. His solution of the problems is based on the right of private ownership of land, but not as a goal in itself—rather, together with collective, mixed, and state ownership. Answering a question as to whether he supports the idea of holding a referendum on transferring land to private ownership, Aleksandr Rutskoy said that "at this stage Russia does not need revolutions: what is needed is an evolution of popular conscience, and this kind of evolution does not take place at rallies and referendums."

At the same time, the vice president is convinced that the "agricultural sector should be governed not by administrative structures and soviets but by finances: state-commercial banks based on mixed and private capital." To this end Aleksandr Rutskoy is actively "pushing" the idea of creating land banks. The necessary package of documents has already been prepared and is awaiting approval by the president of Russia or the Supreme Soviet.

Aleksandr Rutskoy takes as a prototype for the land banks the state-owned Peasants Bank that operated during Petr Stolypin's times; at his insistence some of the

vacant land was transferred to this bank for the purpose of selling it on extremely preferential terms to those who worked the land. For the same purpose, vacant lands that belonged to the treasury in tsarist Russia were transferred to land development commissions. At the same time, the government prohibited land development commissions and the Peasants Bank from handing land out to rural lumpens who did not have the tools and livestock to work on it.

Aleksandr Rutskey emphasizes that as a result of Stolypin's reforms Russia assumed a solid lead in the world with respect to the pace of economic growth, and remained there up until World War I.

It is not accidental that Aleksandr Rutskey chose Stolypin's words as an epigraph to his book: "We need to raise our weak, impoverished, depleted land, because the land is our reserve of strength in the future; the land is Russia."

Aleksandr Rutskey believes that the realization of the current land reform will take five years.

For its implementation, the vice president is not counting on the International Monetary Fund ("because I know they will not give us anything"). His efforts are aimed at the creation of an international financial fund for agro-industrial land reform "which would formulate the credit and investment policy of foreign states with respect to Russia, and that of their private and commercial structures." If such a fund is established ("this idea is in its final stage right now"), "money the entrepreneurs have transferred abroad will start coming back: People will not be afraid that the government will interfere in the activities of an international financial fund." "Rutskey's people" have already gone to London, to the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, whose president has agreed to help in the creation of an international financial fund for agro-industrial land reform.

Thus, summarizes Aleksandr Rutskey, "we will have a dual system for managing the agrarian sector of Russia: the land banks and an international fund which will attract foreign investment and which will start working as soon as in five or six months. Then the agrarian reform will start moving, because its implementation will not be limited to wishes—it will also have the resources and the system." By the way, a land bank is already operating in Nizhniy Novgorod and, according to Rutskey, "the idea has paid off."

As a man of action, the vice president is tackling quite a few practical issues involving the revival of the agrarian sector. He tasked all the regions to fill out summary tables that show the potential for storage and processing of products and identify uncompleted construction projects. This is a far cry from the "report for the sake of reporting," typical of the old times at Staraya Square. For each unused facility Rutskey finds foreign partners willing to start joint enterprises in Russia. "For instance, we have received the summary tables of 'incomplete

projects' in Pskov Oblast—now I will take representatives of a Spanish company involved in meat production and processing there; they are ready to go. We have to keep in mind the level of executive discipline, though: Of 88 regions, only nine sent in the required information. That is, on the one hand we lament that foreign partners are not investing in the Russian countryside; on the other, we do not provide them with information on the local situation," says my interlocutor, "so we have to demand it, tighten some screws."

Through Rutskey's efforts, two Israeli and one British company are building facilities for waste-free sugar processing in Kursk, Voronezh, and Rostov Oblasts. A meat and dairy complex where select livestock will be brought in from Israel is being built in Borisoglebskiy Rayon of Voronezh Oblast. The processing will yield 76 varieties of dairy products.

In Aleksandr Rutskey's estimation, the problem of supplying Russia with sugar can be solved in a matter of two and a half years through reconstruction of processing enterprises. In order to finance this program, in his opinion, targeted oil export is needed; he is currently "pushing" for quotas through Yegor Gaydar's office. Regarding his relationship with the president of Russia, my interlocutor remarks that he has "learned to break through the fence with his fist rather than his head, and then widen the opening," thus demonstrating his "un-protocol" mentality.

"Yes, I am an un-protocol person," he agrees readily. "Before official meetings I try to find out the hobbies of some or other statesman, what he likes, what he is interested in. And, you know, people like it; it establishes real communication right away. My meeting with Gonzales lasted two hours, and with the king of Spain—two and a half, although people of that rank rarely set aside that much time for representatives of other countries. I maintain friendly correspondence with the heads of many states—for instance, President of Egypt Mubarak; he is my colleague—also a pilot."

After accepting a compliment regarding the vice president's style in clothes, my interlocutor divulged a small secret: his wife works for the company of fashion designer Yudashkin, "so it is Valentin who makes my suits." As to pressing them, former Soviet Army Private Rutskey learned this from Sergeant Major Yevdokimov, "whom I will remember for the rest of my life."

Following the example of the president of Russia, his vice president became hooked on tennis ("this year Boris Nikolayevich let me go for a couple of weeks of rest in Sochi—I have not had a vacation in six years—so I shed some weight there at the tennis court"). Now the vice president handles a racket and "pumps iron" (trains with weights) three times a week and feels, by his own admission, "great." This also should be to the benefit of the land reform. "Do not entertain any doubt," said the vice president in conclusion, "there is no way I will abandon the countryside now."



### Commentary on Speech to Peasant Farmers

934A0157B Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian  
30 Oct 92 p 1

[Article by SELSKAYA ZHIZN correspondent A. Bykov: "Commentary on the Occasion: Why I Do Not Envy the Vice President"]

[Text] Stavropol Kray—The delegates to the conference of Stavropol farmers waited impatiently for A. Rutskoy's appearance; their mood was one of liking, sympathy, hope. At the very beginning of his speech, however, the vice president sharply rebuked a former kolkhoz chairman—currently a newly converted farmer—for portraying kolkhoz members as almost the enemy of all that is new. Then he spoke positively of strong public enterprises, quoting as an example Kazminskiy kolkhoz, whose fame extends far beyond the kray boundaries. He unambiguously qualified as wishful thinking the statement of Russia's minister of agriculture regarding the intent to establish a million private farms in 1993. And generally, unlike some politicians, he did not engage in singing the praises of those present in the room and, while acknowledging that the development of private farming is important, did not envision it as the only direction for agrarian and land reform.

The latter was probably even more insulting for those present than the direct praise of kolkhozes. Let us be honest, many farmers already have gotten used to the title of future providers of the people, their hope and support. Still, in my opinion, the main—albeit less perceptible—reason for the disappointment lay somewhere else. To be precise: Instead of promises to help, provide, resolve, sort out, punish, and so on, A. Rutskoy proposed to get down to everyday, routine work. To establish peasant land banks for farmers. To develop the capability to process agricultural production locally. In short, to get down to business instead of rallying and looking for enemies.

By the way, the other appearances of the vice president of Russia during his Stavropol Kray trip were all in the same key. He did not try to play to the public, or adjust his viewpoints depending on the audience in order to please it; A. Rutskoy defended a pragmatic, systematic approach to a solution of the agro-industrial complex everywhere he went: at the farmers conference, at the Stavropolskaya poultry factory, at the Nevinnomyssk wool factory, at the Kazminskiy kolkhoz, and during his stay in Izobilnenskiy Rayon—the largest in the kray. And everywhere, except perhaps to differing degrees, one could feel this atmosphere of unfulfilled hopes.

A paradox? From the point of view of common sense—perhaps yes. For what could be better, one would think, than to be offered a bearing in the sea of verbal masturbation, political intrigues, and rallying passions? Alas, we are probably made differently. Build communism? Sure, within the lifetime of this generation. Capitalism? No problem here as well, just give us 500—or how many was it, 1,000?—days. Set up a land bank? No, this takes

too long, is boring, and may not work. Also, how can this be: The number two person in the country comes to visit and does not give away anything, does not promise anything. Well, forget promising anything—he does not even see fit to pour some salve of moral support, to tell the farmers that they are pioneers of reform, to tell kolkhoz members that the country cannot do without them, to tell food processors that their situation is the worst in the country.

So there is immediately some sulking—the master came, but did not set things straight. But this "master," by the way, is not an acting prime minister or a president—he is only a vice president with extremely limited resources when it comes to "handing out." He himself, by his own admission, is battling Gaydar and his team—whose deaf ear, when it comes to the needs of the countryside, it seems impossible to penetrate even with the help of a most powerful hearing aid. Since they—unlike the vice president—are not much into traveling to the locales, communicating with the people, getting a feel for the troubles ordinary people go through. Meanwhile, so many of these troubles have accumulated that nobody can any longer help anyone individually. What is needed is to change the entire tactics of the reform, to move it from the track of cerebral experiment to the track of practical work. With a clear understanding: The market is not the goal, only the means.

Does our government understand that? I do not know. In the end, it will not last forever. I am personally much more concerned that the clash of class, group, sectoral, regional, and other interests keeps us all from understanding it. Which was graphically demonstrated by A. Rutskoy's trips to Stavropol Kray. Let us hope to God that they were not a waste of time. Let us hope to God that the vice president will gain more confederates than opponents or disenchanted people in this blessed part of the land. One way or the other, however, I do not envy him.

### Gaydar's Meeting With Industrialists Examined

934A0167A Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA  
in Russian 30 Oct 92 pp 1-2

[Article by Viktor Yurlov, editor in the RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA Economics Section: "Do Not Involve the Directors in Intrigues"]

[Text] The biggest sensation in the meeting between Yegor Gaydar and the directors of major industrial enterprises was the fact that it became...a sensation. And the sensation was probably created by the acting premier and his deputies. This attests once again to the strange relationships between the two sides—the government and the entrepreneurs.

Why were many of the mass media—the court press was all there—in a hurry to call the conference in Tolvatti a victory by Gaydar over Volstkiy? Despite the obvious



*Including the obvious fact that only fools, or those suffering from the old regime's report mania—or once again, persons engaging in intrigue—can speak about a victory now.*

When the country is on the verge of losing not only its production—its statehood!—only one fact has the right to be called a victory—a stop to the free fall. These days we are all lying down, as if no one had any ambition. And even if we find the strength to get on our knees, we will be only kneeling. I do not doubt that such a graceful pose seems victorious to some people. But most people are dreaming of something else—not standing with their hands proudly outstretched, but their heads proudly raised. They cannot.

A strange situation has taken shape. We are all shouting—our life is poor, and nowhere is it worse. We all see that the macroeconomic experiments, so clever in laboratory accounts, are not leading the country to the market, but to a riot, or what is even worse, to a revolution. But this is obvious to everyone, the entire world.

Well, they have been confused. It happens. It is not the first time there have been such tragic farces in the history of mankind. So at least listen to the advice of competent people. For example, to the "Civic Union" [Grazhdanskiy Soyuz]. It is no secret to anyone that it has united the healthy forces in society, the sensible heads of economists, industrialists, and entrepreneurs who are worried about the fate of the democratic reforms. They do not include one person opposed to the market. But they have "dared" to advance their own anticrisis program. And it began here! Every newspaper and little paper has considered its most important task to strike at the "Union" a little more. And especially its leaders. But more forcefully at Arkadiy Volskiy, who evidently is among the most popular political figures in the country.

Of course, by this act the government, although belatedly, has sought to prove, to demonstrate, and to introduce into the mass consciousness (with the help of the powerful conductors of free expression) that not only Arkadiy Volskiy, the All-Russian Union "Renewal" [Obnovleniye], and "Civic Union" know how to speak with the directors. Although what is to prove here. Any government that is the least bit serious should realize that it cannot treat the directors of state enterprises presumptuously and disdainfully. At least when they control, as in our case, over 90 percent of the country's industrial production. And while they have practically all the country's defense and scientific and technical potential in their hands.

Only a thoughtless politician (by no means a competent specialist) is capable of not taking into account that he is kept in power as long as this force supports him. And any government, no matter if it is white, red, or grayish-brown and crimson, but really a government, appeals precisely to this audience in the worst crisis situations.

So did Gaydar overreact, or "crack," as some writers are saying, and who benefits from the split with Volskiy? The question, as well as the answer, would be too superficial a view of the situation.

The directors, in our view, presented Gaydar with a lesson, evaluating him as he deserves. They overplayed him in all positions, and apparently he did not notice this. In brief, the directors taught the professor the lesson he deserved. They pretended that they were included in the game. But perhaps Gaydar's "fire brigade" wanted to interpret what took place in Tolyatti precisely that way. But in fact, the directors calmly and confidently pressed the position of A. Volskiy and the Russian Alliance of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs without conceding anything, but wringing serious indulgences and long-term promises from the acting premier. And they practically put the government's activity under the control of the Council of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs that was established. And I doubt that it is worth hoping that they will agree to play the role of approvers of Gaydar's questionable economic experiments in this industrial duma.

This is not an unsubstantiated statement. In analyzing the meeting's documents, you come to an unexpected conclusion: the government, after criticism by the president, may have shown for the first time that it has finally listened to the directors. It is enough to compare the individual points of the statement by participants in the Tolyatti meeting and the program documents of the All-Russian Union "Renewal," for example.

The directors in Tolyatti speak out against political passions and ambitions, and the "Civic Union," in a recent statement, condemns "the process of growing ambitions by the group of persons who lay claim to a special position in the power structure and special influence on its institutions."

"We support the formation of an efficient market economy, an increase in the competitiveness of Russian industry, and the transformation of its structure, including in the world economy," the directors state.

"The pivot of our economic policy today should be continuation of the economic reforms, development of the domestic market and opening of the foreign market, and gradual adaptation of the persons involved in economic affairs to the demands of a market economy," write those who drew up the "Renewal" program.

"We must make the maximum possible effort to provide support for national industry and efficient production facilities, and to preserve the basic elements in our production and scientific and technical potential," the Tolyatti meeting participants tell the government.

But this was stated earlier by the "Renewal" Union.

And so forth. There is no conflict between the directors' statement and the "Civil Union" program.

We know that Yegor Gaydar dispensed benefits liberally to the enterprises whose managers took part in the meeting. We congratulate the happy people—at least their lot will be improved in the current situation.

Be this as it may, a government leader finally met with the directors. As a result, the positions of both sides seemed to have moved closer. We could be pleased with this circumstance, after giving the leaders of "Civic Union" their due; they are purposefully bringing our young and—they say—talented government down to the ground from time to time with their distinctive pragmatism. And it is unworthy to involve the directors in dishonorable political games—after all, thanks to their experience and courage, the country is somehow still functioning and producing something.

### **Chubays Responds to Enterprise Directors' Questions**

934A0160A Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian  
27, 28, 29, 30 Oct 92

[Responses to questions from enterprise directors by A. Chubays, head of the Goskomimushchestvo [State Committee for the Management of State Property]: "They, He, and Ohm's Law"]

[27 Oct p 3]

[Text] They are enterprise directors, and he is the head of the Goskomimushchestvo, A. Chubays. In addition, there are the laws of economics, which operate by themselves, like Ohm's Law.

A meeting was held recently between Goskomimushchestvo managers and representatives of the Association of Russian Industrialists and Entrepreneurs. The claim that the directors are implacably opposed to the reforms personified primarily by "the ministry of privatization" has circulated more intensively lately. With all its potentially destructive political power, "the directors' card" is clearly artificial—there is no monolithic antireform "directory." There are different kinds of people among the production managers, of course, but those who are ready to work with the government in looking for ways out of the blind alleys that appear on the path to reform are the ones that predominate. Extracts of the directors' discussion with Vice Premier A. Chubays at the meeting mentioned attest to this.

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[Question] Why can't a collective purchase all the shares in its own enterprise?

[Chubays] You are not actually speaking about authorizing the collective to buy everything, you know. You mean giving it the chance to buy everything without competition, without an auction, with preferential treatment, without permitting any "outsiders." This is what you are really saying. But what about all the other people who are not working at your enterprise—the teachers,

doctors, and servicemen? After all, they have no chances of acquiring anything without competition and an auction. You have acquired unique privileges which are substantially greater than anywhere else in the world for labor collectives. Any increase, any additional rights for you, means taking away the rights of all the others.

[Question] After several decisions, the government is at a dead end and you don't know how to get out of it. For example, let us take the Ministry of Finance decree on reappraisal of enterprises' foreign currency accounts. At our plant, we have accumulated \$200,000 to buy the equipment we need in the West. However, our account in the Vneshekonombank [Bank for Foreign Economic Activity] was frozen after its bankruptcy. Under the Ministry of Finance decision, what we deposited at the exchange rate of 1.60 rubles [R] per dollar will be revalued at the rate of R125 per dollar as of 1 July, R250 per dollar in the third quarter, and so forth. We have been paying taxes on money we cannot make use of. If we at least had received rubles at this rate, we could have given 32 percent to the state in the form of a tax.

[Chubays] This is not a government decision, but a Ministry of Finance instruction which is obviously in error, and it will be revised, of course.

[28 Oct p 3]

[Text]

[Question] Ours is a defense enterprise. We cannot understand it—isn't the state really concerned by the fact that the stock shares which we will not repurchase have been put on sale freely and they have been bought up by the latter-day millionaires? After all, our plant will not be making cartridges in a year or two. But how can we maintain the plant? Can we write in our charter that the persons who are dismissed may sell their shares only within the joint-stock company?

[Chubays] Do you need investments? You do. Where will they come from if we adopt your proposal? We also want your enterprise to be maintained and operated normally, but we clearly realize that the path you suggest, with all its outward clarity, attractiveness, and traditional nature, is the path into a dead end. In order to keep you for the state, the collective should not be given the exclusive right to hold the stock, but conditions should be created for the influx of capital. You will be lost without it. The second question is how to retain the enterprise's specialization. This is recorded in the conditions for the sale. The shares will not be sold at auction, but by a competition. This means that the person who intends to purchase them is aware of the conditions under which he can acquire them. These conditions are strictly set by the state at the moment of sale, that is, the specialization and capacities may be retained through the normal mechanism of privatization. But a ban on the sale of shares is a guarantee that you will not have any cartridges or anything else, because in spite of all the collective's love, it will not give you hundreds of millions of

rubles to expand production and modernize it. And the state will not lay it out, either. The only way out here is to attract additional investments.

[Question] Look at how commerce has been privatized! The stores, the shopping centers, and trade organizations are operating by themselves. The latter have been turned into retail and procurement firms, seizing for themselves all the equipment and the physical base. Is this really correct, when 15 or 20 persons privatize the entire physical base for a city's commerce? Before privatization, no matter how poor a trade organization was, it was responsible for providing the public with food, clothing, and footwear. Now no one accepts responsibility for anything, but they are all charging extra interest—the shopping centers, the stores, the endless middlemen. Who needs such privatization, and why?

[Chubays] The problem here is that the wholesale part of trade has not been privatized. It is actually in the hands of those same 15 persons you mentioned, but legally they are all state enterprises which do not allow anyone near them, or more precisely, they try to separate themselves from normal privatization. Involving a wholesale unit with privatization when a retail unit is privatized has also created a knot which must be untied.

[Question] Those enterprises that were running in front of the locomotive by implementing the state privatization program have now found themselves in the position of being social outcasts. We have practically been deprived of the opportunity to obtain credits to increase our own working capital. The government's policy in this matter is incomprehensible.

[Chubays] A very fair criticism. Indeed, the enterprises that have become joint-stock companies are separated from the normal state credit support and preferential credit conditions are not being extended to them, no matter if the credit is for working capital, or any other special arrangements. All this has been tied to state enterprises. By becoming a joint-stock company, they are immediately deprived of everything they had a month earlier. This is an absolutely abnormal situation. We are slowing down the process of shareholding itself. This must be changed. I have already discussed this with Ye. Gaydar and the minister of finance.

[Question] The law on privatization states that 5 percent of the shares are transferred to the leadership in accordance with contracts. We do not understand the conditions under which this 5 percent will be distributed.

[Chubays] This is one of our debts—the documents that have not been worked through. I have 28 normative documents on my conscience at this moment, and most of them are at the level of a presidential edict. The volume of documents is gigantic. For example, the edict on investment funds is 80 pages long, a very difficult document in legal and economic terms. We never had anything like this in Russia before. At the same time, we cannot take and rewrite one American law or another—everything must be related to our actual life. The work takes up 17 hours per day, but we are

compelled to pursue this course, all the same: we issue a major document as if we are throwing in a puck, but we stretch out everything that comes after it in accordance with the pace of the work, realizing that this is always linked with difficulties. This includes our obligation in accordance with the contract for directors.

[29 Oct p 7]

[Text]

[Question] Virtually all the banks have been privatized, and as a result, we have acquired usurious offices which cannot implement elementary clearing transactions. It takes months for settlements to be transferred from one branch to another. This is our money, our working capital, without which we cannot live normally. Previously, when the banks were operated by the state, settlements were handled in half a day. What has the government achieved by privatizing them? We should create competition for them; state-commercial banks should be set up, and let us see what the clients prefer.

[Chubays] No banks have been privatized in Russia as of today. In conformity with the state privatization program, commercial banks may be privatized under special conditions only with the government's authorization. As of today, the government has not issued any authorization for the privatization of commercial banks. All the banks operating in Russia are state banks. I am deeply convinced that this is precisely the reason for the main problems in their activity. The problem with settlements was stated quite fairly. It is a very difficult situation, but in my estimation, it has improved somewhat in the past month and a half to 2 months.

The main reason for the problems lies with the clearing centers, because of which everything has spread. I am convinced that much stricter measures are needed here. You realize that I am thinking about the relationships between the government and the Central Bank. It is not subordinate to us; it is actually controlled by the Supreme Soviet, which is holding on to it very firmly. Any attempts to change the situation are voted down entirely. Boris Nikolayevich stated frankly in Cheboksary that this situation is intolerable and must be changed, either by making the TsB [Central Bank] subordinate to the president or making it independent. Khasbulatov categorically rejected this approach in a recent speech. The situation is very complicated, as you see. We are not in a position to resolve this extremely critical question without broad support, including support from you.

[Question] Let us turn to the enterprises' social sphere. Before privatization, we had nursery schools, pioneer camps, hospitals, tourist facilities, and sports complexes. If we give up all this to the local administrative organs, we will simply lose it in a year or two. Our collective is interested in retaining all this. If we transfer the social sphere to local organs of authority, it will still have to be subsidized from the state budget. Can't we arrange it so that these subsidies go directly to the enterprise? Or a contract should be concluded with a municipality or the property fund which



specifies the amount taken from the budget and the amount taken from the enterprise's income.

[Chubays] Social, cultural, and general amenities as a responsibility of the enterprises is a critical matter. The scope of it is such that it may hold up the entire process of forming joint-stock companies unless we clarify it in the next 2 weeks. We have worked out a plan to resolve the problem and put it into the draft presidential edict. The basic concepts are as follows. Anything that can be easily privatized should be transferred to the city for privatization. I am referring primarily to departmental housing and premises that have been built in or added on which contain stores and service enterprises. All this can be privatized under the normal plan. A second group of facilities includes those which in principle may not be privatized. These include part of the engineering social structure and premises that are not living quarters. In accordance with the labor collective's decision, facilities such as these should be transferred to the city or municipality. We realize that without subvention, including from the federal budget, the cities will find themselves in a difficult position.

With respect to facilities such as holiday hotels and rest centers, a decision may depend on the labor collective's position. If they want to retain these facilities, this will be supported. If they do not, these facilities may also be transferred to the cities.

[30 Oct p 3]

[Text]

[Question] We have a large number of enterprises which do not have the means for modernization. The persons who work at these enterprises are receiving very low wages. They are poor customers, and here is the paradox: with a shortage of meat, milk, television sets, and refrigerators, the demand for them and production are declining. Ford was a genius not only because he chose the production line, but because he once said: I can turn out automobiles only as long as they are purchased. We must create the buyer and lend him the money.

[Chubays] I agree with this thought, frankly. Indeed, without a normal customer, without extending his purchasing power, our industry will not hold out for long. Look at the extent to which we are changing, perhaps not being aware of it all the time. After all, for the normal general director, the principal and only question 6 months ago concerned the delivery of raw material, equipment, and materials, and of course, the social sphere. But not one director would have come to a conference with the government to ask for help for his customers. And this is a sign that our industry is beginning to turn slowly and with difficulty toward the side of the consumer, without whom it would not exist.

In November, December, January and February, general directors raised the question of raw material first of all. Today they are saying: give us credit and we will resolve

everything else locally and deal with the suppliers ourselves. This is almost the most important change that has taken place in the economy during this period. This means that the ruble has begun to work. A year ago you could have as many of these rubles as you wanted, but you could not obtain any more lumber or steel. In connection with the new role of the ruble, I would like to direct your attention to a question we are frequently asked: why isn't normal credit being provided? Why has the interest rate in the commercial banks gone up to 120 percent or more? Why doesn't the state want to help, and give us credit? Behind these questions is the notion that credit is something limitless. Give me credit, and I will return it, with interest. This notion must be changed. All the credits which become available in the state come from a single source. If we persuade the chairman of the Central Bank, he makes the decision and writes: allocate 10 billion. Even if this procedure has helped to remove the bottlenecks, it has an unpleasant consequence—an increase in prices. In economics, this operates like Ohm's Law. There is an increase in prices in the economy to the precise degree that we increase the volume of the credit emission.

[Question] But what happens if enterprises are left without credits?

[Chubays] This is a danger we are well aware of: if it is impossible to give to anyone, the economy will rise. But we cannot give to everyone, either, because everything will collapse. Our task is to follow a narrow path. On the one hand, we cannot allow widespread nonpayments, bankruptcies, and unemployment, but on the other hand, there will be high inflation. At the same time, the ruble will cease to function and there will be a return to total and universal barter and regional separatism—what we were seeing last November. You see one danger clearly, and there is a second one which is not as apparent, but the government is responsible for it to the same degree that it is responsible for the first one.

In conclusion, I want to say this. In working through the plans for privatization, we have thought out in detail how to ensure that the interests of both the collectives and the administration are taken into account to the maximum extent. The edict on privatization stipulates that enterprise directors automatically retain their authority in the new joint-stock companies. We are convinced that any attempt to change directors, the internal structure, and the product mix now, along with the privatization, is unacceptable. We have enough difficulties without making them worse.

A great deal of criticism, sometimes impartial in nature, is directed at us. We single out the criticism which is aimed at perfecting, improving, and developing our approach from the demands that the reforms be stopped and that we return to the past. Although many of the people who categorically oppose any changes speak about the need to intensify, expand, and supplement. What I have seen in today's discussion is mainly the desire to move ahead.



**Union President on Planned Resumption of Air Traffic Controllers' Strike***934A0159A Moscow TRUD in Russian 31 Oct 92 p 2*

[Interview with V.G. Konusenko, president of the Federation of Air Traffic Controllers Trade Unions (FPAD) by TRUD correspondent Albert Kozlov: "No Flying on 30 November"]

[Text] The Congress of People's Deputies set for 1 December may not be convened on that day. The Federation of Air Traffic Controllers Trade Unions (FPAD), which decided to resume the strike interrupted in August on 30 November, is capable of making its own "adjustments" to the dates it will work. Why? Our correspondent asked V. Konusenko, the FPAD president, about this.

[Konusenko] The reasons are the same: the government is not fully implementing the wage agreement concluded with our federation. Our principal demand is not about wages, as representatives of the government are attempting to depict the situation. We have been insisting, and we continue to insist, on solution of what for us is the most pressing problem: establishment of an interdepartmental state system—a committee for air-space use and air traffic control.

At present, our controllers control the flights, but the military specialists are in charge of "the air." They can cut off the airways at any moment, leaving thousands of passengers "sitting on their suitcases" in the airports, or making it necessary to extend the routes and "detour" the aircraft. All this creates serious problems in the controllers' work and additional complications for flight safety.

The wage agreements are not being implemented practically in any region today, except for Irkutsk and Domodedovo. There have been attempts to "revise" this document. Since 9 October, for example, controllers at the airport for the Flight Research Institute imeni Gromov in the Moscow suburbs, which is involved with aviaprom [the aviation industry], have been on strike. The LII [Flight Research Institute] controllers are members of our trade union. However, the institute administration maintains the agreement does not apply to them.

There are cases of another procedure as well. M. Stropov, commander of the Samara Unified Aviation Detachment, abolished the wage agreement entirely "on his territory" in violation of Russian laws.

[Kozlov] Vladimir Georgiyevich, have criminal cases been brought against those who took part in the August strike, to your knowledge?

[Konusenko] That is true. Dozens of persons have been prosecuted. In Elista, three shift supervisors were taken away by the VOKhR [internal security forces], and in Novosibirsk they dismissed a controller and a shift supervisor (the trade union managed to get them returned to their work later).

Russian Vice President A. Rutskoy stated unequivocally at a meeting with FPAD representatives that there would be no repression against the strikers. But he has not kept his word.

In resuming the strike, we are demanding punishment for the officials guilty of violating the wage agreement. The agreement states that such persons should be subjected to various sanctions, by the way.

But only in Volgograd did the public prosecutor order an aviation detachment commander to adhere to the wage agreement in his activities. But the latter ignored the order.

[Kozlov] The opinion is widespread that by calling a strike, the controllers are looking out only for themselves.

[Konusenko] Yes, it is unfortunate that people will suffer from the strike. But it is not our fault. Although Minister V. Yefimov knew about the August strike a month and a half before it took place, he did nothing to prevent it. And if there are no flights once again on the last day of November, we will not be the ones at fault, but the Ministry of Transport and the government. I can only advise the people: do not purchase tickets for 30 November.

The FPAD's position is absolutely clear, as they say. It is up to the partners in the wage agreement. Does this conflict have to be brought to extremes? There is still time to resolve this without detriment to the interests of many thousands of Aeroflot passengers.

**Metallurgy Workers Union Withdrawing From FITUR***934A0159B Moscow TRUD in Russian 31 Oct 92 pp 1-2*

[Interview with I. Klochkov, chairman of the FITUR [Russian Federation of Independent Trade Unions], and B. Misnik, chairman of the Central Council of the Mining and Metallurgical Workers Trade Union, by unidentified TRUD correspondent and written by Fedor Yemchenko: "It Has Been Love Without Joy"]

[Text] Everyone realizes that effective social protection for the workers depends to a large extent on how well-organized and unified the trade unions are in their activities. For this reason, apparently, the contradictory opinions led to the decision by the Central Council of the Mining and Metallurgical Workers Trade Union to leave the FITUR, which was adopted on the eve of the mass action protesting the course of government reforms. Some people accuse the miners' and metallurgists' union leaders of betraying the interests of working people, and others believe that the existing structure of the FITUR infringes upon the interests of the sectorial trade unions.

In order to clarify these mutual accusations and help to find a point of interaction, we have invited I. Klochkov,

chairman of the FITUR, and B. Misnik, chairman of the Central Council of the Mining and Metallurgical Workers Trade Union, for a dialogue.

*Igor Klochkov, 53, graduated from the Odessa Engineering and Construction Institute. He has been foreman of a construction and installation train, secretary of the "Gidromontazh" Trust party committee, first secretary of the Naro-Fominsk City Committee of the CPSU, secretary of the Moscow Oblast Committee of the CPSU, secretary of the AUCCTU [All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions], deputy chairman of the AUCCTU, and now chairman of the FITUR.*

*Boris Misnik, 54, graduated from the Leningrad Institute of Water Transport. He has been an electrical engineer in the "Sevzapmontavtomatika" Association, chairman of the trade union committee in the "Severonikel" Combine, and now chairman of the Central Council of the Mining and Metallurgical Workers Trade Union of the Russian Federation.*

[Correspondent] You, Igor Yevgenyevich, were present at the plenum of the Central Council of the metallurgists' trade union and you spoke at it. I would like to hear your point of view about why they took such a step.

[Klochkov] I am confident that the actions by the leaders of this trade union and those members of the Central Council who voted to leave the FITUR do not reflect the opinion of the 2 million workers in the mining and metallurgical industry. Who has asked the tens and hundreds of primary organizations and labor collectives about this? They were simply presented with a fait accompli. The results of the mass action on 24 October attest to this. Numerous trade union organizations in this sector took part in it, although the Central Council opposed it, thereby giving cause to state in the press that the metallurgists are speaking out against the FITUR's confrontation with the government and against the protest action.

The telegrams and telephone calls we have received attest to the fact that the trade unions' unity of action has not been opposed by the metallurgists, but essentially by a small group of people who have assumed the right to decide such a serious matter.

[Misnik] I do not think I have to reduce this very serious problem in trade union construction to participation or nonparticipation in the action on 24 October. The reasons are more profound and complex. The plenum of our Central Council has discussed the question of relationships with the FITUR on three occasions since November 1991. And each time we became more firmly convinced that the FITUR leadership is hindering normal development of the trade union movement in Russia. The allegation that only the metallurgists' trade union has spoken out against this action is groundless. It was not supported by the coal miners and a number of other trade unions. And we did not support it because the action clearly had been politicized and it was premature. It did not reflect the interests of most trade union members. I want to take exception to the statement by Igor Yevgenyevich that the Central

Council leadership does not reflect the opinion of primary organizations. I have gone to 22 oblasts myself, and we are holding a scientific and practical conference on problems of the trade union movement in Yekaterinburg. And our position was developed at these meetings with labor collectives. Incidentally, our Central Council is made up mainly of trade union and shop committee chairmen. Only one oblast committee chairman is a member of the presidium. And he was elected at only the last plenum. Tell me, how is it that such an elected organ cannot reflect the thinking and aspirations of the labor collectives?

[Correspondent] Excuse me for interrupting, Boris Grigoryevich, but I would like to hear your thoughts about why the trade unions' action was ill-timed. Are you opposed to these methods or do you believe the workers' plight is not deplorable enough for a protest to be expressed in this form?

[Misnik] The workers are having a hard time today. And we are telling the government about this directly. But I want to draw your attention to the content of the leaflets which the FITUR distributed on the eve of the action. Most of the demands in them reflect the interests of housewives, veterans, and young persons. Only a small part reflects the interests of trade union members. For this reason, we consider this action to have been politically-inspired. This is why the Central Council plenum did not support it. However, the plenum decision stated that those primary organizations which made use of civilized methods to resolve their social problems but were unsuccessful could take part in the protest action. Although I personally am convinced that going into the streets is not the most efficient method of struggle.

[Correspondent] Evidently Igor Yevgenyevich has a different opinion about this.

[Klochkov] I am listening to dear Boris Grigoryevich, and I have the impression that we are all in a theater of the absurd. Consider this: there have been two plenums of the Central Council of the Mining and Metallurgical Workers Trade Union. The question of whether or not to leave the FITUR was discussed twice. This was preceded by numerous trips by the Central Council chairman and leaders, by conferences, and by discussions, but where is the normal work by a trade union organ for the interests of trade union members, and where are the results? Well, all right, they achieved their own results: they collected 41 votes and left the FITUR. But let us determine what started the strife. Doesn't the current structure of the federation suit them? So let us think about how to change it together. Let us ask the primary organizations about this. But this is not the point, of course. All the fuss about leaving the FITUR is only cause to demonstrate to the powers that be that you do not want anything in common with trade unions which are opposed to the government. This is something we should talk about directly and not engage in demagoguery, saying that the FITUR seeks to exacerbate confrontation with the government, but we should use civilized methods of social partnership.

[Correspondent] You will agree that this makes common sense, too.

[Klochkov] But we did not resort to mass protest actions right away, you know. We approached this step by step. After talks with the authorities. We concluded the general wage agreement. It is not being implemented. We worked conscientiously on a trilateral commission. But finally we were convinced that this mechanism of social partnership in its current form is incapable of resolving social and labor conflicts. And it is no coincidence that the FITUR resorted to assistance from the Constitutional Court to have people paid the wages that were due. This is what is forcing the trade unions to adopt extreme measures. But my opponent states that our action was politicized and did not reflect the interests of trade union members.

Yes, we state openly that we do not agree with the current course of the reforms, which is leading to a production recession and impoverishment of the people. But do you really agree, Boris Grigoryevich, that metal production has already been cut back by 15 percent, that a number of enterprises in your sector are operating less than a full week, and that there is mass unemployment? You do not agree. So why are you avoiding joint, coordinated actions by the trade unions? Are you afraid of losing the authorities' benevolence?

[Correspondent] Excuse me, but it seems to me we are departing from the real sources of your differences in the heat of the polemic. I do not think the point lies in the personality of one trade union leader or another or his views. This would be too simple. And easily eliminated. Let us move on from mutual reproaches to an analysis of the causes.

[Misnik] I agree. But first a few words about Igor Yevgenyevich's assessment of our trade union organ's activity. Not only the problem of relationships with the FITUR were considered at our plenums. You are absolutely incorrect here. This matter was discussed only in the "miscellaneous" section. The main subject was social partnership and opportunities for utilizing it to protect the interests of miners and metallurgists. At the last plenum, as you know, the discussion centered on preparation of the wage agreement for 1993.

But now about the sources. The current structure of the FITUR is based on the old foundation inherited from the AUCCTU. Territorial trade union councils and sectorial committees are members of the FITUR. It turns out that there is dual membership in the federation. And here is the situation: an oblast committee of a sectorial trade union votes for one resolution, but the oblast trade union council votes for just the opposite. As a result, the FITUR Council considers the document which suits it more to be the one in effect. And it states at the same time that it reflects the interests of all trade union members.

A second factor. The FITUR established member organizations, including for management of the social insurance budget, based on the principles of full independence. However, the FITUR leadership has

monopolized control of this budget through the Social Insurance Fund. And it invited government officials from the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Labor to take part in the fund. An attempt to seize 35 percent of the trade union dues from primary organizations did not succeed only because of our persistence.

We are not pleased that old employees of oblast trade union councils are a majority on the FITUR Council. The voice of sectorial trade unions is practically unheard there, and we always turn out to be in the minority. All the proposals to reshape the structure are blocked by the trade union officials in the majority.

[Correspondent] This is closer to the subject, I think. Yes, the structure of the FITUR should be improved. Even I. Klochkov does not deny this. But what has your trade union achieved by "slamming the door?" It is hard to fight the government alone, or more precisely, it is impossible. Today, as never before, workers should have a sense of comradeship with each other. Have you considered all this?

[Misnik] I will say frankly that one of the reasons for our decision was the FITUR's position on relationships with the government. What are the federation leaders calling upon us to do? To turn back to state regulation of the economy. But this is dangerous for the workers. You will recall the struggle we conducted in 1991 to abolish wage restrictions. Now it turns out we are asked to go back. Let us regulate the prices, and hence the wages. This position does not suit us.

I was in Izhevsk on 23 and 24 October. I do not think there is any less social tension in the collectives of enterprises here than in Tambov or Voronezh, let us say. However, the republic council and the sectorial trade union committees did not call upon any people, but we invited the representatives of the administration and our own labor collectives. These meetings took an entire week. On Saturday we organized a roundtable, exchanged views, explained our positions, and outlined specific solutions to numerous problems.

We support this kind of a position by the trade unions. Cooperation with the authorities which produces results.

[Klochkov] If I understood Boris Grigoryevich correctly, he is suggesting that all trade union actions be reduced to negotiations. To beat the air endlessly. Such negotiations, as you should be aware, have already been held for many months. How many meetings with the government were organized by the trade unions: by the machine builders, the textile workers, and the farmers. But the result from them was negligible.

During our last meeting with President B. Yeltsin, we went through all our demands, point by point. He agreed that these problems did not arise yesterday, and with the presence of political will in the government, they could have been resolved much sooner, without the matter being aggravated to such an extent.

The entire problem is that the government has believed, and probably believes even now, that the trade unions can reassure everyone with promises, but do nothing. Promises such as these may be believed once or twice, but no more. For this reason, we believe the time has come for more decisive actions. We are not rejecting negotiations with the government, and as already mentioned, we approached it once again beginning on 27 October. But now we are stating: if our demands are not met in a month, we are organizing a new protest action.

In conclusion, I would like to stress once again that our differences with the leaders of the Mining and Metal Workers Trade Union do not stem from our differing views on the FITUR structure or the Social Insurance Fund. All these discussions are the result of dissembling. There are no problems here that cannot be resolved. The point is the attitude toward the authorities and the present course of the reforms. Today the position of B. Misnik and his circle is very closely linked with those who see the trade unions as a conservative force calling society to the past. I do not think this is a naive delusion; more likely it is a conscious effort to deprive the workers of the only protector of its socioeconomic interests and disrupt the unity of the trade union movement.

[Misnik] It is evident from your words that the FITUR is counting only on the pressure of force. But I have seen by going to the labor collectives that people are looking for different ways out of the crisis. And satisfactory results have been achieved here and there. Incidentally, our "Tulachermet" AO [Joint-Stock Company], where Ye. Gaydar wants to put his voucher, is operating very well. And the people there are satisfied. What does this show? There are no problems today where they have moved ahead a little bit and outpaced the reform movement.

It seems to me that your shortcoming is that you have not gone through a trade union school. And you cannot comprehend that any agreement, beginning with a collective agreement, is the product of consent, not the pressure of force.

[Klochkov] Let us look at history. How did the Tatar-Mongol yoke end for the Rus? When the punitive expedition sent by the khan reached Ugra, they met a Russian force that was prepared for battle. Both armies came to a

stop. So then they began negotiating. I believe that talks can produce a result only when they are reinforced by sufficient force and determination. We are resorting to actions that are interpreted seriously by our opponents. But conversations in a lobby do not lead to anything. We are convinced of this.

[Misnik] You cannot accuse us of lacking determination. You yourself heard members of the Central Council speak at our plenum. And we have sent the documents to the government and the Supreme Soviet.

[Klochkov] At your plenum, I sensed only the orators' fervent desire to demonstrate their loyalty to G. Burbulis...

[Correspondent] Thank you for the discussion. I hope that readers will interpret the certain degree of polemic sharpness and difference in expressions correctly. It is quite obvious that they were dictated by sincere concern for the future of the Russian trade union movement.

#### DELOVOY MIR Economic Statistics, 3 October

934A0126A Moscow *DELOVOY MIR* in Russian  
3 Oct 92 pp 2-3

[Report on Russian Federation economic statistics by Valeriy Galitskiy, Aris Zakharov, and Aleksandr Frenkel: "Prices Are Going Up, Production, Down"]

[Text]

#### The Consumer Market

During the past week meat, vegetable oil, and sugar remained the items in shortest supply in the consumer market. There were not available for sale in the stores of 23-33 cities.

Bread was available for sale in all cities except Stavropol. In Tula, Makhachkala, Groznyy, Omsk, Irkutsk, and Khabarovsk purchasing it required standing in line. Dairy products were not available in the stores in Arkhangelsk and Makhachkala; eggs, in Vladimir, Makhachkala, and Chita; and butter, in Gorno-Altaysk.

Changes in the stocks of basic food products over the week are reflected by the following data:

	As a percentage of the preceding week			Market saturation index	+
	production	trade and industry stocks	of that, in retail trade	09/07-09/11	09/14-09/18
Meat	120	131	200	2.9	3.0
Whole-milk products	99	*	*	3.8	3.8
Vegetable oil	127	117	132	2.6	2.6
Sugar	2.9-fold	113	187	2.7	2.7
Bread	98	114 (flour)	*	3.6	3.9

\* The value of this index is between 1 and 4 and is calculated as a weighted average taking into account the groupings of cities depending on the following situation at the market: (1) the item is not available for sale, (2) is sold by coupons, (3) purchasing it requires standing in line, (4) may be purchased easily.



By the middle of September there was a noticeably stronger demand for fall footwear, which has led to a diminished market saturation by these goods. During the preceding week women's fall boots and shoes and children's half-length boots were not available in the stores in 41-47 cities, and men's low shoes, in 30. None of these categories of footwear were available in the stores in Vologda, Petrozavodsk, Kostroma, Orel, Yoshkar-Ola, Saransk, Saratov, Perm, Ufa, Novosibirsk, Abakan, Ulan-Ude, and Kyzyl.

#### Level of Consumer Prices

After a relative stabilization of food prices during July-August (weekly increases were limited to one to two percent), the trend changed in the end of August. Starting on 25 August prices—taking city markets into account—increased by three to four percent weekly, that is, the rate of increases almost doubled. During the period of 8-15 September prices went up by 3.1 percent—a 2.6-percent increase in retail trade and a 4.5-percent at city markets.

Price changes from 8 to 15 September by commodity category are shown below:

In percent	Total	Including:	
		retail trade	city market
All food products	103.1	102.6	104.5
including:			
Meat and meat products	104.7	102.9	106.5
Fish and fish products	105.9	106.4	
Edible fats	101.9	101.6	103.8
Dairy products and cheeses	101.9	102.6	97.3
Eggs	117.2	115.4	139.4
Confectionery items	104.8	105.3	
Flour	106.2	106.6	
Cereals and pasta	104.9	104.7	
Potatoes and vegetables	102.1	99.2	104.8

During the past week the greatest increases in retail trade were registered with respect to prices for eggs (by 15.4 percent), with the average for Russia price being 29.1 rubles [R] per 10; salted herring (by 8.9 percent)—R79.3; highest grade wheat flour (by 6.7 percent)—R22.2; and bread made of grade I and II wheat flour (by 6.4 percent)—R14.8. Prices for tobacco items went up by almost 14 percent (cigarettes cost R40 a pack). Prices for some fresh produce went down: for yellow onions (by seven percent) and beets (by seven percent).

At city markets prices increased for practically all food products, with the exception of cottage cheese and cabbage. City market prices for beef, pork, sour cream, and beets were higher than retail trade prices by a factor of 1.5-2.0; and for vegetable oil, cottage cheese, eggs, yellow onions, and carrots by 30 percent.

Prices for nonfood items and paid consumer services continue to increase. The highest increase in prices for consumer goods over the week was with respect to knitwear and footwear—by 18 percent and 24 percent, respectively. The average price for men's low shoes was R2,402, women's fall boots—R3,878. Prices for electric appliances went up by four percent. The average price for a floor-standing refrigerator as of 15 September was R22,524 (with the highest price being R48,000 in Surgut and the lowest, R9,600 in Angarsk), and of a color television set—R22,383 (the highest in Yakutsk—R36,000 and the lowest in Grozny—R13,125).

With respect to paid services, during the first half of September the most significant increases were registered in the prices for consumer services. In particular, the cost of custom-tailoring a woman's dress increased by 13 percent, amounting to R1,282 on the average for Russia; of dry cleaning a coat—by 10 percent (R133); the cost of hairstyling and laundry services went up by 13 percent. The average price of a fashion hairdo was R86; for laundering and ironing linens—R119.

#### Industrial Production

During the first half of September production declined with respect to 127 kinds of output (82 percent of the total number of items counted in periodic reports) as compared with the same period of last year, with respect to 72 (almost one half of the items) it declined as compared with the last year's level. This is more or less the same way the situation was developing (with respect to the number of items) in the first half of August as well. However, with respect to 33 items, the decline in the first half of September, as compared with the preceding month, was more dramatic than that in August of this year. This includes production of steel pipes, diesels and diesel generators, metal-cutting machine tools with numeric program control, trolley buses, slate, asbestos-cement piping and couplers, construction brick, commercial timber, bolt timber, paper, cardboard, synthetic ammonia, caustic soda, automotive tires, washing machines, canned meat, sugar made from imported raw base, and mineral water.

In the fuels industry, the decline in the oil production continued and amounted to two percent as compared with the level for the same period this August, or 16 percent as compared with last September. Over the 13 days of this September production of coal and gas has increased as compared with the corresponding period in August, but was two to four percent below the level of the same period last year.

Ferrous metallurgy is experiencing increasing difficulties with respect to production of steel pipes. As compared to last year's level, over the eight months of this year their output fell by one-quarter. Over the 13 days in September, as compared with the same period of the preceding month, the output fell by another 14 percent, or by 37 percent as compared with the last year's level. The greatest decline in output occurred at the Taganrog metallurgical and the Seversk pipe plants, where the output of steel pipes over the 13 days of this September fell by one-half and two-thirds, respectively. The main cause of such a sharp decline is the plants' difficult financial situation.

In machine building, out of 25 items counted in periodic reports, the daily output of one-half of the items in the first half of September was below that of the corresponding period in August; with respect to 17, it was below that of last year's level. The trend towards an increasing decline in production as compared with August was registered in the output of diesels and diesel generators, urban telephone communications cables, metal-cutting machine tools with numeric program control, and trolley buses. The output of these items was one-half or less than that of the corresponding period in August.

In the chemical and petrochemical industry, during the first two weeks of the current month the average daily output of certain items somewhat exceeded the level of the corresponding period of last month; there remains, however, a considerable lag (eight to 27 percent) with respect to the production of, among others, sulphuric acid, mineral fertilizers, polystyrene, polyvinylchloride and plastics based on it, thermoplastic pipes and pipeline parts, and photo and movie film.

The decline is accelerating with respect to production of synthetic ammonia, caustic soda, chemical fibers and filaments, synthetic rubber, magnetic tape, and automotive tires—especially those for agricultural vehicles. Their average daily production in the first part of September was the lowest since the beginning of the year and amounted to no more than two-thirds of last January's level.

In the timber, woodworking, and cellulose and paper industries during the first half of September, as compared with the same period in August, the daily production of commercial cellulose, particle board and fiberboard increased by three to six percent, and of matches, by 23 percent. However, as compared with the level of last year's September, the decline in the production

volume of all the main categories of timber products remains. Average daily production of commercial timber during the elapsed period of September amounted to 196,000 cubic meters, which is one-quarter below that of September of last year. The shortage of raw timber is the main cause of the decline in production of bolt timber. Its daily production fell by 12 percent as compared with the preceding month, and by more than one-third as compared with September of last year. The situation is worsening with respect to the production of paper and cardboard, which is lagging by five to seven percent behind the level of the same period last month, and by 35-40 percent below that of last year. The greatest shortfall with respect to paper production occurred at the Syas, Balakhna, Arkhangelsk, Kotlass, and Kondopoga paper and cellulose plants.

At construction materials industry enterprises, during the first two weeks of September the average daily production of cement, high-quality asbestos, pliable roofing, and construction brick fell by 23-36 percent. As a result of the August stoppage of the Urals asbestos mineral-enrichment plant, which produces 60 percent of high-quality asbestos in the Russian Federation, seven out of 13 enterprises that produce asbestos-concrete pipes and couplings stopped manufacturing them. As a result, overall in the republic the output of this product amounted to only one-quarter of that of the first half of last year's September.

During the elapsed period in September the trend towards an increase of the daily production of most nonfood consumer goods, which emerged since August mostly as a result of employees returning from vacations, remained. However, the output of fabrics, knitwear, footwear, tape recorders, radio receivers, and washing machines comprises only one half, and of television sets, two-thirds, of that during the corresponding period of last year's September. Some enterprises continue to experience forced idling and stoppages of production because of inadequate deliveries of raw materials, supplies, and component parts.

In September, the complete absence of raw materials brought to a halt the factories of the "Vladteks" concern, "Svet" weaving cotton fabrics mill, and Imeni Abelmana spinning and weaving nonwoven materials mill. By the middle of September production of radio receivers and tape recorders still had not been resumed at the Radiopribor Production Association in Velikiye Luki (Pskov Oblast), and of washing machines at the Gidromash Production Association (Nizhniy Novgorod Oblast), both of which suspended the production of aforementioned items in August. In the food group, the production of most items counted in periodic reports is lagging considerably behind last year's level; with respect to one-quarter of items, it is lagging behind the same period of last month (in the first half of August such a decline was observed with respect to one-half of the items).

Reductions in the procurement of cattle and milk have led to cutbacks in the production of most important

varieties of meat and dairy products as compared with the first part of last year's September: meat—by 29 percent; butter and whole-milk products—by more than half; and cheese—by 21 percent.

Production of vegetable oil during the elapsed period of September amounted to half of that of last year. This is a result of the fact that many enterprises producing vegetable oil had been going through preventive maintenance and therefore not operating in August. Also, deliveries of imported raw materials have been very insignificant.

The situation with respect to granulated sugar remains severe. The output of the final product from the 1992 harvest amounts to half the volume of its production in September of last year.

It turned out impossible to make up for the shortfall in the production of salt that had occurred at the Bassol combine in August because of inclement weather. During the 13 days of September the overall decline in production of this item in the salt industry amounted to 22 percent of the level of the corresponding period of last year.

Because of the lack of raw materials received mostly through imports, the production of tea during the elapsed days of September amounted to only half the level of last year.

There was also a 27- to 37-percent decline, as compared with the corresponding period of last year, in the production of cereals made from state grain stocks, confectionery items, and food concentrates.

The production of practically all basic necessity nonfood items has declined as compared with the same period of last year. Production of papirosy and cigarettes, as well as of toothpaste, fell by eight percent; of household and facial soap and lotions—by 19-25 percent; and of synthetic detergents—almost by half.

#### Agriculture

By 21 September 87.6 million tonnes of grain has been threshed at Russia's farms (85 million tonnes by this time last year). The average yield per hectare is 20.2 quintals (16.3 quintals in 1991 and 21.7 quintals in 1990).

During the preceding week total grain yield amounted to 5.4 million tonnes, as compared to 6.5 million tonnes for the preceding week—mostly in the Urals and Siberian regions. There remains 11 million hectares to be harvested in this area, out of the 12 million hectares remaining in the entire Russian Federation.

As before, only one-fifth of the collected grain is delivered to state procurement centers. Most of it is being held back by the farms with the expectation of more lucrative offers. As of 21 September, 17.6 million tonnes has been procured (five percent less than last year). Last week's increase amounted to 1.3 million tonnes, as

compared with 1.5 million for the preceding week. Mandatory state procurement targets have been met by 60 percent.

Potatoes at state and collective farms have been harvested from 517,000 hectares (60 percent of area planted); vegetables—from 87,000 hectares (29 percent), including that during the past seven days—214,000 hectares (25 percent of area planted) and 19,000 hectares (six percent), respectively. The potato yield is somewhat below last year's level (91 quintals of tuber-crops per hectare as compared with 95 quintals last year). In most beet-growing regions, sugar beet harvesting began. By 21 September it had been harvested from 255,000 hectares (19 percent of the area planted), which amounts to 190 quintals per hectare (16 percent more than in 1991).

By the beginning of winter stall-keeping period, livestock feed stocks are noticeably lower than those of last year. Calculated per standard head of cattle, by the end of September stocks of coarse and juicy feed amounted to 11.5 quintals of feed units, as compared with 12.6 quintals by this time last year. Hay procurement is practically completed. The shortfall of this type of feed amounts to approximately one-fifth of last year's volume. The stocks amount to less than one tonne per cow, as compared with the two to three tonnes recommended by veterinary guidelines.

The harvesting of feed root-crops started later than last year; by 21 September the stocks amounted to one-third of the 1991 volume. The farms in most areas of the Northern, Northwestern, and Central economic regions, as well as in the Urals and Siberia practically have not yet started harvesting the root-crops.

The work in laying the foundation for next year's harvest continues to run behind schedule. As of 21 September winter grain has been sown on 13.4 million hectares as compared with 17.0 million hectares last year. With respect to plowing for spring sowing, 20.4 million hectares have been plowed (36.7 million hectares in 1991).

During this busy time for agricultural producers the process of setting up new peasant (private) farms slowed down to 6,000-7,000 a month (in February-April their number increased monthly by 17,000). By the beginning of September there were 138,800 peasant (private) farms in the Russian Federation, with a total area of 5.8 million hectares (42 hectares per farm on average).

#### Construction

The ongoing inflationary processes in capital construction are caused first and foremost by ever increasing prices for construction materials, components, and parts. These prices increase faster than those for construction and erection work, which leads to curtailment of construction in many sectors. During this year investment in the defense industry, shipbuilding, wood-working industry, construction of gas and oil pipelines, railroads, and highways diminished dramatically.

Of the 287 most important budget-financed objects slated for start-up during the current year, as of 1 September of this year only one has been put in operation at full capacity and two were put into partial operation. During the elapsed eight months R22.3 billion of capital investment had been used at the facilities slated for start-up and R13.3 billion worth of construction-erection work done.

Construction of the agro-industrial complex' food processing industry enterprises that are being built on the basis of integrated sets of imported equipment is lagging behind the program schedule. During January-August, the only facilities put into operation were the breakfast cereal production line at the beer and nonalcoholic beverage plant in Perm, and cracker production lines at the Gorokhovets Rayon food combine in Vladimir Oblast and at a Kuznetsk beer plant in Penza Oblast. In order to meet the nine-month targets, it is necessary to complete the construction of 15 facilities during the remaining month of the third quarter.

During January-August 1992 state enterprises and organizations (including leased ones) put into operation residential housing with a total area of 11.2 million square meters, which amounts to 73 percent of that of the corresponding period of last year. The volume of housing construction declines from month to month this year; in June, 3.8 million square meters were put into operation; in July, there was 1.3 million, and in August, 1.1 million square meters.

An especially difficult situation has emerged with respect to construction of general education schools. By the beginning of the 1992-1993 school year, state enterprises and organization—including leased ones—which handle more than 95 percent of the school-building construction, built general education schools with the capacity for 112,700 students, which is 30 percent less than by the beginning of the 1991-92 school year. Only 27 percent of the annual volume of work has been completed. In January-August not a single school facility had been built in almost one-third of the territories of the Russian Federation, including the republic of Chechen-Ingushetia, in Sakhalin, Kamchatka, Murmansk, and Magadan oblasts, where the availability of school facilities is especially low: up to 40 percent of students were attending school in a second shift.

Over the eight months of this year state enterprises (including leased ones) have built preschool facilities with the capacity for 34,700 children (74 percent of the January-August 1991 volume), hospitals for 2,300 beds (54 percent), and outpatient and polyclinic facilities with the capacity of 14,600 visits per shift (66 percent).

#### Railroad Transport

During the first 10 days of September in the Russian Federation the average daily residual of railroad cars with an expired off-loading deadline which were not unloaded due to the fault of the cargo recipients was 26,500—1.2 times more than during September of last

year. The greatest increase was registered in the following krais and oblasts:

	Average daily residual of railroad cars with expired off-loading deadline during the first 10 days of September 1992	First 10 days of September 1992 as a percentage of September 1991
Total in the republic	26,511	120
including:		
Tyumen Oblast	1,052	2.6-fold
Khabarovsk Kray	1,210	2.0-fold
Kemerovo Oblast	1,151	2.0-fold
Chelyabinsk Oblast	578	2.0-fold

In addition to this, there are considerable residuals of cars with an expired off-loading deadline in Maritime Kray—2,093 (1.6-fold increase), Irkutsk Oblast—1,282 (1.1-fold), and in Krasnoyarsk Kray—1,085 (1.4-fold).

There were 1,212 cars awaiting unloading daily at the railroad stations and access tracks of the city of Moscow, which is 29 percent less than in September of last year. In Moscow Oblast the average daily residual cars awaiting unloading amounted to 979—a four-percent decrease; in St. Petersburg and Leningrad Oblast—508, and by 44 percent, respectively.

#### Material Well-Being of the Population

Monetary income of the population in August amounted to R537.6 billion—a 8.2-fold increase as compared with the corresponding period of last year, or a 5.4-percent increase as compared with July. Overall over eight months total monetary income was R2,480.4 billion, which is 5.3 times greater than during the corresponding period in 1991.

The stratification of the society according to material wealth has increased. If in 1991 the average per capita income of the top 10 percent of the wealthiest population was 5.4 times greater than the income of the same percentage of the least wealthy population, during the second quarter of this year the difference was 6.5-fold.

The population's consumer expenditures in August amounted to R304.8 billion, which is seven times greater than in August 1991, and 17.8 percent greater than in July of this year. The total figure for January-August was R1,501.4 billion—a 5.5-fold increase as compared with the same period of 1991.

Total personal taxes and various withholdings in August amounted to R58.6 billion as compared with R48.2 billion in July of this year. Their share in the total monetary income was 10.9 percent. In over eight months the total taxes and withholdings amounted to R255.4 billion.



During this period R106.2 billion was deposited by the populace in the banks or used to purchase securities, including R18.5 billion in August. The proportion of this type of savings in the total volume of monetary income has declined and stood at 3.4 percent in August as compared with 4.1 percent in July. The proportion of savings kept in the form of cash also diminished from 35.7 percent in July to 29 percent in August. During January-August the total cash in the hands of the populace has increased by R617.4 billion, and as of 1 September of this year was R773.5 billion. The August emission was R182.0 billion (in July—R184.7 billion). Over eight months of this year it amounted to R614.4 billion, which met 34.8 percent of the cash needs of the national economy.

**Cost of the Weekly Selection of Basic Food Products as of  
15 September 1992  
(Taking City Market Prices Into Account)**

City	Cost of Selection (Rubles)
Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy	872.60
Magadan	818.20
Vladivostok	746.70
Vorkuta	738.24
Izhevsk	678.26
Prokopyevsk	653.83
Yakutsk	619.12
Khabarovsk	611.93
Perm	607.13
Vladikavkaz	604.06
Tyumen	581.19
Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk	577.30
Ivanovo	576.99
Chelyabinsk	573.77
Tomsk	546.38
Ukhta	543.06
Komsomolsk-na-Amure	538.60
Stavropol	535.72
Kemerovo	533.09
Apatity	529.80
Smolensk	520.88
Kaliningrad	517.91
Severodvinsk	514.62
St. Petersburg	514.48
Cherepovets	513.24
Krasnoyarsk	511.29
Birobidzhan	510.14
Shebekino	509.23
Nakhodka	509.21
Murmansk	504.33

**Cost of the Weekly Selection of Basic Food Products as of  
15 September 1992**

**(Taking City Market Prices Into Account) (Continued)**

City	Cost of Selection (Rubles)
Syktyvkar	496.61
Yekaterinburg	491.94
Saratov	482.36
Armavir	477.47
Blagoveshchensk	476.93
Sovetsk	468.66
Arkhangelsk	467.76
Novorossiysk	466.07
Vladimir	465.95
Petrozavodsk	464.68
Angarsk	463.56
Moscow	462.22
Yaroslavl	462.09
Obninsk	461.70
Yurga	459.99
Lipetsk	459.92
Shuya	457.68
Novokuznetsk	457.44
Irkutsk	455.47
Novgorod	452.98
Nizhniy Novgorod	450.69
Elektrostal	450.23
Kostroma	448.80
Cherkessk	448.69
Syzran	447.89
Tolyatti	446.77
Kopeysk	443.86
Tula	443.78
Tuapse	436.92
Novomoskovsk	436.87
Vologda	435.17
Krasnodar	434.41
Nizhniy Tagil	433.64
Belgorod	432.87
Sterlitamak	431.29
Dzerzhinsk	430.93
Pskov	427.86
Миасс	427.54
Kurgan	426.94
Divnogorsk	425.97
Ulan-Ude	423.82
Tayshet	423.75
Rostov-on-Don	423.01

**Cost of the Weekly Selection of Basic Food Products as of  
15 September 1992  
(Taking City Market Prices Into Account) (Continued)**

City	Cost of Selection (Rubles)
Chita	422.93
Ufa	420.72
Kaluga	419.55
Astrakhan	419.41
Ishimbay	418.67
Tver	418.51
Novosibirsk	417.22
Volgograd	416.96
Abakan	415.74
Sarov	414.71
Tambov	414.07
Shakhty	413.18
Nevinnomyssk	412.94
Novyy Oskol	412.66
Cheboksary	401.69
Barnaul	401.18
Ryazan	397.61
Taganrog	397.16
Penza	391.37
Volgodonsk	387.50
Kirov	387.22
Kyzyl	385.49
Gorno-Altaysk	385.00
Gornyyak	384.73
Berdsk	384.40
Arzamas	380.81

**Cost of the Weekly Selection of Basic Food Products as of  
15 September 1992  
(Taking City Market Prices Into Account) (Continued)**

City	Cost of Selection (Rubles)
Kamyshin	380.18
Bryansk	379.26
Omsk	379.24
Maykop	378.95
Neftekamsk	375.98
Samara	370.54
Balakovo	367.82
Kirovo-Chepetsk	367.77
Biysk	364.45
Novocheboksarsk	364.17
Orenburg	363.67
Orel	359.89
Orsk	358.52
Kursk	352.49
Elista	349.22
Voronezh	349.04
Saransk	347.62
Rubtsovsk	346.08
Yoshkar-Ola	341.18
Yelets	340.31
Groznyy	335.45
Naberezhnyye Chelny	282.17
Chistopol	272.27
Kazan	266.07
Ulyanovsk	251.29
Russian Federation	433.90

**Average Prices of Services in the Russian Federation**

Service	4 August 1992	18 August 1992	1 September 1992	15 September 1992
Individual sewing of woman's dress	1,040.80	1,070.90	1,123.70	1,281.64
Dry cleaning of winter coat	102.27	105.95	120.54	132.99
Laundering and ironing of linens (per kg)	10.53	10.83	10.90	11.92
One bath session (common hall)	8.67	9.04	9.32	9.49
Women's fashion hair-do	70.66	72.49	75.84	86.43
Single-trip bus fare, intracity	0.88	0.89	0.89	0.90
Hotel (per person in a first-class room for two, Grade I hotel)	149.33	160.13	161.85	163.29
Nursery-kindergarten (per child-day)	11.77	12.38	12.78	14.27
Movie ticket, evening show	12.49	13.83	16.33	16.72
Initial doctor's visit	53.71	53.19	59.47	61.21
Ultrasound diagnostic testing	95.08	97.74	101.36	108.59
General blood test	24.68	24.31	25.31	24.36

## Average Prices of Services in the Russian Federation (Continued)

Service	4 August 1992	18 August 1992	1 September 1992	15 September 1992
Manufacture of removable plastic dentures, two teeth (one device)	223.97	229.45	255.99	278.88
General massage (one session)	54.77	50.03	51.79	61.72
Trade-union sanatorium (per bed-day)	290.50	297.20	308.57	327.34
Rest home (per bed-day)	206.25	214.14	223.33	223.18

## Average Prices for Food Products in the Russian Federation (City Market)

Representative products	08/25/92	09/01/92	09/08/92	09/15/92
Beef, Category I	129.80	138.05	142.59	145.94
Pork	136.47	150.43	154.56	165.76
Boiled sausage, Grade I	150.00		130.00	150.00
Salami, Grade I	276.54	257.27	260.65	303.88
Live fish	42.96	49.24	50.94	50.43
Herring, salted and brined, ivasi	100.00			
Butter	186.64	196.68	202.21	211.89
Vegetable oil	67.52	72.18	77.24	86.39
Melted pork fat	55.70	60.87	60.77	62.00
Table margarine	112.00	112.00	170.00	129.76
Pasteurized milk, 3.2-3.5 percent fat	16.95	16.00	15.66	15.93
Fatty kefir				
Sour cream	136.82	146.71	157.08	162.04
Cottage cheese	64.09	66.46	72.04	65.41
Low-fat cottage cheese	28.50	32.31	29.35	27.27
Powdered cow milk			90.00	100.00
Hard rennet cheese (of the varieties Poshekhonskiy, Roslavl'skiy, Kostromskoy, Yaroslavl'skiy, Gollandskiy, etc.)	221.85	235.45	179.94	182.84
Feta cheese	93.24	92.08	97.83	96.89
Canned fish, price per standard 350-gram can, natural, with oil added (mackerel, scad)				50.00
Canned fish, price per standard 350-gram can, salmon in tomato sauce			98.00	75.42
Canned tomato puree and paste			69.89	
Chicken eggs (price per 10)	27.75	29.81	29.62	39.38
Granulated sugar	71.99	72.88	73.29	72.35
Ordinary cookies (of the variety Apelsinovoye, Privet, etc.)	57.14	60.98	70.00	111.33
Spice cake, bulk		38.00	40.00	142.93
Caramel candy, wrapped	150.00	144.42	171.15	171.74
Bohea black tea, highest quality	479.26	508.11	482.61	740.00
Salt				
Highest grade wheat flour	21.57	20.75	26.25	25.91
Wheat bread made of highest grade flour		25.00	25.00	25.00
Pretzels from highest grade flour	60.00			
Milled and polished rice	28.57	30.88	30.00	48.94
Semolina	25.00	25.00	25.00	30.00

**Average Prices for Food Products in the Russian Federation (City Market) (Continued)**

Representative products	08/25/92	09/01/92	09/08/92	09/15/92
Milled millet	19.00			
Unmilled buckwheat	56.84	58.87	60.08	77.08
Gerkules oatmeal				45.00
Ground split peas				
Macaroni, regular and fancy, various styles of cut (long and short), made from highest grade wheat flour	53.33	62.42	62.50	68.33
Vermicelli, made from highest grade wheat flour	47.60	70.00	49.00	50.00
Elbow macaroni, all varieties, from highest grade wheat flour		66.67		55.00
80-proof vodka, price per liter	341.47	336.89	354.26	365.73
Mayonnaise	149.25	160.00	167.50	150.00
Potatoes	19.78	19.80	18.15	18.76
Fresh green-head cabbage	16.72	17.73	18.60	17.20
Yellow onions	24.48	28.09	27.70	29.66
Garlic	96.60	102.75	110.80	125.83
Red beets	25.92	24.91	24.50	27.14
Carrots	25.19	25.86	24.13	26.71
Apples	38.29	36.80	33.44	32.75
Tobacco products, price per pack of cigarettes	17.38	17.13	18.85	21.97
Tobacco products, price per pack of filter cigarettes	44.82	45.87	53.75	59.06
Matches	1.53	1.68	2.06	1.96

Note: Product prices are given in kilograms, for meat patties and eggs—per 10, for milk, kefir, and vodka—per liter, for canned fish—per standard can, for tobacco products and matches—per pack.

**Average Prices on Nonfood Products in the Russian Federation**

Representative product	08/25/92	09/01/92	09/08/92	09/15/92
Men's light overcoat, wool blend	3,291.20	3,383.38	3,648.52	3,844.08
Two-piece suit, wool blend	2,692.39	2,766.76	2,924.72	3,216.01
Men's trousers, wool blend suit fabric	739.12	763.63	809.81	868.89
Men's shirt, cotton fabric	265.42	268.88	302.06	353.11
Women's light overcoat, wool blend	3,867.67	3,920.73	4,104.29	4,285.59
Women's dress, wool blend	740.47	799.89	846.21	916.70
Boy's jacket, lined, synthetic fabric	913.18	999.87	1,158.24	1,311.03
Girl's dress, wool blend	308.62	309.28	305.42	347.86
Boy's shirt, flannel or fustian	94.94	98.54	100.33	107.48
Men's jumper (sweater), pure wool yarn	1,253.62	1,266.64	1,495.15	1,793.03
Children's T-shirt, cotton fabric	44.10	44.98	45.82	50.13
Women's pantyhose, elastic	81.58	83.83	94.05	102.66
Men's socks, cotton	39.00	38.64	41.36	45.70
Children's socks, cotton	17.91	17.80	18.87	20.70
Children's tights, cotton	63.18	64.21	64.40	69.54
Men's low shoes, fashion, with natural leather sole	1,474.16	1,523.99	1,973.87	2,402.33
Women's boots, low-heel or platform sole, lined with textile material, with polyurethane sole	2,171.51	2,101.70	3,022.54	3,877.81



## Average Prices on Nonfood Products in the Russian Federation (Continued)

Representative product	08/25/92	09/01/92	09/08/92	09/15/92
Women's summer shoes, fashion, with high (or medium) heel, with natural leather sole or imitation leather	1,482.88	1,548.83	1,820.72	2,279.10
Summer shoes for school-age girls, medium heel, porous rubber sole	333.18	343.68	408.96	420.48
Refrigerator, floor-standing, semi-automatic defrost (KSh-260)	19,171.94	20,541.86	21,947.54	22,523.82
Electric iron, automatic	648.97	692.10	743.07	765.83
Color television, nonportable (screen diagonal 61-cm.)	19,982.26	20,317.05	21,209.50	22,383.24
Gasoline	7.61	7.65	7.60	7.68
Coal	138.03	143.01	145.13	145.87
Firewood	64.84	65.22	65.47	66.22
Peat briquettes	112.96	113.08	117.08	117.08
Electric power (urban localities)	0.23	0.23	0.23	0.23
Electric power (rural localities)	0.15	0.15	0.15	0.15

Note: Prices are given per item, gasoline—per liter, coal—per tonne, firewood and peat briquettes—per cubic meter, electric power—per kilowatt-hour

## Average Prices for Food Products in the Russian Federation (Retail Trade and City Market)

Representative products	08/25/92	09/01/92	09/08/92	09/15/92
Beef, Category I	112.01	116.31	120.20	123.19
Pork	125.05	138.25	142.18	155.40
Meat patties (per 10)	62.70	64.74	60.07	66.06
Pelmeni [meat-filled dumplings], frozen	62.19	63.16	67.26	69.36
Boiled sausage, Grade I	130.09	137.31	136.61	142.79
Salami, Grade I	193.43	203.66	207.55	214.90
Live fish	43.69	48.07	50.29	52.64
Mackerel, quick-frozen, refrigerated, unsegmented	39.16	42.64	44.17	45.94
Fish filet (mackerel)	54.18	54.40	48.00	67.74
Smoked fish (mackerel)	82.44	90.77	94.58	121.31
Herring, salted and brined, ivasi	72.20	68.93	72.62	79.33
Butter	184.31	188.70	187.69	189.73
Vegetable oil	54.39	57.79	63.90	67.96
Melted pork fat	66.66	65.51	66.22	67.71
Table margarine	71.71	76.36	75.16	78.70
Pasteurized milk, 3.2-3.5 percent fat	9.58	9.85	10.19	10.14
Fatty kefir	10.08	10.69	11.35	11.29
Sour cream	63.93	64.51	66.83	69.34
Cottage cheese	47.73	47.80	53.16	51.62
Low-fat cottage cheese	19.32	20.23	22.02	22.16
Powdered cow's milk	89.13	90.82	90.58	90.92
Hard rennet cheese (of the varieties Poshekhonskiy, Rossiyskiy, Kostromskoy, Yaroslavskiy, Gollandskiy, etc.)	148.34	152.53	151.27	156.42
Pasteurized processed cheese (of the varieties Druzhba, Voyna, Yantar, Leto)	112.47	115.72	118.60	129.14
Feta cheese	84.60	82.33	88.48	87.48

Average Prices for Food Products in the Russian Federation (Retail Trade and City Market) (Continued)

Representative products	08/25/92	09/01/92	09/08/92	09/15/92
Canned fish, price per standard 350-gram can, natural, with oil added (mackerel, scad)	40.40	39.47	39.87	41.08
Canned fish, price per standard 350-gram can, salmon in tomato sauce	52.08	51.46	54.64	55.14
Canned tomato puree and paste	54.01	57.95	57.84	57.31
Canned fruit for children	56.14	57.43	57.93	62.16
Chicken eggs (price per 10)	24.26	25.02	25.34	29.85
Granulated sugar	56.09	58.56	64.91	64.49
Ordinary cookies (of the variety Apelsinovoye, Privet, etc.)	64.86	69.06	73.13	80.56
Spice cake, bulk	56.42	58.83	60.72	62.96
Caramel candy, wrapped	115.18	117.80	123.74	126.78
Bohea black tea, highest quality	296.93	294.49	298.14	334.08
Salt	5.35	5.93	6.08	6.10
Rye flour	10.43	9.67	10.12	11.53
Highest grade wheat flour	18.74	20.82	21.37	22.73
Rye bread	10.19	10.78	11.16	11.98
Rye-wheat bread	9.94	12.06	12.14	12.38
Wheat bread from all-wheat flour	7.25	5.42	5.38	6.11
Wheat bread from highest grade flour	20.05	21.35	22.98	22.24
Wheat bread from Grade I and Grade II flour	12.19	13.82	14.01	14.84
Rolls and buns from highest grade wheat flour, price per 500 grams	11.55	13.53	14.89	14.12
Rolls and buns from Grade I wheat flour, price per 500 grams	9.23	10.71	11.30	11.41
Rolls and buns from Grade II wheat flour, price per 500 grams	11.84	13.50	13.50	13.62
Pretzels, Grade I wheat flour	39.22	39.59	41.77	44.24
Rusk, Grade I wheat flour	48.01	50.36	54.70	56.93
Milled and polished rice	30.98	30.25	31.11	32.97
Semolina	15.33	16.21	18.07	19.57
Milled millet	10.21	10.39	12.92	13.13
Unmilled buckwheat	49.23	50.38	55.62	55.43
Gerkules oatmeal	24.49	23.59	26.27	26.66
Ground split peas	11.37	11.38	11.30	14.21
Macaroni, regular and fancy, various styles of cut (long and short), made from highest grade wheat flour	36.39	37.35	38.71	43.93
Macaroni, regular and fancy, various styles of cut (long and short), made from Grade I wheat flour	25.48	26.47	32.96	35.88
Noodles, made from highest grade wheat flour	27.82	29.81	29.23	30.05
Vermicelli, made from highest grade wheat flour	29.85	29.25	30.89	36.26
Elbow macaroni, all varieties, from highest grade wheat flour	26.25	28.05	28.21	30.01
80-proof vodka, price per liter	253.88	255.44	274.11	279.68
Mayonnaise	94.32	89.69	89.01	97.29
Potatoes	19.64	19.90	18.69	19.17
Fresh green-head cabbage	14.10	14.72	16.05	16.12
Yellow onions	23.27	25.50	25.25	25.59

## Average Prices for Food Products in the Russian Federation (Retail Trade and City Market) (Continued)

Representative products	08/25/92	09/01/92	09/08/92	09/15/92
Garlic	95.89	103.06	112.23	125.27
Red beets	20.40	20.03	20.32	21.26
Carrots	23.17	23.25	21.75	23.42
Apples	37.97	36.60	33.66	33.60
Tobacco products, price per pack of cigarettes	11.68	12.57	15.48	17.62
Tobacco products, price per pack of filter cigarettes	26.16	28.94	35.86	41.87
Matches	1.16	1.23	1.23	1.30

Note: Product prices are given in kilograms, for meat patties and eggs—per 10, for milk, kefir, and vodka—per liter, for canned fish—per standard can, for tobacco products and matches—per pack.

## Presence (Absence) of Goods in Cities as Registered on 15 September

Product	Number of Cities Where Item Was Available As of Survey Date	Number of Cities Where Item Was Not Avail- able As of Survey Date	Cities Where Item Was Not Avail- able As Per- cent of All Cities	Number of Cities Where Item Was Available As of Survey Date	Number of Cities Where Item Was Not Avail- able As of Survey Date	Cities Where Item Was Not Avail- able As Per- cent of All Cities
	in retail trade			total		
A	1	2	3	4	5	6
Beef, Category 1	107	24	18.32	123	8	6.11
Pork	67	64	48.85	120	11	8.40
Meat patties (per 10)	33	98	74.81	33	98	74.81
Pelmeni (meat-filled dumplings), frozen	43	88	67.18	43	88	67.18
Boiled sausage, Grade I	110	21	16.03	110	21	16.03
Salami, Grade I	108	23	17.56	108	23	17.56
Live fish	23	108	82.44	31	100	76.34
Mackerel, quick-frozen, refrigerated, unsegmented	17	114	87.02	17	114	87.02
Fish filet (mackerel)	6	125	95.42	6	125	95.42
Smoked fish (mackerel)	33	98	74.81	33	98	74.81
Herring, salted and brined, ivasi	45	86	65.65	45	86	65.65
Butter	129	2	1.53	129	2	1.53
Vegetable oil	88	43	32.82	99	32	24.43
Melted pork fat	40	91	69.47	41	90	68.70
Table margarine	103	28	21.37	103	28	21.37
Pasteurized milk, 3.2-3.5 percent fat	129	2	1.53	129	2	1.53
Fatty kefir	109	22	16.79	109	22	16.79
Sour cream	124	7	5.34	127	4	3.05
Cottage cheese	71	60	45.80	101	30	22.90
Low-fat cottage cheese	65	66	50.38	67	64	48.85
Powdered cow's milk	56	75	57.25	56	75	57.25
Hard rennet cheese (of the varieties Poshekhonskiy, Rossiyskiy, Kostromskoy, Yaroslavskiy, Gollandskiy, etc.)	113	18	13.74	114	17	12.98
Pasteurized processed cheese (of the varieties Druzhba, Volna, Yantar, Leto)	55	76	58.02	55	76	58.02
Feta cheese	11	120	91.60	15	116	88.55

Presence (Absence) of Goods in Cities as Registered on 15 September (Continued)

Product	Number of Cities Where Item Was Available As of Survey Date	Number of Cities Where Item Was Not Avail- able As of Survey Date	Cities Where Item Was Not Avail- able As Per- cent of All Cities	Number of Cities Where Item Was Available As of Survey Date	Number of Cities Where Item Was Not Avail- able As of Survey Date	Cities Where Item Was Not Avail- able As Per- cent of All Cities
	in retail trade			total		
A	1	2	3	4	5	6
Canned fish, price per standard 350-gram can, natural, with oil added (mackerel, scad)	73	58	44.27	73	58	44.27
Canned fish, price per standard 350-gram can, salmon in tomato sauce	17	114	87.02	17	114	87.02
Canned tomato puree and paste	73	58	44.27	73	58	44.27
Canned fruit for children	52	79	60.31	52	79	60.31
Chicken eggs (price per 10)	124	7	5.34	128	3	2.29
Granulated sugar	101	30	22.90	101	30	22.90
Ordinary cookies (of the variety Apelsinovoye, Privet, etc.)	100	31	23.66	100	31	23.66
Spice cake, bulk	102	29	22.14	102	29	22.14
Caramel candy, wrapped	65	66	50.38	65	66	50.38
Bohea black tea, highest quality	93	38	29.01	93	38	29.01
Salt	121	10	7.63	121	10	7.63
Rye flour	8	123	93.89	8	123	93.89
Highest grade wheat flour	90	41	31.30	91	40	30.53
Rye bread	31	100	76.34	31	100	76.34
Rye-wheat bread	70	61	46.56	70	61	46.56
Wheat bread from entire-wheat flour	2	129	98.47	2	129	98.47
Wheat bread from highest grade flour	65	66	50.38	66	65	49.62
Wheat bread from Grade I and Grade II flour	91	40	30.53	91	40	30.53
Rolls and buns from highest grade wheat flour, price per 500 grams	105	26	19.85	105	26	19.85
Rolls and buns from Grade I wheat flour, price per 500 grams	41	90	68.70	41	90	68.70
Rolls and buns from Grade II wheat flour, price per 500 grams	2	129	98.47	2	129	98.47
Pretzels, Grade I wheat flour	76	55	41.98	76	55	41.98
Rusks, Grade I wheat flour	67	64	48.85	97	64	48.85
Milled and polished rice	100	31	23.66	100	31	23.66
Semolina	81	50	38.17	82	49	37.40
Milled millet	49	82	62.60	49	82	62.60
Unground buckwheat	61	70	53.44	61	70	53.44
Gerkules oatmeal	38	93	70.99	38	93	70.99
Ground split peas	13	118	90.08	13	118	90.08
Macaroni, ordinary and fancy, various styles of cut (long and short), made from highest grade wheat flour	47	84	64.12	48	83	63.36
Macaroni, ordinary and fancy, various styles of cut (long and short), made from Grade I wheat flour	7	124	94.66	7	124	94.66
Noodles, made from highest grade wheat flour	54	77	58.78	54	77	58.78



## Presence (Absence) of Goods in Cities as Registered on 15 September (Continued)

Product	Number of Cities Where Item Was Available As of Survey Date	Number of Cities Where Item Was Not Available As of Survey Date	Cities Where Item Was Not Available As Percent of All Cities	Number of Cities Where Item Was Available As of Survey Date	Number of Cities Where Item Was Not Available As of Survey Date	Cities Where Item Was Not Available As Percent of All Cities
	in retail trade			total		
A	1	2	3	4	5	6
Vermicelli, made from highest grade wheat flour	96	35	26.72	96	35	26.72
Elbow macaroni, all varieties, from highest grade wheat flour	71	60	45.80	71	60	45.80
80-proof vodka, price per liter	117	14	10.69	118	13	9.92
Mayonnaise	63	68	51.91	63	68	51.91
Potatoes	117	14	10.69	128	3	2.29
Fresh green-head cabbage	114	17	12.98	121	10	7.63
Yellow onions	115	16	12.21	124	7	5.34
Garlic	40	91	69.47	107	24	18.32
Red beets	104	27	20.61	117	14	10.69
Carrots	96	35	26.72	122	9	6.87
Apples	109	22	16.79	127	4	3.05
Tobacco products, price per pack of cigarettes	61	70	53.44	64	67	51.15
Tobacco products, price per pack of filter cigarettes	109	22	16.79	111	20	15.27
Matches	118	13	9.92	118	13	9.92

## Average Prices for Food Products in the Russian Federation (Retail Trade)

Representative products	08/25/92	09/01/92	09/08/92	09/15/92
Beef, Category I	84.27	86.25	89.63	92.31
Pork	83.26	88.99	90.45	95.08
Meat patties (per 10)	62.70	64.74	60.07	66.06
Pelmeni [meat-filled dumplings], frozen	62.19	63.16	67.26	69.36
Boiled sausage, Grade I	130.05	137.31	136.63	142.78
Salami, Grade I	191.73	202.27	205.96	212.16
Live fish	44.23	47.49	50.13	53.19
Mackerel, quick-frozen, refrigerated, unsegmented	39.16	42.64	44.17	45.94
Fish filet (mackerel)	54.18	54.40	48.00	67.74
Smoked fish (mackerel)	82.44	90.77	94.58	121.31
Herring, salted and brined, ivasi	72.15	68.93	72.62	79.33
Butter	184.16	188.39	186.98	188.49
Vegetable oil	51.94	55.24	60.57	65.08
Melting chocolate	67.77	65.68	66.45	67.98
Tablet chocolate	71.61	76.29	75.09	78.55
Pasteurized milk, 3.2-3.5 percent fat	9.43	9.72	10.05	10.02
Fatty kefir	10.08	10.69	11.35	11.29
Sour cream	54.73	54.88	56.98	59.52
Cottage cheese	40.45	40.71	43.71	45.73
Low-fat cottage cheese	19.10	20.02	21.90	22.06

Average Prices for Food Products in the Russian Federation (Retail Trade) (Continued)

Representative products	08/25/92	09/01/92	09/08/92	09/15/92
Powdered cow's milk	89.13	90.82	90.58	90.79
Hard rennet cheese (of the varieties Poshekhonskiy, Rossiyskiy, Kostromskoy, Yaroslavskiy, Gollandskiy, etc.)	147.19	151.35	150.60	156.03
Pasteurized processed cheese (of the varieties Druzhba, Volna, Yantar, Leto)	112.47	115.72	118.60	129.14
Feta cheese	78.87	76.65	79.28	84.25
Canned fish, price per standard 350-gram can, natural, with oil added (mackerel, scad)	40.40	39.47	39.87	40.99
Canned fish, price per standard 350-gram can, salmon in tomato sauce	52.08	51.46	54.14	53.99
Canned tomato puree and paste	54.01	57.95	57.43	57.31
Canned fruit for children	56.14	57.43	57.93	62.16
Chicken eggs (price per 10)	24.08	24.78	25.11	29.12
Granulated sugar	55.65	58.26	64.70	64.44
Ordinary cookies (of the variety Apelsinovoye, Privet, etc.)	65.00	69.20	73.17	80.40
Spice cake, bulk	56.42	58.88	60.81	62.73
Caramel candy, wrapped	114.98	117.15	120.28	125.48
Bohea black tea, highest quality	288.08	290.74	284.98	323.98
Salt	5.35	5.93	6.08	6.10
Rye flour	10.43	9.67	10.12	11.53
Highest grade wheat flour	18.70	20.82	21.20	22.64
Rye bread	10.19	10.78	11.16	11.98
Rye-wheat bread	9.94	12.06	12.14	12.38
Wheat bread from all-wheat flour	7.25	5.42	5.38	6.11
Wheat bread from highest grade flour	20.05	21.34	22.97	22.24
Wheat bread from Grade I and Grade II flour	12.19	13.82	14.01	14.84
Rolls and buns from highest grade wheat flour, price per 500 grams	11.55	13.53	14.89	14.12
Rolls and buns from Grade I wheat flour, price per 500 grams	9.23	10.71	11.30	11.41
Rolls and buns from Grade II wheat flour, price per 500 grams	11.84	13.50	13.50	13.62
Pretzels, Grade I wheat flour	38.92	39.59	41.77	44.24
Rusk, Grade I wheat flour	48.01	50.36	54.70	56.93
Milled and polished rice	31.04	30.24	31.14	32.88
Semolina	15.31	16.20	18.06	19.54
Milled millet	10.12	10.39	12.92	13.13
Unmilled buckwheat	48.69	50.13	55.35	55.25
"Gerkules" oatmeal	24.49	23.59	26.27	26.64
Ground split peas	11.37	11.38	11.30	14.21
Macaroni, regular and fancy, various styles of cut (long and short), made from highest grade wheat flour	36.25	37.21	38.40	43.31
Macaroni, regular and fancy, various styles of cut (long and short), made from Grade I wheat flour	25.48	26.47	32.96	35.88
Noodles, made from highest grade wheat flour	27.82	29.81	29.23	30.05
Vermicelli, made from highest grade wheat flour	29.64	29.22	30.83	36.22

Average Prices for Food Products in the Russian Federation (Retail Trade) (Continued)

Representative products	08/25/92	09/01/92	09/08/92	09/15/92
Elbow macaroni, all varieties, from highest grade wheat flour	26.25	27.97	28.21	29.90
80-proof vodka, price per liter	251.55	253.82	272.58	278.26
Mayonnaise	92.71	89.56	88.76	96.86
Potatoes	19.28	20.16	20.06	20.22
Fresh green-head cabbage	12.96	13.44	14.88	15.66
Yellow onions	22.13	23.15	23.14	21.84
Garlic	93.31	104.91	119.23	122.75
Red beets	15.59	16.40	17.25	16.80
Carrots	19.71	18.82	18.63	19.10
Apples	36.46	35.67	34.75	36.89
Tobacco products, price per pack of cigarettes	10.48	11.49	14.70	16.88
Tobacco products, price per pack of filter cigarettes	21.64	25.47	33.25	39.55
Matches	1.15	1.21	1.21	1.28

Note: Product prices are given in kilograms, for meat patties and eggs—per 10, for milk, kefir, and vodka—per liter, for canned fish—per standard can, for tobacco products and matches—per pack.

## REGIONAL AFFAIRS

### Krasnodar Produced 20 National Deputy Candidates

934C0178A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 14 Oct 92 p 2

[ITAR-TASS-NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA report: "Kalugin, Borovoy, and Kasatonov] Want To Be Deputies"]

[Text] Twenty candidates for people's deputies of Russia for election district No. 17, instead of having resigned their deputy powers, were registered Monday evening by the district election commission. Among the candidates are the former chairman of the kray Soviet of People's Deputies, Nikolay Kondratenko, and his successor, Aleksandr Zhdanovskiy, the ataman of the Cossack Society, Dmitriy Podlipentsev, and the president of the Rayon Association of Peasant and Individual Farms, Fndrikh Timoshenko. Muscovites—the former USSR People's Deputy from the Kuban Oleg Kalugin, the well known entrepreneur Konstantin Borovoy, and the first deputy commander of the navy, Admiral Igor Kasatonov—are ready to compete against the Kuban Cossacks.

According to the data of an express survey of the inhabitants of the inhabitants of Krasnodar on the elections to people's deputy of the Russian Federation, conducted by the RIKa and Postfactum agencies, the question: "For whom do you intend to vote?" was answered as follows:

—for Kondratenko	7 percent
—for Borovoy	7 percent
—for others	1 percent
—still undecided	32 percent
—not interested in the elections	52 percent.

### Borovoy Sued by People's Deputy Candidate

934C0178B Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 16 Oct 92 p 2

[Krim-press report: "Suit Against Borovoy for 1 Billion"]

[Text] In the Kuban, the well-known entrepreneur Konstantin Borovoy, candidate for people's deputy of the Krasnodar National-Territorial District No 17, evidently will stand before a court. The suit against him for the sum of 1 billion rubles is being prepared to be brought before the court by another candidate for people's deputy, the Krasnodar scientist Nikolay Aleshin. As was stated in the declaration received in the district election commission, the violation of campaign ethics by Borovoy during one of his public appearances before voters served as the reason.

In the opinion of Aleshin, the statement by Borovoy also did economic damage and led to the postponement of the signing of the agreement on humanitarian assistance to the Kuban Center for the sum of US \$3 million.

### Tuleyev Accuses Oblast Administration of Corruption

934C0178C Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 17 Oct 92 p 2

[Report by Natalya Gorodetskaya: "Tuleyev Wants To Judge the Government"]

[Text] Aman Tuleyev once again shook the deputies of the oblast Soviet with his expansive statements at the session: At first he demanded to take away from the

administration the funds outside the budget and foreign currency funds (it allegedly makes poor use of them) and to deposit them in the oblast Soviet account. This would require the creation of an executive committee, and Tuleyev would head the executive and legislative power in the oblast, which, in the opinion of the head of the administration, Mikhail Kislyuk, "would return Soviet power to the oblast." The deputies did not support the proposal.

In his conclusion, Aman Tuleyev accused not only the oblast administration of corruption, but also the law enforcement organs, the procuracy, and the government of Russia and the president, and demanded their trial. At least it is necessary to investigate their activity, Tuleyev declared, for which an independent commission must be created, best of all an international commission. Tuleyev said that he is an opponent of strikes, but, if the people unites in the struggle against the present situation, which is the fault of the corrupt government, he will be the first to support such a strike.

Apparently, this time the zeal of Tuleyev at the session was suspected by the presence there of members of the editorial board of the journal VOSKRESENIYE (the former SOVETSKIY SOYUZ). Well, and as far as the deputies are concerned, they, according to Kislyuk, "hardened" and did not react in any way.

#### **Tatarstan Supreme Soviet Chairman on Republic Policy**

934C0135A Moscow DEN in Russian 23-29 Aug 92 p 3

[Interview with Farid Mukhammetshin, chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Tatarstan, by political scientist Shamil Sultanov; place and date not given: "But We Are Realists"]

[Text] [Sultanov] The declaration on the sovereignty of the Republic of Tatarstan was proclaimed two years ago. Can we today speak about the special path of your republic?

[Mukhammetshin] The multinational people of our republic want to answer for their fate themselves. This is their basic right. I repeat: Our multinational people means Tatars, Russians, Chuvash, Bashkir. We are gradually shaping our legislative base. We will shortly adopt a constitution. But we are realists, we need a certain continuity. The laws of both the Russian Federation and the former Soviet Union, unless they are contrary to our internal legislation, will operate on our territory in the transitional period.

[Sultanov] But your sovereignty is not yet recognized....

[Mukhammetshin] It all depends. We have already signed intergovernmental economic agreements with Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Belarus, and Turkey, and the republics of the Transcaucasus and Montenegro. A process of de facto recognition is under way.

[Sultanov] Why has the Republic of Tatarstan, together with Chechnia and Tyumen Oblast, not signed the Federal Treaty?

[Mukhammetshin] We did not agree with the basic postulate of this treaty advanced by Moscow. Our fundamental position was as follows: If we are talking about a real federation, we delegate the federal authorities certain powers from the bottom up and finance them. But relations are built on an equal bilateral basis.

Our position originally evoked furious rejection in Moscow. But we said: The process of national and regional sovereignization was initiated by you at the Soviet Union level. And it is now objective. It cannot be halted.

Take the example of our referendum. A majority of representatives of different nationalities voted for the sovereignty of their republic.

[Sultanov] The Federal Treaty was to have been part of the Russian Constitution. But, as I know, it has already been appreciably abridged. It has been integrated in Section VI with big revisions. Moscow is tacking and dissembling, and this will hardly improve the present regime's relations with the Russian regions.

[Mukhammetshin] There is no question that this will not improve relations. Russia needs a fundamentally new formula of the federal arrangement, taking account of both the regional and national diversity of the country. Considering the present complex situation, incidentally, we are avoiding in every way possible any drastic unilateral steps, and we aspire to the formulation of mutually beneficial concerted positions.

[Sultanov] From my viewpoint, an attempt at the embodiment in practice of certain basic principles of Eurasian community living is being made in the Republic of Tatarstan....

[Mukhammetshin] We have social and cultural centers of Bashkirs, Germans, Udmurt, Tatars, Russians, Jews, Chuvash.... We recently held an all-republic congress of the peoples of Tatarstan. The principal theme of this congress was that no one people can be happy at the expense of another—Tatars at the expense of Russians, Russians at the expense of the Chuvash.... We aspire here, for example, to real bilingualism.... We are also prepared for a citizen of Tatarstan to hold citizenship of Ukraine, for example. The main thing is that in this case Tatarstan and Ukraine sign the corresponding agreement: to bear responsibility for these citizens together.

The main thing is preventing interethnic conflicts, and we are succeeding here.

[Sultanov] But there are problems, nonetheless....



[Mukhammetshin] And there will continue to be, and we cannot close our eyes to this. Our national patriots are exerting strong pressure: the immediate severance of relations with Russia, our own army, our own currency, and so forth. And the local democrats are demanding: Change nothing. There are, generally, malcontents on both sides. But we have our own diversified systemic strategy, and it is supported by a majority of our multinational people.

[Sultanov] There is increasing talk in Moscow about the possibility of the establishment of a dictatorship in Russia....

[Mukhammetshin] It is clear to any serious politician that dictatorship in this form or the other would signify a tragedy for the Russian Federation. Dictatorship would most likely lead to Russia's disintegration.

[Sultanov] Is separatism within Tatarstan itself possible?

[Mukhammetshin] If there are no outside subversive actions, separatism will have no internal roots in the Republic of Tatarstan.

[Sultanov] The Soviet Union, however it is damned currently by certain Moscow "democrats," was our common motherland. After its criminal liquidation, many peoples have found themselves split into dozens of states, and this applies to Russians, Ukrainians, and Tatars primarily. Is this not a historical contradiction: On the one hand, global sovereignization, on the other, the interstate division of the peoples themselves?

[Mukhammetshin] Very many people now regret the disintegration of the Soviet Union. I personally also. But since this has happened, it is essential to seek fundamentally new forms of future relationships....

[Sultanov] ....Within the framework of "Eurasian" ideology?

[Mukhammetshin] It is not a question of definitions but of essence. In the light of our history, the creation of mononational states means, at best, utopia, and at worst, permanent bloody conflicts.

As far as ideology is concerned, real ideology also should be shaped from the bottom up. The respectful coexistence of Islam and Orthodoxy, the effective interaction of different peoples, love of one's land and its traditions, patriotism—these are the prerequisites of future ideology. We would like to create a society which is an example of the creative interaction of heterogeneous elements. Yes, this is difficult, but essential. Ideology means primarily the flow of life itself, not the imposition of some armchair tenets. We need today primarily social stability, and for this, a flexible policy. This is the basis for the formation and realization of the state interests of the Republic of Tatarstan.

### **Illegal Weapons Arsenals Reported in Tatarstan**

934C0131B Kazan SOVETSKAYA TATARIYA  
in Russian 5 Sep 92 p 5

[Article by A. Kobayakov: "From the Underground Arsenals: More and More Often the Militia Confiscates Weapons Intended for Sale or for the Criminal Trade"]

[Text] A lot of attention is being given to crime prevention in the state's comprehensive program to fight criminal offenses in the Republic of Tatarstan in 1992-1995, which will be submitted for consideration by the Supreme Soviet. There can be no doubt that work in this direction will be continued at a much higher level. And an important part of it, of course, will remain the "disarmament" of the criminal element. As practice shows, a rather large amount of weapons is present in the underground arsenals of a certain segment of the population of the republic now, and not only hunting rifles. In any case, in August alone, about 150 pieces were confiscated.

Here is an example. Employees of the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] of Tatarstan confiscated seven hand grenades from a warrant officer of the Kazan tank school. The case is extraordinary! When the matter began to be investigated, the thread led to Moscow, to an apartment and to the dacha of a senior officer who serves in the system of the Main Administration for Higher Educational Institutions of the Ministry of Defense of Russia. The "catch" itself of the Moscow and Kazan operators exceeded all expectations: 23 RGD-5 grenades, a sniper's rifle with an optical sight, military fixed night vision binoculars, cartridges for various types of firearms, and also...a parachute and the breech-block of a tank cannon were confiscated.

"Indeed, here in the MVD," says Major V. Veselov, "we could open up an entire armory. All kinds of things are uncovered in searches! In addition to weapons of plant manufacture, we run into a mass of no less threatening and dangerous homemade weapons."

Together with specialists, we examine a display that has been prepared for the visit of journalists. There is a wide assortment: from hand grenades and pistols of various brands to a sniper rifle and even an arbalest. By no means a toy, but manufactured as a murder weapon: An arrow released from it is capable of going right through two people standing one behind the other.

And one more fact is sickening. Only a small part of the confiscated weapons still had the traces of the plant lubricant. Many more pieces had clearly been used in "work." And how is one to know how much blood and human suffering is behind them?

Lieutenant Colonel E. Fatykhov, the deputy chief of the expert-criminological department, told us about what route the weapons take that are confiscated in an arrest:

**Operational employees transfer their dangerous "finds" to the investigators. At this stage, the weapons are evidence, and in parallel with the investigation, they undergo**

expert analysis. Its objective—to classify a given object as in fact a firearm or cold steel. To corroborate whether shots were fired from one or another weapon is no problem for us. But if a pistol or a rifle are plant manufactured, then to establish the place from which it was stolen, we send it to Moscow, to the bullet ballistics section of the MVD of the Russian Federation. After special research is conducted, the weapon is returned to the investigator, and afterwards it is presented in court as material evidence, together with its former owner. After the trial, a special act is drawn up and, if the weapon is homemade, it is destroyed under a press. Plant-made weapons end up in our depot....

We were continuing the inspection when our attention was attracted by a high-quality dagger whose handle was done in deerskin.

"First rate work!" we exclaimed. "It is both beautiful and handy."

"The work really is outstanding," agreed Major Veselov. "However, its handiness is of a special nature: Handles like this do not leave any fingerprints."

PHOTO CAPTION: You get an unpleasant feeling when you think of the fact that these lethal "toys" are kept in our homes, and that they could be used some day....

#### **Report on Emergency Session of Kabardino-Balkar Supreme Soviet**

934C0151A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 13 Oct 92 p 3

[Report by Igor Terekhov: "Extraordinary Session of Parliament Demands Disarming of Illegal Formations and Condemns Actions by KKN Leaders"]

[Text] The Extraordinary Session of the KBR [Kabardino-Balkar Republic] Supreme Soviet which was held in Nalchik discussed the sociopolitical situation that has evolved in this republic as a result of the standoff between the official authorities and the opposition forces. As is known, during the period from 24 September through 4 October Nalchik witnessed mass disorders; attempts were made to storm the House of Soviets, as well as the television studio; the republic-level procuracy, the airport, and the highway were blocked off; and there was a marked upsurge of crime. These mass disturbances and the holding of an unscheduled political meeting were caused by the detention of Musa Shanibov, president of the Confederation of Caucasian Mountain Peoples (KGNK), by an investigative group of the RF [Russian Federation] Procuracy. However, in the considered opinion of Valeriy Kokov, president of the KBG, there was a purely pro forma cause. In his report at the above-mentioned session he declared that if this cause had not arisen, the demonstrations would have taken place at some other time and would have been connected with other social aggravations. Inasmuch as the standoff, screened by slogans about national revival—in the president's opinion—is the result of a political struggle for

power and, moreover, a struggle to change Kabardino-Balkaria's geopolitical orientation, to break it away from the RF and create an independent Islamic state under the banner of the KGNK, "the events which are modestly termed a republic-level political meeting, will—in fact—go down in the history of this republic as the most dramatic events, practically leading to the collapse of the republic, the loss of state sovereignty, the beginning of civil war, bloody terror, and the raging violence of Mafia-type clans and structures. These events will also lead to a struggle for the right to plunder the national wealth and the people themselves without hindrance." Such was the statement made by the president of the KBR.

In touching upon the causes of the social explosion, the president of the KBR also noted its objective preconditions: the instability of the economic situation in this republic, the inability to solve a considerable number of problems relating to the national, ethnic, and cultural revival, and the insufficient scope of implementing the Declaration of Sovereignty.

As a result of the situation being destabilized, arms began to be widely disseminated among the population, along with the formation of bandit-type gangs. There has also been an increase in crime and violations of the law. Although the president's report did not contain a quantitative estimate of the illegal armed formations, in a statement from the floor he declared that he would do everything possible to see to it that the opposition would lay down at least 2,000 weapons and that—obviously—this number could be taken as a rough estimate. And the KBR Ministry of Internal Affairs, as stated at the session by Major General Khachim Shogenov, has confiscated six pistols, 15 automatic weapons, one machine gun, five grenade-launchers, and a large quantity of ammunition.

In a decree adopted by the session the actions of the organizers and participants in the unscheduled political meeting in Nalchik were deemed unconstitutional; the KBR Ministry of Internal Affairs, Ministry of Security, and Procuracy were assigned the task of guaranteeing a timely investigation of the facts of the illegal actions committed by certain citizens and officials. Deputies demanded that the law-enforcement organs take decisive measures to disarm the illegal armed formations and confiscate weapons from the population. At the same time, KBR Supreme Soviet commissions and the government were entrusted with the duty of thoroughly analyzing the causes which led to the exacerbation of the sociopolitical situation and taking measures to stabilize it. And the Supreme Soviet Presidium was given the task of speeding up the development of a number of legislative acts directed at improving this republic's political system.

The mass attack undertaken by the president, the government, and the Supreme Soviet Presidium on the KKN [Congress of the Kabardinian People] as one of the principal groups guilty of exacerbating the situation was

embodied in a special decree "On the Congress of the Kabardinian People." With regard to its adoption, one of the most prepared deputies stated that he did not consider its adoption to be a politically farsighted step. Nevertheless, the above-mentioned decree was adopted, albeit in a somewhat watered-down form. Thus, whereas the draft decree recognized the activity of the entire KKN as unconstitutional, the final version declared as follows: "We recognize the activity of the KKN ispolkom and leadership, which have set as their goal the violent overthrow of the lawfully elected organs of power, as unconstitutional, leading to destabilization of the sociopolitical situation, the disruption of Kabardino-Balkaria's unity, a breakaway from the RF, and the unleashing of an interethnic war." The KBR Procuracy—instead of submitting a resolution to bring the activity of the KKN to a halt—proposed to examine and consider the legality of its activity.

The Extraordinary Session of the parliament discussed in one form or another the activity of the KKN and—in particular—the results of the Confederation Congress which took place in Grozny. The latter body had proposed that the northern Caucasian republics denounce the Federation Treaty with Russia. And although this item had not been included on the agenda, a decree was adopted stating that the KBR had no relations with the KGNK and had not delegated its representatives to this organization.

#### **Counselor of All-World Vainakh Association for Peace in the Caucasus**

934C0166A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 10 Oct 92 p 3

[Interview with Adam Mokhammed Amin, counselor to the general secretary of the All-World Vainakh Association, by Natalya Pachegina: "The State of Peace Is Natural for Man. The Counselor of the All-World Vainakh Association, Adam Amin, Appeals Not To Spare Efforts for This"; place and date not specified]

[Text] Adam Mokhammed Amin is the counselor of the general secretary of the All-World Vainakh Association, whose center is located in the capital of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Amman. As is well known, Jordan, since the Sixties of the past century, has become the homeland for more than 20,000 Vainakhs—Chechens and Ingush who left the country during Russia's wars of conquest in the Northern Caucasus. The greatest dream of Adam Amin, by his admission, is to become a citizen of a unified sovereign Vainakh state in the Caucasus. Moreover, Amin represents the Foreign Policy Association, headed by Aleksandr Bessmertnykh, in the Northern Caucasus.

[Pachegina] So you were born in Jordan?

[Amin] What are you saying, I am a citizen of the Chechen Republic. If you want to know, I acquired the

citizenship of the Chechen Republic almost as early as the president of the Chechen Republic, Dzhokhar Dudayev himself.

Generally speaking, my ancestors came to the Northern Caucasus from the Near East at the end of the 13th century. According to our family tradition, their missionary activity in regard to the dissemination of blessed Islam first went on in Dagestan, and at the end of the 17th century the family settled in Chechen. Thus my Arab ancestors became related with the Vainakhs.

With the beginning of the democratic processes in our country, I understood that it is my duty to promote peace in the Northern Caucasus. Moreover, I believe that my Vainakh people, who suffered so much during the years of the Russian-Caucasian war and during the Soviet period, is worthy of living in a civilized state. The Chechen diaspora in Jordan has not forgotten its homeland and wants to be useful to it. Sheikh Abdul Baki Dzhamo, a member of the parliament of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, a Chechen by birth, is the general secretary of the All-World Vainakh Association [AWVA] which I represent. Our foreign compatriots, through the AWVA are inclined to get involved, above all, with peacemaking activity in the Northern Caucasus. Today the Caucasus, as during the past century, is a "powder-keg". The confrontation of the peoples has attained the kind of level where any insufficiently considered word, and all the more so action, can entail dangerous consequences. The chief task of our organization in the present conditions is to promote the peaceful "untying" of all the "knots" of the former policy. Unfortunately, for the time being it is impossible to say that the present leadership of Russia is skillfully solving the conflicts. I am afraid that to the old "knots" during the past few years quite a few new ones have been added.

The AWVA is inclined to have itself registered in the United Nations, in order for the world association to be able to influence the events in the region in a civilized manner. The National Bank of the Vainakh Association in Amman is allotting significant funds for the organization of the instruction of the Vainakh young people of our country in the secular and religious educational institutions of the Near East. The association is ready to organize the publication of books, newspapers, and journals—for the time being they are published only in Amman—even in the Northern Caucasus, and everywhere in Russia where Chechens and Ingush live.

[Pachegina] And how are your intentions received in your homeland, in Grozny?

[Amin] Dzhokhar Dudayev brings great understanding to the plans of our organization. After his recent trip to the countries of the Orient, I think, our work is being activated, especially as the Chechen leadership is quite cognizant of the significance and role of the Muslim world in the life of the Vainakh people. Not long ago, I was in Chechnya. You understand, I passed through 11 countries, and nowhere was I searched. But in my



homeland, an OMON member quite shamelessly climbed on my car and rummaged through my pockets. In the Caucasus things are very bleak at present. People look unfriendly, there are armed young people all around. All this is very far from my dream. After the people, even Grozny itself has changed: Kind of grey, dusty, the former good-heartedness is no longer in people.

[Pachegina] In your dream about the independent Vainakh state, Russia occupies the place of the "quarrelsome neighbor" or are there nevertheless prospects in the relations between the former Soviet peoples?

[Amin] I am convinced, we have nowhere to go from one another. The world is not so big. And there is no reason for Russians, Vainakhs, or other peoples living in the Caucasus to live under the threat of civil war. I hope that the Russians who left Chechnya, fearing for their lives, will return. I believe that here, too, in Russia, the human and civil rights of Chechens and Ingush will be protected. The borders of the future sovereign Vainakh state, I see as transparent ones. There can be no others: The destinies of peoples are indivisible, as mankind is indivisible. Enemies of our peoples can only be those who call to war. . . .

[Pachegina] You, probably, know about the activity of the Confederation of the Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus, which united through the idea of the creation of a Mountain Republic, as was stated in its charter, the peoples of the Northern Caucasus. How do you regard the position of leadership of this organization?

[Amin] You know, I am convinced: The present situation in the Caucasus cannot be solved through armed methods. Only through negotiations can and must a way be found out of any conflict. There is no need to regret the time, the effort, and the words to convince people, even if they have already taken up arms. Perhaps, this is pure idealism, but this is my credo.

[Pachegina] Thus, your organization intends to become a competitor of the Confederation of the Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus in the Northern Caucasus?

[Amin] I think that the sympathy of people, who have become tired of war, will without fail turn to us. The state of peace is so natural for man.

#### **Profile of Caucasus Federation Leader Shanibov**

934C0179A Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian  
15 Oct 92 p 2

[Article by Alan Kasayev: "A Single-Minded Person: Strokes in a Political Portrait of Musa Shanibov"]

[Text] In recent times the Confederation of Caucasian Nations [CCN] and the name of its leader Musa Shanibov have appeared with increasing regularity in the pages of Russian newspapers. Truth becomes mixed with conjecture and unfounded accusations with the facts... Alan

Kasayev, the author of this material, has had a long personal acquaintance with the President of the CCN and offers the readers his own analysis of Shanibov's personality and the reasons for his growing popularity.

Well-known to many in the capital of Kabardino-Balkaria as an instructor of political science at the local university, Yuriy Magometovich Shanibov changed his name and patronymic and became Musa Mukhamedovich. This took place after a congress of representatives of the peoples of the Caucasus was held in Sukhumi in November 1990, at which the Assembly of Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus was organized and Shanibov chosen as its leader. At first little was known of the activity of the assembly and its leader, and those who followed socio-political life in the Caucasus counted dozens of newly-formed parties and organizations. Less than two years have passed since that time, and the majority of those parties have faded into oblivion, and only a dozen or so "founding fathers" know that others even exist. But the Confederation of Caucasian Nations, which grew out of the association, has become a powerful military-political force on the scale of all of the Caucasus, and its leader has indeed become well-known far and wide.

Many people have interpreted Shabanov's change of his European name and Russified patronymic as emphasis of the Muslim orientation of not only the President, but also the CCN as a whole. In his recent speech at the UN, Georgian leader Eduard Shevardnadze let it be known that the Confederation is indeed a power to be reckoned with, for it represents a conductor of fundamentalism in the Caucasus. The fact that fundamentalism itself bears a threat to the peace does not, it would seem, require further proof for Shevardnadze. At the very same time Musa Shanibov has not spoken to anyone at the session of the UN General Assembly; but at a session of the CCN parliament in Makhachkala in May of this year he made a well-argued declaration that Islam cannot become the main unifying force for the nations of the Caucasus, for a great number of the active members of the Confederation simply do not practice Islam. We would note parenthetically that the "Muslim card" was skilfully played for the purpose of arousing the politicians and public opinion in Russia and in the West. Thus, recently the newspaper NEW YORK TIMES wrote about Abkhaziya, that it is a Muslim nation which speaks a Turkic language. In fact, the only thing true here is that the Abkhazi are indeed a nation.

Shanibov arrived at the peak of his popularity at the time of the escalation of the Abkhazi-Georgian conflict as a consequence of his scandalously well-known order and his threats directed toward the leadership of Georgia, by the real assistance of the organization of Abkhazis which he headed and by his arrest by the Russian prosecutor. Those who know Shanibov well are certain that his order was dictated under the influence of emotion and its provisions were never actually put into effect. Shanibov can without any exaggeration be called a fanatic on the



idea of a unified Caucasus, which would include Abkhazia as well. But serious analysis of his actions could hardly provide serious evidence of the fact that Musa Mukhamedovich believes that the unification of the North Caucasus is directed against Russia, Georgia or anyone else. Many observers considered the sending of volunteers from the Confederation into Abkhazia a provocative factor, and could hardly believe that a Caucasian to the core such as Shanibov was mainly thinking about saving the lives of the thousands of people who fell or could have fallen victim to aggressive actions. And this is Shanibov in toto. He is much less a politician than an orator or a rhetorician.

The levers of the political as well as military leadership of the Confederation were not in Shanibov's hands, nor are they now. And in this sense the actions of the Russian and Kabardino-Balkarian prosecutor and Russian Ministry of Security were practically perfect for the creation of an image of a hero for all the Caucasus. The clumsy attempt, upon reflection, to get out of the awkward situation which arose after Shanibov's arrest, which ended in the "escape" of the 58-year-old President of the CCN from prison, was the final straw.

Henceforth and for an undetermined time to come, Musa Shanibov will personify a kind of a saint for every Caucasian: self-sacrifice in the name of freedom and unity, martyrdom and personal bravery. This only adds to the prestige of the organization which he heads and strengthens its influence on the development of the situation, which is not canceled out by accusations of terrorism and force. The military aspect is not the main one in the activity of the CCN and its President. In a conversation with the author of these lines, Shanibov somehow said that his desire is that the Confederation would finally consolidate the peoples of the North Caucasus and thereby solve the existing conflicts between them by peaceful means. It is a matter for Russian politicians to decide, whether Russia needs a unified but peaceful Caucasus or not.

#### **North Caucasus Peoples Association Created, Adopts Program**

934C0131A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA  
in Russian 20 Oct 92 p 2

[Article by S. Elmanovich, Moscow: "Association of Caucasus Peoples Created"]

[Text] A conference of representatives of Caucasus peoples was held at the end of last week in the parliamentary center of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation. Members of various national and regional social organizations took part in the work: the congress of Kabardinian people, the congress of mountain people of the Caucasus, the Terskoye Kazachestvo [Cossacks from the Terek River area], the Kumyk and Lezgin social movements, and many others.

Conference speakers included scholars and industrialists, and lawyers and entrepreneurs who discussed

questions associated with how to improve the political and economic situation in the Caucasus. Conference attendees proclaimed the creation of the North Caucasus Peoples Association, whose principal aims are: the establishment of mutual understanding among all peoples of the Caucasus, the creation of conditions for the peaceful resolution of all disputes that arise between peoples of the region, and the creation of legal and financial conditions for the development of industry, trade, and enterprise.

A political statement was adopted at the conference, and leading organs were elected. Professor Sh. Dzoblayev was elected general secretary of the assembly.

#### **Union of Cossack Troops of Russia Leader on Political Stance of Group**

934C0148A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 14 Oct 92 p 3

[Interview with Albert Vetrov, chairman, Council of Atamans, Union of Cossack Troops of Russia, by Igor Rotar; place and date not given: "First and Foremost, We Seek Mutual Understanding With the Armed Forces"]

[Text] The first half of October has been marked by extraordinary activity in the political life of Russian Cossackdom.

A Council of Atamans of the Union of Cossack Troops of Russia (SKVR) took place on 3-4 October. These Cossacks elected a new leader. Albert Timofeyevich Vetrov, ataman of the Yenisey Cossack Troops, became chairman of the Council of Atamans.

The Union of Cossack Troops of Russia came into being as an alternative organization to the Union of Cossacks. The SKVR considers itself to be the heir of the White Movement and thereby separated itself from the Union of Cossacks, which was created—in their opinion—with the support of the CPSU. The election of a new leader in one of the most influential Cossack movements will, undoubtedly, exert a definite influence on the further destiny of those organizations uniting people who consider themselves to be the rightful heirs and successors of a privileged class or caste in tsarist Russia.

Personnel changes have affected not only the Union of Cossack Troops. On 10-11 October a large meeting of Cossacks from the Don Troops took place in Novocherkassk. By a vote of 215 to 200 these Cossacks deposed their ataman, Sergey Meshcheryakov. A descendant of a renowned White Cossack general, the Volgograd Cossack, Vasilii Ivanovich Kaledin, was elected to be the new ataman. In the opinion of independent observers, the deposition of Sergey Meshcheryakov—who was objectionable to the Union of Cossacks—signifies the strengthening of that organization's position in the Don region.

We have published below an interview with Albert Vetrov, chairman of the Council of Atamans, Union of Cossack Troops of Russia.

[Rotar] Does the change of leadership in the SKVR signify a change of political orientations in your organization?

[Vetrov] No, it does not. The reason for this change is much more prosaic. The Council of Atamans listened to the report by Chief of Staff Yevgeniy Yefremov and assessed his work as unsatisfactory. It was recognized as feasible to elect a chairman of the Council of Atamans who would express the opinion of the SKVR atamans and who would exercise monitoring controls on the staff's activity.

[Rotar] Prior to your becoming the new SKVR leader, a great deal was said about the need to unite your organization with the Union of Cossacks. To what extent is this realistic?

[Vetrov] There is a trend toward unification. But it would be extremely complicated to implement this. A merger of these organizations will take place if the Union of Cossacks rejects both its communist and its national-Bolshevik ideologies. We stand for nonparticipation in any political organizations. Cossacks serve neither parties nor individuals, but rather the Russian state.

[Rotar] But, in fact, the traditional Cossackdom relied on government structures....

[Vetrov] The Cossacks always keyed not so much on the government structure as on the army. Even nowadays—first and foremost, we seek mutual understanding with the Armed Forces. Since a president was elected, we must carry out his orders—if we trust him. And if not, then we must resolve the matter of his resignation in a constitutional fashion.

[Rotar] So you trust the president?

[Vetrov] You know, I have just accepted this new post. So I cannot answer that question just now.

[Rotar] During the conflict in the Dniester region the Cossacks, including troops, fought on the side of the unrecognized republic. Does that mean that if the views of the Russian government and the Cossacks do not coincide, you consider it possible to take a decision on your own? Or was the "Dniester Campaign" just a mistake?

[Vetrov] When Christian Slavs began to be slaughtered anywhere, the Russian people always used to rise up to protect and defend them. The Cossacks' participation in the Dniester region fighting was a gesture of pure heroism and devotion. People went there on their own; nobody sent them there. I think that such actions by the Cossacks were not systematic. It was simply that the situation at that time required such a solution.

[Rotar] Who can guarantee that such a situation will not come up again?

[Vetrov] I cannot give such guarantees.

[Rotar] In connection with the Abkhazian-Georgian fighting, the situation in Krasnodar Kray has become sharply worse. Most of the refugees arriving in Krasnodar Kray are Abkhazian Armenians. The most radical Cossack leaders have begun to talk about pogroms....

[Vetrov] The Armenians should flee into Armenia and take refuge there. Why are they fleeing into Krasnodar Kray, or—let's say—into Rostov Oblast?

[Rotar] The fact of the matter is that since the 19th century Armenian villages have been situated all along the Black Sea coastline. The Abkhazian Armenians are fleeing to their own relatives in the Kuban.

[Vetrov] I repeat, the Armenians should live in Armenia. If they happened to arrive in Russia at one time, that does not mean that they should now speak about state-type formations.

[Rotar] So how is this problem to be solved?

[Vetrov] To my way of thinking, a state program should be adopted here. The Russian population of Central Asia and Transcaucasia must be resettled in Russia, whereas the Caucasian peoples should depart for their own homelands.

[Rotar] But just how could this be carried out in practice?

[Vetrov] That ought to be decided at the state level. But if the state will not take measures, then the people will begin to make decisions on their own.

[Rotar] But what kinds of decisions will the people make?

[Vetrov] Inaction on the part of the government will provoke interethnic clashes. Dissatisfaction with the Caucasian peoples in Russian is very great. And any spark could lead to uncontrollable consequences. These peoples have historical homelands; let them live there. But Russia should be inhabited by those peoples who have traditionally lived there—in our country.

[Rotar] But any division into indigenous and non-indigenous peoples is quite conditional and relative. What kind of temporary or provisional criterion would you consider sufficient for a people to be called indigenous?

[Vetrov] My opinion is as follows: an indigenous inhabitant is one who was born in our land. This is not a matter, let's say, of the Nakhichevan Armenians, who had traditionally lived in the Don region. But it is about that non-Slavic population which nowadays inhabits our land, having fled here from conflicts in the Caucasus. Let them restore order in their own countries. Why do we need them here?

[Rotar] How do you assess the deposition of Sergey Meshcheryakov as ataman of the Troops of the Don?

[Vetrov] That is the will of the Cossacks of the Don Troops. The Council of the Atamans and the Cossacks are prepared to cooperate with the lawfully elected ataman of the government of the Troops of the Don. All these unions of Cossacks and associations are a stage of the past. The SKVR wishes success to the new ataman.

[Rotar] According to the assessment of many observers, the deposition of the disgraced ataman signifies victory in the Don region for your opponents in the Don region—the Union of Cossacks.

[Vetrov] I consider that there are no grounds for pessimism. This re-election was based not on ideological considerations, but on the individual personalities of the candidates for the office of ataman in the oblast of the Troops of the Don.

#### **Association of Russian Koreans Head Interviewed**

934C0152A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 20 Oct p 3

[Interview with Mikhail Pak, Korean Association president, by Natalya Pachegina under "Ethnicity" rubric: "Russian Koreans Will Have To Wait for Autonomy: Interview With Korean Association president, Mikhail Pak"]

[Text] [Pachegina] Judging by the growth of anti-Japanese sentiments in our society, the problem of creating territorial autonomy in the Far East for Russian Koreans is not being resolved with any great success. Several pieces in national-patriotic publications give reason to believe that our, politely speaking, poorly-informed audience identifies Russian Koreans with the population of the Japanese islands.

[Pak] This is a sensitive issue not only for the Far Eastern region. Koreans in Russia have put down roots not just in the Amur region; there are areas with compact Korean populations in the Caucasus, in Central Asia, in the European part of Russia. The Association of Russian Koreans does not feel that it is possible today to pose this question to the Russian leadership. And although the question of an ethnic and cultural rebirth of the Russian Koreans remains as before a pressing one for us, we, all the same, are aware that the state is incapable of assuring this problem's resolution through economic aid, and that the Koreans themselves are unable to unite around the idea of a rebirth. Unfortunately, questions of national sovereignty and autonomy take advantage of forces that, under national banners, resolve their own problems, which are far from the interests of peoples. I will not hide my own opinion that in some places, bandit elements are simply exploiting the national idea. The Far Eastern authorities are doing everything possible to monopolize their cooperation with neighboring countries. While the Korean population of the Far East is kept from participating in the development of trade and economic relations with both

Koreas, Japan and China. The attempt by individual Korean families to move from Central Asia to places closer to traditional Korean areas—in the Amur area—are perceived by chauvinistic circles in the region as efforts to "occupy Russian land." In the mean time, Koreans in this region could resolve a mass of economic problems, including the food problems, in a fairly short period. The ability of Russian Koreans to grow "vitamin" produce is well known. Especially zealous in igniting anti-Korean sentiments among the local population are the Ussuri Cossacks\*, who themselves experienced the cruelty of genocide during the Stalin years. The media, with the connivance of local government organs, are spreading the rumor that Korean settlements allegedly serve as an advanced post for future Japanese "conquests." While it is a well-known fact that the anti-Japanese movement in Korea has created all the conditions required for a national liberation war between the Korean people and foreign aggressors.

I will repeat myself: the resolution of ethnic problems under our conditions is closely tied to the problems of economic property. Only a healthy market economy will allow the resolution of the humanitarian issues connected with the rebirth of peoples, their culture, language, traditions.

[Pachegina] That means that it would benefit Koreans in Russia to come to terms with the idea that, if one is to judge by the tempos of economic reforms, in the foreseeable future, no part of their fate will change?

[Pak] You know, I think that external circumstances (I have in mind first of all progress in Russo-Korean relations, in my view, the unification of North and South Korea is unavoidable) will facilitate the resolution of problems concerning the Russian Koreans. For now, however, as it seems to me, we must work towards a cultural rebirth for the Russian Koreans. After all, it happens that 95 percent of the Koreans do not know their native language, and have lost their ethnic traditions. It was for these purposes that a center for Korean studies has been created at Moscow State University, the leadership of which has been entrusted to me.

[Pachegina] Does the Moscow State University International Center for Korean Studies have as its goal the study of Korean culture?

[Pak] The center's creation was a Korean initiative. The head of the leading party in South Korea, Kim En Sam, stood at the source of our center. Almost two years have gone by, and we still have no accommodations, and a tiny staff. We received nearly 40 thousand dollars worth of books in Korean as a gift from South Korea, but they are lying in boxes, unpacked. But the organizers' plans for the center nevertheless range very far. Using the university as a base, there is the possibility of organizing joint research projects on the study of Korean culture.

### Smolensk Oblast Faces Influx of Refugees

934C0128B Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 20 Oct 92 p 1

[Article by Viktor Artemenko, PRAVDA correspondent, Smolensk: "The Bosses Themselves Got Poor"]

[Text] Smolensk has become a receiving zone for refugees and those who have been forced to become migrants. A branch of the Moscow Countrymen center opened here. Russians come from Georgia, Moldova, Azerbaijan, and Tajikistan. The department of labor under the head of the administration formed an entire section in the oblast employment center that is trying to ease the lot of involuntary migrants on Smolensk territory.

Unfortunately, the Smolensk residents are unable to provide all of them with a house and daily bread. It is best of all to earn bread through peasant labor, and it is also a little better with housing in the countryside. But a majority of the refugees prefer the city, and an oblast city is desirable. Only 95 families—less than half—have accepted the invitation of rural rayons, and they are setting themselves up on oblast farms. The Russian parliament has not yet passed a law on refugees and, according to a temporary decree of the emigration committee of the Russian Federation, persons who have been forced to become migrants against their will are granted very modest benefits. Unmarried mothers, single pensioners, and large families receive 900 rubles [R] per person. But again, in rural areas the figure is twice as much.

The situation is somewhat better for the "planned" migrants, whom the Smolensk region long ago invited for a joint revival of the village. But the impoverished kolkhozes and sovkhoses are refusing to pay the arrivals even that pittance which was stipulated.

And here, you see, is the paradox: The Smolensk region needs additional working hands. To the present day, the prewar population level has not been restored. But the oblast cannot shelter the growing flow of refugees properly. Apparently, it is necessary to establish the status of a refugee in Russia legislatively and to meet countrymen, if not generously with bread and salt, then by giving them an opportunity to earn bread and salt by themselves.

### Labor Supplies Help Determine Regional Investment Potential

934A0138A Moscow KOMMERSANT in Russian  
No 36, 5-12 Oct 92 p 21

[Article by Leonid Bogdanov, Boris Skorobogatko and Sergey Smirnov: "Labor Reserves"]

[Text] The peculiarities of territorial labor markets have a significant influence on conditions for capital investment. Mass privatization makes this circumstance especially current for investors.

Favorable investment conditions presuppose the presence of markets adequate to the capital—commodity, currency, and labor markets. However, up until recent times, independent economic structures in Russia, as a rule, did not take the labor market into account. There was no need for this: From the standpoint of the labor wage, the advantages of a small private sector over the state sector were so great that there was no question of competition for manpower.

However, for the present day, the labor wage has practically levelled out, and state enterprises have been able to retain the image of a zone of stability and guarantees. Thus, manpower has become the same object of competitive struggle with equal rights as the other factors of production. It is quite natural that the capacity of the labor market is not uniform—in a sectorial as well as in a territorial cross-section. The shortage of manpower of a certain specialty and training in one territory or another makes it a more expensive resource. As a result, there is an increase in outlays and prices, and investments—with all other conditions being equal—become less effective.

### Regional Labor-Excessive Markets

The level of layoff of the work force reached in August—0.4 percent of the overall number of persons employed in the national economy—remains an unprecedentedly low figure as compared with countries having a comparable level of economic development. (We should, of course, consider the fact that there is latent unemployment and, on the contrary, employment in the shadow economy).

Unemployment is an indicator of the presence on a certain territory of a work force which is not employed, and unwillingly so. The description of the standard of unemployment as compared with the level of employment, as well as the qualification make-up of the unemployed contingent, reflect the capacity of the labor market reserves on which the potential investor can actually count. A high level of unemployment exacerbates the shortage of jobs and makes it possible to economize on labor wages. Therefore, in regions with a higher level of unemployment, as a rule, inflation is lower. At the same time, high unemployment exacerbates social conflicts and makes the region less attractive for investments.

The relative share of unemployed persons is highest in several of the seaside oblasts of the North and Northeast (Murmansk, Arkhangelsk, Sakhalin, Magadan, Kamchatka), which have always depended on subsidies from the federal budget and have always been strongly militarized. The educational and qualification make-up of military servicemen and civilians working for the army is usually higher than for the national economy as an average. Moreover, the affiliation with the army could not help but have an effect on the level of discipline of the work force. This circumstance, as well as the presence of large ports and the convenience of the seaside oblasts for organization of free economic zones on their



territory with the potential participation of foreign capital, makes the above-named regions rather attractive for investment.

The labor market of the republics of the North Caucasus is oversaturated to the limit. This relates primarily to North Ossetia, where the state of affairs has been complicated by the influx of refugees. The phenomenon of full employment in Chechnya, where unemployment existed even in the best Soviet times, may be explained only by the unique record keeping in the sovereign republic.

Yet at the same time, we are seeing an intensive exodus of the comparatively skilled Russian-speaking population from this region. This creates additional problems for the local labor market: Unemployment here is combined with a shortage of skilled industrial cadres. As a result, the oil processing industry, machine building, light industry and processing of agricultural products is being stripped of manpower. We should note that the peculiarities of the lifestyle, traditions and mentality of the region's native population do not predispose it to hired labor. On the contrary, local residents are sooner inclined toward self-employment in agriculture, crafts and the sphere of trade.

As for the oblasts of the North Caucasus (Rostov Oblast, Krasnodar and Stavropol Krays), here the situation is largely determined by the wave of Russian refugees which has poured into this region from the North Caucasus republics, the Transcaucasus and Central Asia. These are migrant workers, oriented in their spirit toward independent work, artel labor in agriculture, small-scale industry processing agricultural raw materials, or toward the sphere of sales. As a result, in oblasts with a large number of vacancies in heavy industry, a large excess of unemployed manpower has been formed. It will acutely compete with the native Cossack population, which has similar preferences. Therefore, the region with an excess of active work force, aimed at mobile quick-turnover business (in this sense attractive for adequate investment), also has the potential for social protest and labor conflicts.

A new phenomenon is the exacerbation of the problem in the developed industrial and agricultural oblasts of the center of Russia (Yaroslavl, Kostroma, Vologda, Ivanovo, Tula, Bryansk, Vladimir, Kirov, and Nizhgorod), as well as in the major cities—Moscow and St. Petersburg. Here the decline in production and the structural reorganization which has begun, including conversion, are most acutely felt. At the same time, it is primarily the curtailment of production that is laying off engineering-technical workers and white-collar workers. Blue collar workers, on the contrary, are employed, and there are also quite a few unfilled jobs. We must note that the most well-skilled and educated work force is concentrated in this region. In this sense, the labor potential for the future investor exists, but one will have to compete for worker specialties.

The Urals are a region of greatest concentration of industry and manpower. Unemployment here is at the average level for Russia. Predominant among the unemployed (as well as also the employed, we might add) are skilled male workers, as well as young people without any particular skill or training who do not want to work in the heavy industry sectors. The peculiarity of unemployment is its extremely uniform structure: Primarily low-skilled worker cadres which are difficult to re-train.

We must note in particular that the population of the Center and the Urals is predominantly oriented toward hired labor. This tradition was formed back in the times of formulation of Russian industry, and still exists to this day. Hired labor here is viewed not only as a source of means for existence, but also as a method of self-expression of the people. In connection with this, the unemployed in these regions perceive their status in an acutely negative manner, which may become the reason for sharp social protest.

#### Unemployment—Not a Very Ruinous Phenomenon

Already today the question of increasing the insurance contribution to the employment fund is being discussed. The most probable is an increase of deductions from the labor wage fund of enterprises and commercial structures up to two percent, which is analogous to the level adopted in the developed countries. As a result, the average amount of the unemployment benefit in 1992 will be brought up to R1,000 (75 percent of the minimum labor wage), and in 1993—to R6,200.

According to the evaluation of the Russian Goskomstat [State Committee on Statistics], by the end of the year the number of unemployed may reach 2 million people. The authors of the government program for intensification of economic reforms give a more accurate prognosis: A total of 2,377,000 people will be considered unemployed for 1992 (in 1993 the figure will be 6,632,000 persons). Of these, 1,783,000 (75 percent) will receive unemployment benefits, while in 1993 almost all unemployed persons will receive benefits. Thus, there is a chance to achieve a "decent" level of unemployment—2.7 percent—by the end of 1992. We might add that unemployment predictions in Russia are an unprecedented matter, and therefore unreliable. It is enough to say that for 1992 the Ministry of Economics predicted 6 million unemployed, while the Committee on Employment predicted as many as 7 or 8 million unemployed. The Goskomstat was a bit more reserved: It believed that 5 million people would find themselves out of work, although this is not in Russia alone, but in all the states of the Commonwealth. If the Goskomstat prognosis is justified by the end of the year, then over R44 billion will be needed to pay unemployment benefits, to organize retraining, and to pay stipends to persons who are undergoing retaining. Considering the costs for maintenance and expansion of the employment services, as well as for organization of social work, the fund expenditures may reach R55 billion. We will note that the existing

standard of insurance deductions—one percent of the labor wage fund—will provide for revenues of no more than R30 billion.

The effect of the new phenomenon on the labor market will be manifested in a maximal degree in regions with the highest level of unemployment. The government plans to give these regions a special status which presupposes the expansion of the capacities of local authorities for influencing the labor market, as well as for stimulating investments, creating new jobs and preserving existing ones. The new economy, according to government plans, will be able to enjoy a whole series of privileges here.

Among these privileges will be direct subsidies to enterprises from the federal fund for regional development, and subventions (special-purpose subsidies) from the state budget to local budgets. In other words, we are speaking about "live" money for the possible investor who ventures into the depressed region.

Another indulgence are the privileges of a property and non-property nature extended to the investor. The former include preferential conditions for granting credit and tax benefits. The latter—maximally advantageous conditions for registering enterprises, the introduction of simplified accounting, and the provision of nonresidential facilities, especially in the framework of the upcoming programs of so-called "self-employment of the unemployed."

The most probable aspirants to the status of territories of priority job development are (in order of descending probability): Adygea, North Ossetia, Dagestan, Kalmykia, Arkhangelsk, Murmansk, Pskov, Ivanovo, Kostroma and Yaroslavl Oblasts.

### Chelyabinsk-70 Redirecting Nuclear Work

934C0162A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA  
in Russian No 43, 21 Oct 92 p 12

[Report by Eduard Filatyev: "The Nuclear Chicken and the Golden Eggs"]

[Text] The scientific nuclear center in the open city of Chelyabinsk-70 was making ready to conduct the latest experiment.

47, 46, 45, 44....

Despite the firm and solemn moratorium proclaimed by our country, "secret physicists" nevertheless did decide to check the operation of a new "article."

22, 21, 20, 19....

When it learns about the upcoming action, the world community should certainly protest in desperation.

12, 11, 10, 9....

But....

4, 3, 2, 1....

They have tested the new item. And very successfully. And progressive mankind has indifferently ignored this alarming fact. And all because in the open city of physicists, they were testing not a threatening nuclear weapon, but only an installation for drying chicken manure.

The powers are drying out the "brightest minds" and the most "golden hands"....chicken manure! Do we need more eloquent proof that all is not well in the homeland's nuclear sector?

When on that day in May, at 26 degrees above zero, an ominous cloud suddenly appeared above the forest of Industrial Area No. 20, a mild panic immediately flared up in the city.

"What is that?" the inhabitants asked in some concern. "An escape of chlorine or a radioactive excursion?"

It is easy to understand the concern of the people in the city, because they live side by side with the project where the most threatening weapons—nuclear weapons—are born. The facility is VNIITF—the All-Russian Scientific Research Institute of Technical Physics. Russia's second nuclear center.

The second center was created not to compete with the first. It was all rather more dramatic. In the mid-1950's it was reported to the Soviet leadership that America knew where the brain of our nuclear program was located and had targeted everything it had on it.

Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev, who at that time was totally engaged with the grandiose business of opening up the virgin lands and fallow lands, clutched at his head:

"So what should be done?"

"Secretly form a second, analogous center," an adviser proposed. "A backup. In case of an emergency. And send there the best minds from among those whom Kurchatov has not yet managed to recruit for his own needs."

Creation of a parallel nuclear structure threatened to cost the country a pretty penny. A lot. And Khrushchev was reluctant to divert funding from the insatiable virgin lands that were so dear to his heart. But it was more important to teach them a lesson. And on the boundless territory of the then still mighty and indivisible USSR, yet another unseen city appeared, and in it there was a nuclear center. A doppelganger center. A second scientific head, as it were, capable at any moment of replacing the first.

While bustling with a full life, our invisible city at the same time apparently did not exist at all: It was not shown on the maps, and the underground numbers of the conspiratorial city were periodically changed. During the 1960's it was not for nothing that we sang with pride about the "cities that have no names." Even today the center for the Ural nuclear people has two official names.

One is something like a military rank conferred on everyone who has anything to do with the defense of the country or the army: Chelyabinsk-70. The other is a totally civilian name—Snezhinsk. Absolutely peaceful, almost poetical and lyrical. And at first blush so remote from what the city actually does.

However, is it really so remote? For the shape of a snowflake [snezhinka] is very similar to that of an explosion. The cunning physicist's somehow outwitted the vigilant military people and gave their city a name that drops a hint. And a city emblem was devised for the dimwits—a star inside a snowflake, and inside the star the point of an atom. Even a schoolboy could guess that one!

Of course, it would be "suitable" for the main square in this kind of city to have a statue of some eminent physicist. Kurchatov, for example. And this is in fact what was initially suggested. But the strictest of secrecy was an impediment.

What if a foreign satellite discerned the personality depicted in the statue? And they would understand everything, guess everything! So the central square of Chelyabinsk-Snezhinsk was decorated with a bronze Ilich. And the memorial to Kurchatov, already cast, was banished beyond the forest and lakes and swamps and set up on one of the production areas. That same production site No 20 that so scared the city on that May morning.

However, all suspicions about harm from the mysterious emissions were dispelled the next day by the local newspaper NASHA GAZETA. It reported on page one that "the green cloud caused a totally unnecessary mild panic among the city folk; it turns out that it was simply birch pollen."

By an irony of fate these measures of strict secrecy reached a unique culmination. Our own leaders never once visited the nuclear cradle of power. It was as if they had forgotten about its existence. And the first major state figure who managed to find time for Snezhinsk was U.S. Secretary of State James Baker. In memory of this official visit by a potential adversary, the inhabitants of Snezhinsk now call the street leading from the control and entry point to the city Baker Street.

During the secretary of state's visit to one of the laboratories, he unexpectedly asked why the physicists working in it had gray hair. They explained to the curious American that a gray head was merely the consequence of the constant worrying about the fate of the business entrusted to them. And, as is known, the business of the "secret physicists" is such that it cannot but trouble them....

It would, however, be more honest to answer that the "secret heads" have turned white because of the new questions raised by perestroika.

Why does the country allocate 100 million rubles [R] annually to the VNIITF, while in the United States the analogous center is given a billion dollars each year?

Why were the Soviet experts who were observers at the nuclear proving ground in Nevada given only \$15 a day, while the labor of a simple American worker at that same test site is paid at the rate of at least \$25 an hour?

Why are the wages of a trolley bus driver in Chelyabinsk Oblast more than the monthly pay of a top-class theoretical physicist from the closed Chelyabinsk-70?

But that is by no means all. Conversion and the moratorium have descended like a June snow on heads warmed by a sultry heat. The nuclear racer across the ocean has continued its fast gallop, as if nothing has happened, while ours has come to a standstill, like something rooted to the ground. An alarming silence hangs over the Soviet test sites. The sector has fallen into a half-sleep.

It would appear that this is the very time to plan for the switch onto peaceful rails and, having regrouped, to move forward in a new direction. But this has not occurred! The size of Russia has had its effect. Without thinking about it for very long, the energy reformers completely closed off the channels of funding for the nuclear programs. The flow of money that for so many years steadily turned the millstone of the insatiable nuclear mill suddenly ran dry and became a very small, gurgling sputter. It was as if the polarity of a gigantic magnet had instantaneously been reversed and had started to repel just as powerfully what it had previously attracted so strongly.

But the staff of VNIITF is made up of about 17,000 people! Of these, 10,000 were directly involved in the development of nuclear weapons. There was simply nothing for their "disarmed" brains to do. And then everywhere they started to talk about a "brain drain." The world was startled.

The U.S. secretary of state hurried to bring "first aid" to Snezhinsk. James Baker was generous in his promises, supporting in particular the idea of creating an international nuclear center, a kind of philanthropic shelter for Russian scientists losing their jobs.

President Yeltsin, too, decided not to be left behind by the United States. In order to maintain parity in terms of high-level visits, he went to Arzamas-16, where he signed an edict giving both Russian nuclear centers the status of federal centers. And when this was done, the scientists were promised comprehensive support.

However, the all-powerful bureaucratic structures were in no hurry to comply with the presidential edict. The promised pay raise was late in coming. Moreover, payment was constantly delayed in the spring and summer.

Of course, the institute of technical physics is not just waiting for the weather to roll in from the sea. In order to survive and to stay on its feet, they have put a multitude

of various affairs in train there. Mainly those that do not "get on the nerves" of other departments. Thus, they have prepared a computerized topographical map the like of which no one in the country has. They have learned how to coat cutting tools with diamond dust, thus doubling or even trebling their service life. They have managed to organize the production of fiber optics for the most up-to-date communications facilities. Instead of disposable syringes, which are in short supply, they are suggesting that we use a more promising, stronger repeat-use syringe that is capable of withstanding high-temperature sterilization.

The latest achievement of the Ural nuclear people is an installation for grading chicken eggs and a unit for drying chicken manure. Do not be in any hurry to burst into sarcastic laughter; these things are extremely necessary for agriculture! Yes, and it is not so simple to manufacture them. The question is, why are the nuclear people doing this?

But what can they do, life is forcing them to it.

It is true that the scientists are somewhat puzzled by the complete indifference that the country is showing toward all their stunning developments. Foreigners, well, they are interested, and there is no end to the suggestions. But it is as if our domestic business world is not noticing their achievements, or the advantages that are hidden in the new "articles." The better minds of the power are prepared to show everyone what they are capable of. The nuclear chicken should be laying golden eggs! And for this only a little is needed—just keep them afloat for two or three years.

The despair has led to a situation in which some of the nuclear people who conceived "the bomb" and tested it almost a thousand times have started to be convinced that nuclear weapons are almost absolutely harmless items.

The splendid story is already being circulated in the pages of the newspapers that a thermonuclear weapon is not dangerous. They say that our glorious scientists thought through everything so scrupulously and studied and made provision so carefully that a modern "bomb" can be safely left at any busy crossroad—nothing terrible will happen. The "article," they say, may be sawed, drilled, kicked, and struck with whatever force you have available, and there will not be an atomic explosion. The most unpleasant thing that can happen is that the conventional explosive will blow up, smash the casing to pieces, and scatter splinters about. As a result, it will be easy to raise the background radiation at the site of the incident, and that is all!

It has, alas, now become possible to read and hear such carefree assertions repeatedly. But common sense still cautions and, like the world, suggests the old wisdom that God helps those who help themselves.

This is why another rule of the physicists is more to my liking: While even one single nuclear weapon remains on

the planet, there must be experts who have a thorough knowledge of that weapon, everything: how to store it, how to move it from place to place, how to check its safety, how eventually to destroy a bomb that is too old.

Yes, the physicists do make the "bomb." But not only that. In this case, mankind has for the first time in its history encountered a unique phenomenon, when the creation of a weapon of destruction has been inseparably linked with the development of means to protect itself against it. A nuclear weapon is equally dangerous both for its "own" people and for "others." And the danger of radioactivity comes not only from weapons. It may descend on us from space. And even from the center of the Earth itself. So in the face of this threat it turns out that we do not have the right to be unarmed.

The somber law of nuclear balance for many long years determined the balance of power on the planet. If they exist, we exist. If they have the bomb, we have to have the bomb.

Now, apparently, there are no enemies. Our nuclear centers have put peaceful lilies of the valley and carnations in their buttonholes, rolled up their sleeves, and started to implement conveyor-belt and commercial programs, establishing the closest of links with foreign partners.

And then, like thunder in a cloudless sky, a perplexed voice rang out:

"And why did you not seek our advice? Why did you not ask us?"

This was a voice test from the modest public organization with the dreaded name of SRYaZ—the Alliance of Nuclear Weapon Developers. It includes the "secret physicists," the "secret mathematicians," the "secret designers," in short, the direct creators of nuclear weapons from both scientific centers—Arzamas-16 and Chelyabinsk-70. A Lenin Prize laureate, the theoretical physicist B.M. Murashkin, was chosen as the head of SRYaZ.

The newly created public organization immediately issued a declaration in which it expressed its burning concern with the state of affairs in the nuclear sector.

"Have we not been too distracted by secondary issues?" the Alliance of Nuclear Weapon Developers people asked. "Yes, we can make instruments for the medical people, and fiber optics for the communications people, and sets of tools for the processing industry, and even units for poultry farmers! But we must not forget the main purpose of the nuclear scientific centers—to care for the defense of the motherland."

As is stated in one of the documents of the alliance of developers, in recent times too many "organizations and people have appeared that are supposedly concerned with the development of nuclear weapons," but the fate of our nuclear program is often "considered without the



involvement of the experts." Commissions and delegations sent to resolve the issues of nuclear disarmament and conduct reciprocal checks at the international level are made up of people who, although sound enough, are very poorly versed in this specific field, or, to put it more simply, are simply incompetent.

It is the opinion of the Alliance of Nuclear Weapon Developers that as a consequence of this it is now a somber fact that the American side has gained significant advantages in the matter of conducting nuclear tests. So the alliance of developers considers that the treaty signed by Bush and Gorbachev, which essentially authenticated this for us disappointing inequality, needs to be amended immediately.

Perhaps at no time since the opposition to the official authorities by the rebellious Academician Sakharov has the nuclear sector experienced such stormy upheavals. The rank-and-file physicist-developers, who for years had looked only at the screens of oscilloscopes and computer displays, have suddenly had an opportunity to look around. And they have found with astonishment that what has occurred is, as it were, a change of the leading team: The places occupied by scientists with acute consciences and incredible loyalty to the common cause have been gradually replaced by energetic pragmatists, people without complexes but with a rigid, businesslike grip.

Hence the extreme increase in secondary, "nonprofile" work and the attraction for business trips abroad. At the same time, there is a desire to maintain the regime of top secrecy and lack of publicity, which also allows continued uncontrolled rule on a closed sector.

All of this is taking place against a backdrop where (we cite SRYaZ again) "the impoverished standard of living for leading experts is not in line with the degree of their responsibility for ensuring the defense capability of the country and maintaining Russia's scientific and technical parity with respect to nuclear weapons."

Of course, it is not for us to judge the scientists. One thing is clear: The unity of the ranks of the nuclear physicists has been disrupted. And this leads to very dismal reflection.

When the capital's theaters seethe and disintegrate, when the workers in the Hydrometeorological Scientific Research Center or Aeroflot threaten a strike, when the miners or the medical people or the teachers strike, it is undoubtedly regrettable, but quite understandable: People have the right to fight for their rights.

But when "intellectual ferment" seizes the nuclear centers, the reaction is unambiguous: This is also understandable, but it cannot stand on its own. One starts to fear for one's near and dear, for the country, for the planet. For scientists in dispute are like angry elephants let loose in a china shop. Is it really difficult to understand that our fragile world can be so easily transformed into a formless pile of shards? And skulls, too!

There is a reserved place in closed Chelyabinsk-Snezhinsk where almost no one is allowed to go. It is a secret museum where they keep examples of the "articles," or, to put it simply, examples of nuclear bombs of various force. Like a collection of little china elephants, the bombs, little ones and big ones, stand there, from the very first, big and clumsy, to the very latest, compact and graceful.

And a sympathetic globe adorns the front of the House of the Pioneers. It is big, about two meters in diameter. The children love to twirl it.

So: What is kept in this museum is quite enough to blow up this globe—the world.

#### **Nizhniy Novgorod Congress of Workers, Peasants, Employees**

934C0128A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA  
in Russian 20 Oct 92 p 2

[Article by P. Orlov, SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA correspondent: "We Cannot Save Ourselves One by One: the First Russian Congress of Workers, Peasants, Specialists, and Employees Was Held in Nizhniy Novgorod"]

[Text] Three of the 158 delegates of the congress were unable to fill in the column "place of work" on the registration form. In the place where others indicated their position, these three were compelled to write "Unemployed." This fate of "superfluous" people awaits 22 million of our fellow citizens in the near future. In citing this figure, which is predicted by economists, Professor A. Sergeyev outlined for congress the prospects for the policy of our present authorities in restoring capitalism. The national income for 1995 will be cut by a factor of two, although even in the years of the Great Patriotic War, it was reduced only by one-third.

Private property in all and everything will intensify the social and property stratification of society. In 1995, 20 percent of the rich will consume 4.6 times more than 80 percent of the remaining population of Russia. Today, there is so much currency in the accounts of Russian businessmen in foreign banks that all of the vouchers can be bought up...20 times. The improvement in the life of the people by autumn of 1992 that was promised by Yeltsin will have to be awaited not for just three years. Only in the year 2012 will Russia reach the volume of the national income of the 1990 level.

The impoverishment and exploitation of the working people and the deprivation of their freedoms and rights will be formulated legislatively, if the ruling regime succeeds in imposing its draft Constitution. Yu. Slobodkin, candidate of juridical sciences, people's deputy of Russia, and a member of the constitutional commission, turned the attention of the congress to such a danger.

The common people will learn of the "charms" of the transition to capitalism not only from the words of people with scholarly degrees: They will experience them

the hard way. But why do the workers, peasants, specialists, and employees not organize and strongly oppose their transformation into lackeys of the regime, in the service of the newly brought-to-light masters?

D. Igoshin, who presented a report, and delegates I. Puchkovskiy (Moscow), I. Morozov (Belgorod), A. Bogdanov (Nizhniy Novgorod), V. Trapeznikov (Perm), and others gave as the reason for the apathy the lack of coordination of the workers, the disunity of their efforts, and the absence of a unified program of actions.

Life teaches in a harsh way that the workers cannot save themselves one by one, that must jointly defend their interests, it was established by the first Russian congress of workers, peasants, specialists, and employees.

The congress set the task of establishing soviets in the labor collectives and in the territories. They are supposed to fight against privatization, price increases, and unemployment, and against private property in land and its purchase and sale. The congress elected a Russian central executive committee of soviets for the organization and management of the work of the soviets of workers, peasants, specialists, and employees that are being established everywhere.

The activity of B. Yeltsin in the post of president of Russia was subjected to severe criticism. The congress expressed distrust in B. Yeltsin in connection with his failure to implement pre-election promises on the improvement of the life of the people, with his personal participation in the breakup of the USSR, and with his conducting of political genocide, and it proposed that he resign from the post of president.

The congress instructed that the draft Constitution of the RSFSR, which was approved by the first Russian congress of workers at the beginning of this year, be submitted for consideration by the Congress of People's Deputies of Russia. It supported a national assembly in Moscow on 24 October. The resolution that was adopted sharply criticizes the Poltoranin attempt to bring pressure on the newspaper SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, which reflects the life of the working people frankly.

#### **Moscow Mari Elect Delegates to All-Mari Congress**

934C0218A Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian  
30 Oct 92 p 2

[Article by Aleksandr Rybakov: "Mari Announce Assembly"]

[Text] Some 2,500 Moscow Mari elected delegates to the Congress of Peoples of Mari in Yoshkar-Ola. The forum will be held during 30-31 October. As the deputy permanent representative of the Republic of Mari El under the president of Russia, Prokopyi Sivatelyev, said, they will discuss questions of consolidation of the people, development of the national culture and traditions, and strengthening of ties among Mari living in various

regions of Russia, and there are 670,000 of them. Half of them live on their ancient territory, the rest—in Bashkiria, Kirov and Sverdlovsk Oblasts...

Representatives of 50 nationalities live in Mari El itself. Therefore problems will be considered taking into account the interests of Russians, Tatars, Chuvash, and Ukrainians. There is no friction among them but, as everywhere nowadays, certain nationalistic statements are ringing out: Appoint only representatives of the indigenous nationality to the government, business documentation only in the Mari language, and so forth.

But here is what the Moscow Mari think. Valeriy Shaymiyev, the representative of the Onar society who was elected delegate to the congress, is in favor of conferring the status of state language on two languages—Mari and Russian—as well as proportional representation of all nations in organs of state power.

Not everyone agreed with this viewpoint. Delegate Yuriy Yashmolkin suggests making three languages state languages: Russian, high Mari, and the language of the lowland Mari. In a word, the discussion at the congress will not be easy.

#### **Stepashin Views Tenure as Petersburg Security Chief**

934C0171A St. Petersburg SMENA in Russian  
6 Oct 92 p 1

[St. Petersburg Security Chief Sergey Stepashin interviewed by Aleksandr Gorshkov: "Man of the Week: Sergey Stepashin Leaves 'Big House' for White House"]

[Text] It became known last week that Sergey Stepashin, chief of the Ministry of Security's St. Petersburg Administration, is leaving his post.

The news, which gave rise to a good many rumors in the halls of Smolnyy and the Mariy Palace, was to some extent a surprise even for Sergey Vadimovich himself.

[Stepashin] When I raised the question of combining two posts before the Supreme Soviet, I took into account the fact that deputies are allowed to hold positions in executive structures without any particular problems. But the Supreme Soviet voted in favor of my remaining as chairman of the parliamentary committee.

Lieutenant General Sergey Vadimovich Stepashin is chairman of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet Defense and Security Committee. He was named chief of the St. Petersburg Administration in early 1992. In 1990, as an instructor at the MVE Leningrad Technical School, Lieutenant Colonel Stepashin was elected to the post of RSFSR People's Deputy.

The nine months that Stepashin headed the administration is not a long period of time. But one result is beyond doubt: During that time, the committee became a more open organization, and the abbreviation KGB, it seems, no longer causes ordinary people to shudder.

[Stepashin] The administration underwent a serious reorganization. Fundamentally new services were set up. Instead of the notorious "fifth department" (the former department for protecting the constitutional order—Author), we made staff changes and created a very important antiterrorism unit that has actively gone to work. In addition, we created a totally new economic security department. The department for combating corruption at the highest echelons of government was substantially reorganized. Finally, the idea of creating intellectual special services that can perform not only specific tasks but also make situational forecasts is now being implemented. A new information and analytical service is oriented toward this. That's the first thing we were able to do.

The second aspect is purely psychological. After August of last year, the future of most committee officers was very uncertain. Now the collective has been stabilized, and many new young officers have come aboard. In my opinion, officers now see their main task as one of serving the law and creating conditions to safeguard citizens' rights.

We managed to make a good start for future serious work by the administration.

[Gorshkov] At a press conference, you said that you would soon make public information on instances of corruption in government agencies.

[Stepashin] But before making anything public, we have to complete the cases—in other words, to take them to the courts. I think that we will soon be able to talk, for example, about the factors that led to the arrest of Karagapodov, Krasnoselskiy Rayon administration chief. Furthermore, the administration is currently working on several very serious incidents, and the time is not far off when they too will be made known to the public.

[Gorshkov] It seems that the administration has investigated instances of corruption involving certain officers of the "Big House." What are the results of those legal proceedings?

[Stepashin] There were no legal proceedings as such. But we did indeed have instances in which certain officers were very actively involved in commercial activities, and a number of them were implicated in outright solicitation of bribes and in crimes involving abuse of official position.

After a certain amount of work, two high-ranking officers were forced to submit their resignations from the administration.

[Gorshkov] Is it possible that, after your departure, we will see a situation in which your beneficial initiatives will be gradually deemphasized?

[Stepashin] I myself nominated Cherkasov, the administration's new chief. He is a highly experienced legal specialist. I think the new chief's coming will make it possible to preserve the continuity of the initiatives. Furthermore, I'm not leaving completely. I remain a

member of the Ministry of Security Collegium and chairman of the Defense and Security Committee, which oversees security agencies. And as the minister and I agreed, I will continue to have responsibility for the St. Petersburg Administration.

Yesterday Russian Federation Minister of Security Barannikov introduced the new chief to the administration's staff in the "Big House."

### **Petersburg Residents Polled on Support for Yeltsin**

934C0171B St. Petersburg SMENA in Russian  
6 Oct 92 p 5

[Article by Candidate of Philosophical Sciences Zinaida Sikevich, director of the Scientific Institute for Comprehensive Social Research Russian Ethno-Political Center: "Sociological Sketch: If the Elections Were Held Today"]

[Text] Are St. Petersburg residents prepared to support the opposition? In a telephone survey conducted by the staff of the Scientific Institute for Comprehensive Social Research (on September 7-13, of 985 people representing the city's adult population), between one-fourth and two-thirds of the city residents expressed support for "rightist" slogans (from "government with a strong hand" to "Russia for Russians").

This is clearly in odds with the city residents' responses in the same survey concerning their potential vote "if the elections were held today": 41.1 percent would vote for Yeltsin's supporters, 12.2 percent would vote for his opponents, 37.2 percent wouldn't vote, and 9.5 percent are still undecided.

Having noted the large number of people who are indifferent to the election battles (every third St. Petersburg resident), let us consider the following discrepancy: A part of the electorate that sympathizes with anti-democratic slogans intends to support the presidential team. This discrepancy is attributable to both the enigmas of popular mythology and the ideological vacillations in ruling circles.

It is undoubtedly true that in the eyes of a sizable number of Russian Federation residents, the president retains the charismatic image of the people's elect. Whether he is a democrat or not is for many people a secondary concern; moreover, not all have a clear concept of the essence of democratic values. Naturally, the luster of the president's charisma also reflects on his supporters.

At the same time, we cannot overlook a certain turn to the right on the part of the governing forces. Do St. Petersburg residents tell the Russian leader what direction they would like to see state ideology take? The average person uninvolved in politics prefers the slogan of a great Russia, which flatters his pride, or the ingenious, at first glance, call for a "Russia for Russians" to the weakly promoted "civil society."

The table shows how the president's supporters and opponents are distributed among various groups of St. Petersburg's population. There are slightly more supporters as well as opponents of Yeltsin among men, while almost half of the women "won't pay any attention" to the elections (it will be recalled that women are as a whole more conservative than men). A somewhat larger number of people who are older and in preretirement age groups (people in their 60s) would vote for the presidential team, and young people would likely ignore the voting, although they wouldn't especially join the opponents' camp either. Yeltsin most often has the sympathy of entrepreneurs and servicemen, and less often of college and school students. Finally, a relatively larger proportion of the intelligentsia is traditionally more supportive of the president.

It would seem to be to the Yeltsin team's advantage to hold the elections as soon as possible, without procrastinating. And here's why: The number of people "outside politics" is going to steadily increase and could exceed half of the

electorate; moreover, a new generation is coming of age and is hardly likely to join the democrats' ranks.

Today's young people are, on one hand, increasingly apolitical, with their politicization being of a situational character, as was the case during the August putsch; on the other hand, they are more willing to heed the opposition's catchy slogans, which win them over by virtue of their unequivocal character and the prospect of "struggling" instead of "working." Given the lack of guaranteed jobs after graduating from their schools, vocational-technical schools, and higher educational institutions, the aggressiveness characteristic of the young generation could push them into the embraces of not even the rightists, but of the most radical nationalists.

No less a danger to democracy is posed by people who are "outside politics" and have unstable views. Given the right circumstances, these people could move to the right (to the nationalists) or to the left (to the communists). Exactly who succeeds in bringing these people to the polls will decide the fate of not just democracy, but of Russia itself.

**Electoral Preferences of St. Petersburg Residents**

If elections were held today, you would vote for	Yeltsin supporters	Yeltsin opponents	wouldn't vote
city population as a whole	41	12	37
men	44	17	30
women	40	10	41
19 and under	33	9	45
20-29	34	11	46
30-39	42	10	42
40-49	40	16	34
50-59	47	13	31
60 and older	43	13	33
unskilled workers	35	9	52
skilled workers	38	19	36
white collar workers without education	37	8	45
humanitarian intelligentsia	43	11	36
technical intelligentsia	47	11	33
servicemen, police	51	14	29
entrepreneurs	49	10	35
school and college students	35	10	40
employed in state economy	44	12	34
employed in new economy	35	8	48
pensioners	43	24	36
below secondary education	37	12	44
general secondary	40	11	35
specialized secondary	38	13	42
higher and incomplete higher	46	13	32

Total responses per line is less than 100 percent by the number of respondents without a definite position.



**Assault on Petersburg Deputy Said Politically Motivated***934C0171C St. Petersburg SMENA in Russian  
7 Oct 92 p 2*

[Article by Viktor Malkov: "Deputy Assaulted"]

[Text] Late in the evening, Deputy Konstantin Fyodorov was returning home from the Kuybyshev Rayon Soviet. Preparations were under way for a decisive session at which, after several months of gridlock, a Soviet chairman was to be elected, and Fyodorov, as head of the mandate commission, had a lot of work to do.

As he was nearing the entrance to his apartment building, two young men suddenly confronted Konstantin Petrovich at a dark pedestrian crossing. One suddenly thrust forward his hand, in which he was holding a cylinder, and a stream of nerve-paralyzing gas left Fyodorov unconscious almost instantaneously. Fyodorov was able only to shout out, and then fell. The assailants then attacked him as he lay on the ground and began beating him. Responding to his shout, Fyodorov's wife ran out. The hooligans took off, telling her as they ran away: "Tell your husband to mind his own business—or we'll kill him." Doctors found that Fyodorov had sustained a double jaw fracture and serious head contusions.

A state security officer who is involved in investigating the incident and who knows the circumstances of the case (we cannot yet give his name for understandable reasons) is convinced that this is not a case of hooliganism or robbery (Fyodorov's briefcase of documents and his money were left untouched), but revenge by "critics" who were angry with the principled positions taken by the deputy, who seeks to uphold the interests of the rayon and its residents.

"We know that various groups are struggling for influence, positions, and power in the Kuybyshev Rayon Soviet," the security officer said. "This is especially apparent in view of the fact that the incident took place two days before the session was set to begin. Someone obviously wanted to intimidate one of the chief rivals of the 'opposition' and to put him out of commission."

Not too long ago, Kuybyshev Rayon Soviet Deputy Lukin was also assaulted in his apartment. The motives were the same: He had been standing in the way of "colleagues" who were much more concerned for their own well-being than for the situation of children and the elderly.

And although a worthy man was elected chairman of the rayon Soviet all the same—General Konstantinov, former head of the Suvorov School—there is no doubt but what the struggle for power among the deputies is not over. It will intensify as the general elections approach, elections that ordinary citizens aren't even thinking about yet. As you can see, preparations for the elections have begun. And all means are being used in those preparations, up to and including blackmail and violence.

**INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS****Ambartsumov Response to Kozyrev's Parliament Speech***934C0183B Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 23 Oct 92 p 2*

[Article by Aleksey Zuychenko: "Ambartsumov Is Resigning Himself to Kozyrev's Existence?"]

[Text] Having issued the traditional warning about the danger of rejecting the democratic path of development in foreign and domestic policy, Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrey Kozyrev devoted the greatest part of his speech in parliament yesterday to the relations with the CIS states.

Touching upon the negotiations with the leaders of Tajikistan, Andrey Kozyrev called upon parliament to support Russia's peacemaking efforts in this country, and announced the possibility of using the 201st Division to separate the opposing sides.

The MFA [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] leader pointed out the emergence of "signs of willingness to come to an agreement" in Abkhaziya, although he noted that it is unknown what will happen first—agreement or a battle for Sukhumi. Russia's task in this situation, as Mr. Kozyrev stated, consists of "reconciling two extremisms (of Abkhaziya and Georgia—'NG') somewhere in the middle."

Speaking out with a brief response, the head of the Supreme Soviet Committee on International Affairs, Yevgeniy Ambartsumov, noted the positive tendencies which have emerged, in his opinion, in the activity of the Russian MFA, and suggested to Andrey Kozyrev that he engage less in domestic policy and that he dismiss Deputy Minister Georgiy Kunadze, who had lost confidence. Mr. Ambartsumov expressed the opinion that the MFA should "show more imagination." For example, it might think about Russia's departure from UNESCO, since this organization engages not in culture, but in politics, and moreover has excluded Yugoslavia from its membership.

**Arab League Ambassador Discusses Ties, Mideast Peace Process***934C0195A Moscow TRUD in Russian 21 Oct 92 p 3*

[Arab League Ambassador Mohammad Durra interviewed by Anatoliy Repin: "Planet's Pulse: Ambassador With an Easel—Visit With the Chief of the Arab League Mission"]

[Text] Both in the past and in our time, writers and poets have often been appointed ambassadors: Kontemir, Griboyedov, Fet, Aytmatov. But I can't remember any instances in which artists have become ambassadors. Not amateurs who relax with the easel on their days off, but professional artists—artists who have, moreover, a world

reputation. Nevertheless, such a person with the rank of ambassador has for the past four years headed the mission of the Arab League (AL) in Moscow. Exhibits of his work have been sponsored by the Museum of Modern Art in New York and the Museum of Eastern Cultures in Moscow; his work has been seen in Rome, London, and Washington, and his canvasses have been purchased for the Rockefeller Gallery. But Mohammad Durra is best known in the Arab countries, of course, especially in his native Jordan, where the Durra clan is quite popular: The artist's father, a writer and educator, organized the modern public education system in that country. And the ambassador's home in Amman is on a street that bears his father's name.

[Repin] I'm curious to know just how an artist and a diplomat coexist within one person.

[Durra] Deep down inside, I sometimes regret having wound up in politics. But work is work.

We are in the conference hall of the AL mission on Konyushkovskaya Street. A long table nearly fills the entire room. Arab ambassadors come here for meetings. Each one has his own seat, designated by a small flag of his country. It is like a miniature version of the league's headquarters in Cairo.

The Arab League arose at the same time as the UN—in 1945. It was originally made up of seven states. Today there are 21 flags here. The community of Arab countries that the league personifies is an entire world with a rich history, original culture, and enormous economic potential. Finally, it represents more than 225 million people and a territory of 14 million square miles stretching from the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean. An official AL brochure from which these figures are taken doesn't forget about trade: The region's exports are estimated at more than \$80 billion annually, and its imports at nearly \$94 billion a year.

That last figure includes Lebanon's recent purchase of a large shipment of Lada automobiles.

[Durra] The Arab market is a natural place for Russian goods, and vice versa. Many of your goods and many of our products encounter obstacles on Western markets. So let's develop mutual trade. Even the poor Arab countries (compared to the oil-producing states) can successfully trade with Russia and the CIS. Those that owe money to the former USSR are not refusing to repay that debt. Under bilateral agreements, the debt is being repaid in the form of nationally produced goods.

[Repin] Now opportunities are arising for cooperation on the part of private business as well.

[Durra] That's right. And hundreds of business people from the Arab countries are already working in Russia, despite the fact that business conditions here are not the best as yet. When Arab capital is invested in France or Italy, it is perfectly clear there just who must be dealt with and how, and there is certainty as to the stability of

legislation, including legislation with respect to repatriation of profits. You will agree that the situation in this regard in Russia is more difficult. I hope that the situation will be corrected with the opening in Moscow of the planned Russian-Arab Chamber of Commerce. Institutions of this kind can be found in New York, Paris, London, and Rome. They are interconnected and operate in concert under the aegis of the Arab League. It is expected that the president of the Russian-Arab Chamber of Commerce will be a Russian Federation citizen, while the director will be an Arab citizen.

We should not forget that cooperation between the Arab countries and Russia is not starting from scratch. The question is sooner one of the continuation of this cooperation, considering that none other than Russian, Ukrainian, and other specialists from the republics of the former USSR built the Aswan and Euphrates dams and helped construct dozens of important industrial and agricultural facilities.

[Repin] We can expect a natural interest in the Arab League mission in Moscow on the part of the new states of Central Asia, as well as of republics within the Russian Federation that have recently referred to themselves as Moslem.

[Durra] I won't hide the fact that there has been interest on their part. But we are a political, not religious, organization. The AL mission is accredited in the capital of the Russian Federation. Our objective is to promote the development of relations between the Russian Federation and the Arab countries and mutual understanding between our peoples. Any kind of interference in the internal affairs of the Russian Federation is absolutely out of the question.

[Repin] You have been in Moscow for four years and have witnessed all the events of these years on the space of the former USSR. What does the Arab world think of these changes?

[Durra] Arabs are closely following events in your country. We want our northern neighbor to be a strong, self-confident, and stable power. This is important for the stability of our entire vast region.

To be honest, I find it strange to hear discussion of the question of whether Russia is a European, an Asian, or a Eurasian country. Russia is Russia, a country that has proven its distinct identity through its extremely rich culture—its music, literature, and fine arts. Herein lies the true expression of that inimitable thing known as the Russian soul. Fate has linked me with Russia since I was a child. My first drawing teacher in Jordan was a Russian named Zhorzh Aliyev. When I was six years old, I heard in his house the music of Rimskiy-Korsakov and Chaykovskiy. And I fell in love with Russian culture for the rest of my life, even though I later studied in Italy and Britain.

[Repin] What do you think of the fact that with press freedom in our country now, we see differing assessments of events in the Middle East? Before there was no

such "disagreement" in our press's approach—Central Committee directives were in effect.

[Durra] For the Arabs, this is indeed something new. I respect freedom of the press. Your public should know all the circumstances of the Middle East situation. But it is clear to me that rather effective propaganda from the Israeli side is now appearing in your country (perhaps not even directly); meanwhile, we Arabs have far fewer opportunities in this regard.

[Repin] But I heard that you plan to open Arab cultural centers.

[Durra] Yes, in Moscow and St. Petersburg. The Saudi Arabian cultural center in the Russian capital could serve as the prototype for them. I think these centers will reinvigorate, among other things, interest in the rich heritage of Russian Arab scholarship, which is rightly respected throughout the world, and in the history of our relations. Consider this. The Eastern Slavs did not take part in the crusades. The silver Arab silver dirham—a kind of medieval dollar—once circulated widely throughout Rus. The first translation of the Koran was done in Russia—by order of Peter the Great. Russian studies of the Arab world led to the founding of the Institute of Eastern Studies in the last century. Moreover, Russian Arab studies have been of a scientific character from the very outset, in contrast to the applied research of Western orientalists, research that served to assist the colonizers in their crusades of conquest.

Needless to say, a conversation with the ambassador of the Arab League could not avoid purely political issues regarding the situation in the Middle East, Russia's role in the regional peace process that got under way a year ago, and the effect of the end of the cold war on that process. Allow me to summarize M. Durra's responses:

[Durra] The role of the UN is growing. The Arabs hope that it will safeguard international legality. Demands that its norms be observed should apply equally to all. But not one of the resolutions the UN has adopted on the Palestinian problem has been carried out as yet.

The world used to be bipolar—with the USSR at one pole, and the United States at the other. At that time there existed a certain balance of world forces. What will the new world be like? It could be multipolar.

We are grateful to Russia for serving as a sponsor of the Middle East peace conference. But there would hardly be a need for that conference if Israel would comply with the UN Security Council resolution on withdrawing troops from all the Arab territories occupied in 1967.

My conversation with Mohammad Durra is being published in our newspaper as an interview with a politician and an ambassador. But I also had an interesting discussion with Durra the artist—in his studio on Bolshaya Gruzinskaya Street. Instead of a business suit the host was wearing a sweater. He puffed furiously on a pipe, treated me to aromatic coffee, and offered "something a

bit stronger." We leafed through albums of reproductions of his work. The speakers of his stereo system softly carried the music of Rimski-Korsakov.

Muhammad Durra the artist has to be the subject of a separate article.

### USSR People's Deputies Congress Official Reports on Iraq Visits

934C0157A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA  
in Russian 10 Oct 92 p 3

[Interview with Sazhi Umalatova, chairperson, Permanent Presidium, USSR People's Deputies Congress, by N. Garifullina; place and date not given: "The Lessons of Steadfastness: Sazhi Umalatova on Her Trip to Iraq"]

[Text] A group of people's deputies from the Russian Federation and the USSR recently visited Iraq. Sharing her impressions of that visit with us today is Sazhi Umalatova, chairperson, Permanent Presidium, USSR People's Deputies Congress.

[Garifullina] Sazhi, the very fact of a trip abroad made by a delegation from the Permanent Presidium of the USSR Congress of People's Deputies is already—in and by itself—something out of the ordinary. How did this come about?

[Umalatova] The initiative came from us—from the Permanent Presidium of the USSR Congress of People's Deputies. Yuriy Golik and I met with Iraq's ambassador and stated our desire to visit his country. On the third day after that we received a reply: Our delegation would be accepted.

It included the Russian deputies Ivan Shashviashvili and Vladimir Makhanov; in addition to myself, the delegation from the Permanent Presidium was to include Yuriy Golik and Viktor Alksnis, but at the very last moment the Russian authorities refused to give Alksnis an exit visa. That was a petty and dirty trick.

[Garifullina] You traveled to Iraq last year and now too. Why specifically Iraq?

[Umalatova] Last year, when the press reported that Bush—the humanist—was exhibiting his humanism even during the war by bombing only military facilities, and that peaceful facilities would not be damaged at all, I did not believe it. I sensed that this was a deception, a trick, and that we were being made fools of once again. I knew that the war had been provoked by an incursion into Kuwait. This war was needed specifically by Bush, and it was unleashed with Gorbachev's help. I wanted to see with my own eyes what had happened there. And I saw a cloudy sky over Iraq, the burnt out land, and the ruins: There was the "New World Order" right in front of my eyes.

We were shown the facility which had suffered the first hit. It was—most likely—a "very important military facility." Actually it was a combine for producing milk



for children—the only such plant in Iraq. Outfitted with up-to-date equipment it had been fully satisfying the population's needs for this valuable product. And it was destroyed. And now, just imagine the sorrow of a mother whose child is dying of hunger; imagine thousands of such mothers.... This strike was inflicted with the calculated intention of inciting specifically such mothers against Husayn. But even in this monstrously difficult and complicated situation the mothers and the entire nation understood the following: This had been done in order to weaken Iraq, to transform it—just like our own country—into a raw-material appendage of the United States.

It is most interesting that, when the entire democratic press was writing with delight that the United States and Bush were going to help us to bring about "democratic changes," in Iraq a settlement inhabited by Soviet specialists was wiped off the face of the earth. As you may well have guessed, this was also deemed a "very important military facility." A strike was inflicted on government buildings; communications and electric-power plants were completely; they were all living by candlelight. Bridges were bombed in four or five places so that it would be impossible to restore them.

[Garifullina] And what did you see on this recent trip?

[Umalatova] You know, last year I saw how the Iraqis were working to restore and revive their damaged country. After the working day people used to arrive from the provinces especially to restore the damaged buildings and enterprises. And now, just before our trip, they told us the following at the embassy: Now you will not see a single unrestored facility. Speaking frankly, I did not believe it because the entire country had been in ruins.

What Iraq's people have accomplished in just one year is worthy of amazement and delight. Although they have been blockaded for two years now, during this past year they have restored more than 100 facilities out of 200. And the remaining half are at the stages of completion. Electric power was restored in only three months, whereas Bush had stated the following with satisfaction: Just to restore the electric-power capacity destroyed by us will require five years and foreign capital. But the Iraqis fully restored electric power and communications within three months.

It is difficult to express in single word what it is that has helped these people and their president, Saddam Husayn. Of course, there is patriotism and faith in oneself. It is specifically a feeling of love for their country that has helped them and is still helping them to hold out. It will go down in history as the shame of the 20th century that 53 countries united against one and bombed little Iraq: 53 countries! But it turned out to be unconquerable because the truth was on its side.

[Garifullina] With whom did you meet in Iraq?

[Umalatova] With the vice-president, the first vice-premier, the ministers of foreign affairs and information, as well as with other leading officials.

We were pleasantly surprised that—despite everything—the Society for Soviet-Iraqi Friendship still exists in Iraq and that the Iraqis sincerely sympathize with us and for our country. They have kept up with everything that is happening here in our country. Not once did we hear a single bad word aimed at our country, or even at its leaders, who betrayed Iraq. They remember the achievements of our people, its boldness and heroism. They said things like the following: Such a people as your Soviet people will still—despite everything—occupy a worthy place in the world community.

Naturally, in frank conversations, the talk would sometimes get around to Shevardnadze. Two years ago, in the name of the USSR, he declared himself in the Security Council as favoring military sanctions against Iraq; and thereby he helped to drown Iraq in blood. Now, after returning to Georgia, he is drowning the little nation of Abkhazia in blood. Such is the true face of this "renowned democrat and peacemaker."

On the second day we had a meeting with Iraq's minister of foreign affairs. We talked about general problems; then he unexpectedly inquired about Aleksandr Bessmertnykh—what we think about him, and what he is engaged in nowadays. I replied that Bessmertnykh is a highly professional diplomat, but that—for some reason or other—he is not to be seen nor heard these days. And then the minister said: "Know one thing: he is pure, honest, and honorable." To my way of thinking, that is a very exact assessment. Of course, if Bessmertnykh had not been precisely like that, Gorbachev would not have removed him so quickly. Gorbachev did not used to keep honest, honorable, and pure persons around him; he was afraid of them.

In our conversations the topic of betrayal used to come up—as if by itself. The purpose of our trip was to tell the Iraqis the following: the Soviet people never was and never will betray them. At meetings we said things like the following: With perestoyka in mind, states turned to people who betrayed not only us, their brothers, but also their brother-Slavs, brother-Muslims, and Eastern Europe; they betrayed their own country and their own people; they unleashed an undeclared, fratricidal war in their own country. In reply, we heard how very bitter it was for them when—in the Security Council—an American proclaiming humanism with regard to Iraq, and a Russian—in contrast—proposing even harsher measures....

[Garifullina] And what was the attitude of the people toward you?

[Umalatova] We reached Oman by motor vehicle after traveling more than a thousand kilometers; nowadays no airplanes fly into Iraq. Everywhere—from Jordan to Iraq—we felt the tension, the expectation of alarm; and, therefore, we were often stopped. And you had to see the joy and delight on people's faces when they found out



that we were from Russia. They would return our passports to us in a moment and would say: We love Russians. And everywhere, no matter where we were—in a museum, in a hotel, or on the city streets—the word "Russian" became a unique kind of password which opened up the people's hearts to us.

[Garifullina] Speaking recently in the U.S. Congress, Bush declared that the USSR remained merely something in school textbooks. Did you feel in Iraq that you were a representative of a former country?

[Umalatova] Only two or three persons at the highest level used the phrase "former Soviet Union." But I said the following to them: Don't say that; it is very painful for me to hear that. The Soviet Union was, is, and will be; it will be born and rise up from the ashes. The people have simply been deceived. Three persons cannot annihilate a state by merely one stroke of a pen. The fact that persons who have spent all their lives at the feeding-trough and who have used the fruits of the toil of millions of people, did, in one day, in the midst of some kind of poisonous fumes, sign a death sentence for their own country cannot be assessed as anything else but a plot and a conspiracy against their own people and country, against the representative and legislative authorities.

I explained our stance at all the meetings: that it is only the USSR Congress of People's Deputies which can declare the USSR Constitution to be invalid. And it has not done that. There are USSR people's deputies, whom the voters have not deprived of their powers of office. There is the will of the people, as manifested in a referendum which no one is allowed to abrogate. Persons from Yeltsin's team, representatives from "Democratic Russia," traveled throughout the entire country and called upon the people to vote against their own country. Nevertheless, 76 percent of the population said "Yes" to the Soviet Union. The people are wiser than their rulers. Don't say that there is no Soviet Union. It is and will be—I convinced them of that at all the meetings.

[Garifullina] Do the people in Iraq feel pressure from the United States?

[Umalatova] They feel it very much. But this proud nation has not been forced to its knees. And whereas the presidents of the CIS have groveled before Bush, the Iraqis just don't give a damn about him. And—after all—who is Bush anyway? As director of the CIA [Central Intelligence Agency], he became accustomed to weaving plots, messing things up, and destroying them.

[Garifullina] Our press has created an image of a dictator for the president of Iraq. What is he really like? How is he regarded by the Iraqis?

[Umalatova] The Iraqi people support Saddam Husayn. The fact that he is pictured nowadays as a dictator is a bluff. This man was able to inspire his people with a belief in their own strengths and to uplift it to the great cause of restoring their own country. Based on Iraq's

example, I have seen that we too can revive our own powerful state, if it is led by a government which is devoted to the people. As a human being, I rejoice that there is a courageous Iraq on this earth—this proud nation which has honor and dignity.

[Garifullina] What is your principal conclusion after your trip?

[Umalatova] Our homeland is the most sacred thing which we have. And we must act so as to rescue it from desecration and enslavement. Act! And I have no doubt that the Soviet Union will be restored.

### Journalists Visit Libyan Parliament, Interview Foreign Minister

934C0146A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 22 Oct 92 p 7

[Article by special correspondents Sergey Filatov, Viktor Shirokov under the rubric "Libyan Notes": "Life in the Blockade"]

[Excerpts] The leader of the Libyan revolution, Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi, recently called the current conflict between Jamahiriya and several western countries over the so-called "Lockerby matter" a "confrontation of honor." He announced that in this conflict, a small country stands in opposition to the great powers, the permanent members of the UN Security Council.

### What Makes Misurata Rich

A comfortable bus with darkened glass steamed in the hot air of the Mediterranean coast. Leaning into the turns, it flew into the setting sun like a hot Arab steed racing impatiently to its home Bedouin tents, pitched in a close-by oasis.

The sea, at first approaching almost to the highway itself, the sea, caressing the eyes with its piercing blueness, fell away. All around was a plain, covered by thousand-year-old shale, sand and tussocks with coarse bushes of drying grass. A rare palm tree livens the landscape.

And suddenly, without any transition, groves of trees have sprung up along the sides of the highway—date trees, orange trees, lemon trees. Fields of living plants in their Spring brightness have kindled fires in the spaces between palm plantations.

Just as suddenly, the bus has flown into the city by-streets. On every side are a multitude of newly constructed buildings. In fact, this is noticeable in other Libyan cities, as well—there is the sensation that all of Jamahiriya has arisen today out of lumber.

We were settled for the night in an excellent hotel—as far as "stars" go, a four. Incidentally, both before and after Misurata, we had the opportunity to see more than a few hotels that are in complete compliance with the best European standards. One could not say that they were overcrowded. And this is completely understandable—right now, this is not an especially popular destination

for tourists. For various reasons. The air blockade declared by the UN Security Council scares them away. They are also frightened by the negative image of Libya that has been skillfully drawn by the Western press.

But all of these reasons are transitional. Sooner or later the world community will understand that it is impossible to punish an entire nation by any kind of sanctions. The blockade will be removed, and relations between Libya and the other countries will thaw. [passage omitted]

Tall factory buildings are "stuffed" with modern machinery and equipment. West German and Japanese firms took part in the outfitting of the combine. Specialists from the USSR also contributed a sizeable share: they constructed the buildings, set up the rolling mills and the fuel source. And nobody at the combine has forgotten this.

Libya's first steps along the road to industrial development make an impression. Some people might say: of course, it has so many oil dollars! So what, there was a time when we had no fewer oil dollars than they, maybe even more. What we spent them on is another matter. Libya does not use these funds (it now receives up to 6 billion dollars a year) just to buy weapons—as is said in the West,—it uses them to stride into a developed civilization—a fact about which people in the West would prefer to keep silent.

#### Debates Under the Folds of a Tent

Why meetings of the session of the General People's Congress (VNC)—Libya's parliament, which we attended, were held not in the capitol, but in the city of Sirt will become clear with a brief explanation of the concept of government structures.

Here, it is believed that the people are the masters of their country, and they guide it through elected representatives in people's committees. The highest organ in the "direct democracy" state, which is the translation of "Jamahiriya," is in fact the VNC. And because the people live all over the country, they can govern it from any point.

Besides the arguments cited above, Sirt was selected as the meeting place for the sessions of the VNC because Qadhdhafi, the leader of the Libyan revolution and a native of these parts, holds a special affection for it. A congress complex has been specially erected on the outskirts of town.

For this time, the deputies had entirely enough work—the session lasted twelve days. The first ten days were occupied with discussions of exclusively internal issues. We will name a few of those discussions. The government was criticized for not executing the resolutions of the previous session of the VNC in full, specifically, the compilation of programs for the development of branches of industry not connected with oil—the main branch, were delayed. The executive powers do not stand

in the way of transforming what in Libya are quite small, and for this reason, valued, fertile areas into construction space for the villas of the nouveau riche. In general, the deputies posed the question of corruption very sharply—everything up to the death penalty for those who are caught redhanded embezzling national funds.

And that is how the session went until it achieved its apogee—a discussion of the question of the UN sanctions against Jamahiriya and the problems of extraditing the two Libyans accused by the USA and Great Britain of planning the explosion of the American passenger plane over the Scottish town of Lockerby in 1988.

PRAVDA has written about this discussion, and, so as not to repeat ourselves, we will remind you that the VNC adopted a resolution on the possible extradition of its countrymen only into the custody of an independent international court under the aegis of the UN or the League of Arab nations. The Western countries had not considered meeting them halfway to resolve the conflict. Their decision was to stiffen the sanctions, up to forbidding the import of Libyan oil. Moscow is present on this.

#### 'Do Not Repeat Moscow's Mistakes'

There is no need to prove yet again that the USSR's disappearance from the world globe has posed a mass of problems for the former numerous members of the union, and the friends and satellites of the Soviet country. Here, in Libya, we became clearly convinced of this: literally in every conversation with Libyans or correspondents from world agencies and newspapers who had come to the VNC session, we were presented with the question: "What happened? Where is your country going? What is the fate of the world now?" Journalists from China, Lebanon, Germany, Japan, Denmark, Switzerland, Tunis, Egypt, and other countries, people who are professionally involved in international affairs, even they had difficulty understanding the sense of what is going on. It is true that some of them nevertheless had their own explanations for the events in our country. And these were usually Libyans, who, it seemed, were attempting to draw conclusions from the Soviet experience for themselves.

—What happened to you,—one of the deputies at the session, who asked that his name not be used, assured us,—was the result of the natural course of history. The stagnated, totalitarian society could not exist forever. It was not Gorbachev's fault that the USSR fell, the country collapsed because of internal problems.

One wonders if he saw before his eyes his native Libya as he spoke? After all, the press draws parallels openly. The capital's AL-JAMAHIRIYA, according to general opinion, a newspaper that is close to the leader of the Libyan revolution, has called upon people to benefit from the lessons of the Soviet experience, especially in the area of support for allies abroad: "Moscow was the bastion of support for anti-imperialist centers, but they did not save her. We are falling into the very same mistakes. We have been providing aid in all forms to

liberation movements, but what have the residents of Libya gotten out of this? Changes in international life force us to ask ourselves: must we, also, keep paying on these kinds of accounts?"

A reexamination of past Libyan postulates has already begun: after Qadhafi's official announcement that Libya was ending its support of the Irish Republican Army (IRA), contacts were made in Geneva between Libyans and English citizens, during which British counter-intelligence agents from MI-5 obtained many documents having to do with the period of Tripoli's cooperation with the IRA, including lists of trained terrorists. Over those same days, several Palestinian military camps were cleared from Jamahiriya territory. From these facts, a general picture develops of a change in the political course of the Libyan leadership, which is making a sharp turn.

And what about relations with Russia? This is what Minister of Foreign Affairs I. Bishari said in an interview with us.

—Right now, we have good relations with Russia,—he maintains.—We hope that they will continue in the economic and political arenas. I am in constant contact with Minister Kozyrev. Even with a situation where Russia is implementing the resolution on the embargo against Libya, this does not interfere with our continuing dialogue.

That is all very well, but the embargo, after all, struck such a blow to bilateral ties between Moscow and Tripoli that to expect that they will be restored to their former volume is, we are convinced, practically impossible. Contrary to the laws of geography, the distance from Moscow to Tripoli has increased. [passage omitted]

### **Sobchak Comments on Controversy Over Site of British Consulate**

934C0173A St. Petersburg SMENA in Russian  
22 Sep 92 pp 1,2

[Article by Igor Yulin: "Proletarian Dictatorship Square—A Find for Spies?—Once More on the Scandal Surrounding the Future British Consulate in St. Petersburg"]

[Text] Near the close of summer, on August 31, in the meeting hall of St. Petersburg's Lesser Soviet, there occurred an event that in any other country would have a good chance of becoming one of the noisiest political scandals of the year: Speaking before the Deputies, Andrey Korotkov, deputy head of the Russian Ministry of Security's St. Petersburg Administration, said that British intelligence has an interest in the building at 5 Proletarian Dictatorship Square, a building that St. Petersburg Mayor Anatoliy Sobchak has offered to Great Britain for its consulate.

The building, which currently houses the Smolny Rayon Young People's Creative Center, was selected by

the British themselves. When the question arose of selecting a specific building for the opening of their mission, they were offered their choice of more than 20 (according to some reports, more than 40) addresses. The building on Proletarian Dictatorship Square appealed to the diplomats most of all: In addition to its proximity to the municipal administration, the building also had other advantages vis-a-vis the others, such as a much better view.

But officials of the Russian Ministry of Security believe that the experienced British selected the building for completely different reasons: The future consulate is directly opposite Smolnyy—repository of a large number of state and commercial secrets; nearby the building lies a government high-frequency communications cable that carries conversations worthy of the attention of any intelligence service; and finally, the offices of the Ministry of Security and their secrets are for all practical purposes quite nearby.

On taking possession of the building they have selected, British special services, in the opinion of our security officials, will obtain unprecedented capabilities for espionage.

According to the Russian Ministry of Security, the windows of the future consulate afford a view of the windows of the offices of the mayor and the deputy mayor, offices that totally lack any acoustic protection. British intelligence officers, armed with the highly sophisticated equipment, will be able to easily monitor all Anatoliy Sobchak's and Vyacheslav Shcherbakov's conversations. Meanwhile, the Ministry of Security will have no way to put a stop to the harmful activities of the arrogant Anglo-Saxons: Russian devices, which only yesterday proudly bore the name "Soviet," are far inferior to their British counterparts and cannot prevent eavesdropping on conversations.

It cannot be said that it would be totally impossible to provide acoustic protection for the offices; it's just that equipping the Smolny building with protection against acoustic eavesdropping would be so expensive as to be beyond the wherewithal of both the Russian Ministry of Security and the municipal administration.

In addition to the capability to eavesdrop on conversations in executive offices, the importunate British spies, in the opinion of our security officials, will acquire an excellent capability to tap, for eavesdropping purposes, the high-frequency government communications cable that lies not far from the building. The cable is protected only by technology dating to the middle of the last decade, and so eavesdropping on all the conversations carried by it would be an elementary task for the British, who are quite skilled in the use of sophisticated equipment.

According to our security officials, another prize morsel for a seasoned intelligence agent is a device that is used to process secret, top-secret and super-secret information and is also located in the Smolny building. If they want

to, the British could use that same sophisticated equipment, which the Russian Ministry of Security lacks, to tap into that device as well and thereby gain access to all the state secrets to be found on the banks of the Neva.

Finally, not far from the future consulate lie communications cables that are used in the day-to-day management of city services—something that, in the event of war, God forbid, is a subject of attention of all enemy spies. The British, after moving into the building next to these communications, could study their layout in minute detail. And how our relations with the United Kingdom will develop in the future is something that the Russian Ministry of Security obviously cannot predict.

Security officials emphasize that the British themselves are insisting that they be given this building, making a great many programs for humanitarian aid to St. Petersburg contingent on their future move into the building. In the security officials' opinion, this insistence stems precisely from the intelligence interests of the fog-enshrouded overseas power.

Meanwhile, the municipal administration has a somewhat different explanation for the British insistence. It says that the British side initially insisted that it be given any building at all—that it linked its aid programs to its being provided with any building in general. But once it chose a specific building, it proceeded to make it the object of its demands. In addition, the municipal administration says, the British agreed to partly finance the relocation of the high-frequency communications cable, something that could allay any suspicions directed at them.

Anatoliy Sobchak himself agreed only reluctantly to comment on Andrey Korotkov's statement. After reading the transcript of the security official's statement to deputies, the mayor told a SMENA correspondent that, in his opinion, "since August of last year, officers of the former State Security Committee haven't had anything to do, and now they are inventing for themselves all manner of espionage horrors." In addition, Anatoliy Sobchak speculated that Korotkov's statement might be linked with some sort of personal ambitions, adding that a struggle among such ambitions can currently be observed at Liteyny. He said that making the decision is his business, and the Russian Ministry of Security's job is to make sure that state interests are protected once the directive is implemented.

Some deputies took a no less skeptical attitude toward the security ministry's report. Vitaliy Skoybeda maliciously speculated that the only secret the British might learn by eavesdropping on Smolny would be information about the scale of corruption in the municipal administration. (To this Andrey Korotkov responded that his agency is not interested in corruption in this instance, but is concerned only with protecting state secrets.)

As for the relatively nearby Russian Ministry of Security administration, it should be pointed out that many consulates in our city are situated virtually next door to the Big

House—for example, the missions of the United States, the FRG, and Finland. Should they be moved too?

In the end, as we know, the Lesser Soviet, after rescinding Sobchak's order turning the building over for the consulate, gave the building to the British diplomats by decision of its own—in order to avoid an international scandal and to bring the situation into conformity with the requirements of legislation. It advised security officials to mind their own responsibilities—the protection of state secrets. In the opinion of members of the Lesser Soviet, even if British intelligence agencies do set up shop at such a convenient site, it is the Russian Ministry of Security's job to figure out how to neutralize the British agents' advantages.

### **Problems in Russian-Indian Trade, Petroleum Deals Highlighted**

934A0152A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 27 Oct 92  
Morning Edition p 7

[Article by Nikolay Paklin: "Exchange Rate of the Dollar Deals a Blow to Russian-Indian Trade"]

[Text] After a marathon of negotiations, two Russian firms signed contracts one after the other in Delhi with the Indian Petroleum Corporation for the delivery of approximately one million tonnes of oil to India. We are speaking here of the state association Prodimtorg and the predominantly private company Uralinvest. This is the first experience in our new economic structures' venturing into the Indian oil market.

The Indian Petroleum Corporation, which is a state monopoly on the purchase of foreign oil and petroleum products, at first greeted its newly arrived Russian partners without much enthusiasm. After all, before it had dealt with the Soviet state as represented by its official oil representatives—the same monopolists as it was. And bureaucrats throughout the world understand each other right away. However, gradually the ice of mistrust melted, and the deal was made.

Yet it will not be that simple to implement. And for now its economic effect is unclear, and specifically: Will the Indian Petroleum Corporation's Russian partners be able to cover their expenses with their revenues? And their expenses are considerable. First of all, they spent a goodly sum at the auction to acquire certificates from the Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations for the delivery of oil to India. These certificates are a form of securities. They must be ensured with a certain amount of oil. But who will ensure them? Once again, those who acquired them. But they will have to buy Russian oil at commercial prices. And this price is growing: At first they wanted 2,000 rubles (R) for a tonne of oil on our oil market, then R8,000, and now even more.

Yet it is curious that not a drop of this Russian oil will get to India. It will be pumped along the oil pipeline to Western Europe, and there it will be sold. And for the



realized currency our firms will buy oil abroad—presumably in the Persian Gulf zone—and supply it to India. We must remember that even before, we delivered to India not Russian, but Iraqi oil.

I asked the representative of Prodintorg what motives his organization had in getting involved in the oil business with India if its economic result evokes doubt.

"We have decided to take part in fulfillment of the trade protocol for 1992 signed by Russia and India," he responded. "It is true, our participation will be rather humble: According to the protocol, Russia has assumed the responsibility of supplying four million tonnes of oil to India this year, and another million tonnes of petroleum products. As of now, however, it has delivered only 60,000 tonnes. Our deliveries, together with those of Uralinvest, will only close the breach by one-fourth, and that will not even be this year. If we begin delivering oil to India in December, then we will complete the deliveries by 1993."

It is clear that Russia will not fulfill the responsibilities to India which it has assumed under the trade protocol. The Russian government does not have such capacities of leverage over the producer, including the oil producers, as the USSR Council of Ministers had in the past. The formerly monopolistic state foreign trade has one foot in the grave. In general, is a trade protocol needed under these conditions? What is the use of signing a document which you will not fulfill?

But, on the other hand, the economic structures which are being born in our country are in no condition to conduct large-scale trade with India. The commodity turnover between our countries is rapidly dwindling. And we are being left without tea, coffee and other Indian goods which are just as vital to us. The matter here lies not only in the fact that trade-economic relations with India are unusual and new to us. The main obstacle in the path of trade is the outrageous exchange rate of the dollar in relation to the ruble. This exchange rate cuts all our import at the root.

I recently spoke with two businessmen from Omsk. They had signed contracts in India for the purchase of a shipment of tea and instant coffee. But will this rather large contract be fulfilled—that is in question. "In buying Indian goods, we are proceeding from the fact that a dollar costs us R340," they told me before I left. "But today we learned that the price of the dollar has increased to R368. Our predictions that this exchange rate will drop or at least remain stable did not come to pass. Thus, the deal loses its economic interest. Nevertheless, the residents of our city really need these goods. For us their purchase was not simply business in the name of profit."

How can we break the vicious circle?

## 6-Week Import-Export Picture Ending 20 October

934A0146A Moscow KOMMERSANT in Russian  
21 Oct 92 p 6

[Article by Tatyana Korotkova: "Humble Fascination of Export"]

[Text] There were no great changes noted last week in the structure of Russia's foreign trade as compared with the beginning of the month. As before, import dominated over export (73.1 percent versus 26.9 percent) in the foreign trade turnover. However, the dynamics of the average contract cost over the last six weeks demonstrates a weak but rather clearly expressed tendency toward a decline of this indicator for import and, correspondingly, a more clearly expressed increase for export. This fact remains practically unseen upon simple comparison of the overall volumes of export and import in the foreign trade turnover.

Despite the general decline of export, there are seemingly favorable changes taking place in its structure in the direction of an increase in the relative share of finished products, primarily in machine building and the chemical industry. Unfortunately, however, the question is not one of increasing the capacities in these sectors or of improving the quality and assortment of products, but rather one of absolute reduction in the export of Russian raw materials.

The first reason for the change in the structure of Russian export is the flooding of the world market with metals and, as a result, the continuous decline in prices on these types of raw materials. Thus, at the latest public sales at the London Metals Exchange (15 October), prices, for example on aluminum, comprised \$1,173/tonne (as opposed to \$1,215/tonne during past public sales); on nickel—\$6,275/tonne (\$6,630/tonne), and on tin—\$6,415/tonne. The second reason is the complication of conditions for export of raw materials in Russia itself. Evidently, the first two reasons have affected the results of the latest auctions of export certificates which were held last week. Thus, aluminum was sold at most export auctions at a starting price of 3,000 rubles (R)/tonne, and at the auction of the International Trade-Clearing House not one lot of non-ferrous metals was sold. As for ferrous metal rolled stock, in October the MVES [Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations] reduced the starting auction price on it by 3.3 times. Despite this fact, both rolled stock and ferrous metal scrap went at export auctions for the starting price—for R1,500/tonne and R400/tonne, respectively. Part of the lots of metals were bought up primarily under contracts for Bulgaria and India.

The third reason for growth of the export cost indicators, as strange as it may seem, is the transformation of the former union republics, which were traditional consumers of the products of Russian industry, into independent states. The fact that domestic trade has been transformed into foreign trade, it seems, has affected the cost indicators of Russia's export to the greatest degree. Last week the export of Russian automobiles, machine


tools, equipment and complements, as well as other finished products, actively took place specifically to these states. With the setting of new Russian boundaries as of 1 October, export began also to Ukraine and Azerbaijan. Thus, during the week a large shipment of domestic-made computers was sent to Ukraine, and to Latvia—electrical equipment, polishing compounds for optics, and ceramic dishware. The products of Russian machine building are eagerly purchased not only by the nearest foreign countries, but also by the former CEMA [Council for Mutual Economic Assistance] member states. Aside from automobiles, last week we exported large shipments of spare parts for trolleys, primarily to Bulgaria.

As before, the commodity structure of import was influenced by the drop in the exchange rate of the ruble.

Cheap goods from Southeast Asia and China predominated among the imported consumer goods. Of the food products, as before, the most popular was coffee of all varieties, tea, cocoa, canned meats and vegetables, juices, syrups and chocolate.

Certain changes have occurred in the cigarette market. It was noted that under the "CIF" conditions, consumer demand dropped sharply on brands of cigarettes priced under 20 cents a pack (such as "Magna," "Aida," "Dawros," and "Opal"), and as a result in some cases a decline in the wholesale prices on them was even noted. The change in the import tariff on consumable alcohol which became effective as of 15 October has not yet led to a sharp reduction of its import. However, after the introduction of the new tariff, as a result of some panic among alcohol importers, there has already been a wave of broken contract agreements.

Dynamics of Average Contract Cost for Last Six Weeks (Ending 20 October 1992)



Key:


a - Average contract price in thousands of dollars

b - Weeks

c - Import

d - Export

## Commodity Structure of Export for Last Six Weeks (Ending 20 October 1992)




Key:

a - Relative share of export (in %)

b - Number of groups according to TN VED [expansion not given]

Commodity Structure of Import for Last Six Weeks (Ending 20 October 1992)



Key:

a - Relative share of import (in %)

b - Number of groups according to TN VED



## AZERBAIJAN

## Elchibey Interviewed on Personal Issues

93US0066A Baku BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY in Russian  
19 Sep 92 pp 1-2

[Interview with Abulfaz Elchibey, president of Azerbaijan, by Yelena Semenchenko, correspondent for the newspaper VSYAKAYA VSYACHINA, Krasnodar; place and date not given: "Elchibey: 'When Peace Comes, We Will Also Learn To Smile'"]

[Text] Not two hours had passed after the landing of the aircraft at Baku airport when the pleasant coolness of the palace of the president of Azerbaijan embraced me. I was met on the fifth floor by Gyulshad Zarbaliyev, the young but very presentable secretary of the president: "You will have to wait a bit. The president is busy. I will tell him you are here." Well, this gave me time to gather my thoughts and to look around.

"You were very lucky; the president has not been receiving any of the journalists. You are one of the first." Gyulshad again disappeared into the president's office, and afterwards the door opened wide and a well-turned voice proclaimed loudly: "The president will see you." And, taking a step to the side, now more quietly, he said: "You have half an hour." I nodded and crossed the threshold....

It was easy to talk to him. He did not overwhelm, and he did not try to appear better than he was, and there was none of the moralizing and imperious tone that is so typical of many leaders of high rank. In addition, he turned out to be an interesting interlocutor with an attractive nature. That is the impression I got of Abulfaz Elchibey—the new president of Azerbaijan, a well-built and smart-looking man 54 years of age, with a stubborn furrow across his brow and an attentive look.

His full name is Abulfaz Gadirgulu, the son of Aliyev (Elchibey). He was born in the village of Kelek, Ordubadskiy Rayon. He graduated from the department of Arabic philology of the faculty of Oriental studies of Azerbaijan State University (now BGU [Baku State University]). He is a candidate of historical sciences.

In 1963-1964, he worked as an interpreter in the Arab Republic of Egypt. After he returned to his homeland, he did graduate work, and then he taught at the university. During these years, he conducted explanatory work among the students and colleagues that was directed against the existing totalitarian system, for which he was arrested in 1975 by the KGB, and, after the court sentence, he served about two years in prison.

In 1977, he began to work in the Institute of Manuscripts of the Academy of Sciences of Azerbaijan, where he was a senior researcher for a long time.

He is the author of more than 50 scholarly works on Eastern philosophy, history, literature, and religion.

From 1989 to June of 1992, he was the chairman of the People's Front of Azerbaijan. On 7 June 1992, he was elected president.

Behind these few lines there is a whole life, full of adventures and suffering, doubts and hopes, and the bitterness of defeat and the joy of victory.

We know something more or less about the leaders of the other republics, owing to the press and television. But for many Russians, Elchibey is still a mystery. He rarely appears on the screen, or in the press, either. Indeed, he does not like to give interviews. In Azerbaijan, he is considered to be a leader who is out of the ordinary for the East, and it is believed that he will lead the republic out of chaos.

Well, as the saying goes, we will live, and we will see. But in the meantime, we are sitting in the spacious office of his residence, and we are talking about life.

[Semenchenko] Mr. Abulfaz, you are a scholar and a candidate of historical sciences. Were you not sorry to leave science for the sake of a political career?

[Elchibey] I have not left it forever. While I was still working in the academy, I always thought about how to change society and our entire life for the better. And therefore, I had to choose—science or politics. Yes, I had to sacrifice science. But this is temporary. And so, after a number of years....let us say, 20 years, when I get old, I will leave the political arena, and I will return to scholarship. It is not without reason that Aristotle said that the word combination "young philosopher" is rather rarely encountered. A philosopher should "go through life," absorb humanity's accumulated experience, and only then will he "mature" and become wise and be able to teach others something, to help them, and to indicate the path that has to be followed.

And when you think about it, science is not forgotten. I use all of my knowledge and all of the accumulated experience now in my new work. In the academy, I was engaged in the history of philosophy, and, now, let us say, I am getting to know the philosophy of history and life.

[Semenchenko] Do science and politics take up a lot of time? Does the family help you in some way?

[Elchibey] I prefer that no one interferes in my work, especially relatives. My wife, Galima, is busy with all of the household chores, and she is bringing up the children—a son and a daughter. If you have this in mind, then, yes, this kind of support helps me.

[Semenchenko] How often do you give gifts to your wife?

[Elchibey] Not often. Somehow, this is not a tradition with us. I do not consider a birthday to be a holiday, but I do celebrate 8 March—a wife should have at least one day a year that is beautiful.

[Semenchenko] But what, in general, is your attitude toward women?

[Elchibey] For me, this is a miracle of nature. A very great miracle—frail, frequently unpredictable, beautiful, and very often with great willpower that sometimes we men do not have enough of. Do you know how many women came out on the square on 15 May to defend democracy during the coup attempt? And in January 1990, thousands of women raised the flag and attacked a tank in order to defend their children and the republic! That is willpower and spirit for you!

[Semenchenko] Are you a one-woman man?

[Elchibey] I have never asked myself such a question. I like beautiful women, as I do everything beautiful in nature, and the main thing for me, of course, is the family.

[Semenchenko] Do you have any pastimes?

[Elchibey] I simply do not have time for them. I like nature very much, and when free time is available (but this happens so rarely), I like to go to the zoo. I can look for hours at the panther and the cobra—my favorite animals. There is something in them that is so proud, independent, graceful, and powerful that attracts one. I like flowers. Previously, I liked equestrian sports, but now, unfortunately, there is no time for this.

[Semenchenko] And where do you like to take a vacation?

[Elchibey] It has been several years since I have had one. Perhaps this will seem strange to you, but I have not been to a health resort or a health center once. I know Sochi, Pitsunde, and the Riga seaside or Varna only second-hand. And if I do get five or six free days in the summer, then I spend them in the village with relatives.

[Semenchenko] Are you rich?

[Elchibey] Rich? It depends on what you have in mind. Until I became president, I did not even have my own apartment; we lived with my brother's family. I do not even have one now—I live in the residence. I was unable to accumulate money during my years of work in the academy. And if you divide my current salary among the four members of my family, then you will see that it also is not that much. But if you take friends, then, yes, I am a wealthy person. I am surrounded by good people. The People's Front movement simultaneously surfaced and trained many individuals.

[Semenchenko] Incidentally, how much did you make previously, when you worked in the academy, and how much do you make now?

[Elchibey] As chief researcher, I received 1,500 rubles [R], and now—R25,000. I have a small family, by our standards—a wife and two small children—but large expenditures are required in today's life. My wife does not work. Therefore, from a material standpoint, I have

nothing to complain about. There were many problems that previously unsettled our family (you yourself know that one and a half thousand rubles for four is meager, R375 per person, and what can be bought for such money?) and that are now resolved.

On the other hand, it is even somewhat awkward before my people. I, it turns out, am provided for on this day, but a majority of the people of Azerbaijan still live poorly. It grieves me morally when another family does not have a piece of bread. Previously, when I was receiving little, it was as if I were equal with everyone. But now I am terribly uneasy, and this will be so until the standard of living of our people is raised. But in the meantime, there are about a million people unemployed in Azerbaijan. And believe me, we are doing everything so that in the course of a year to a year and a half at least half of these people would find work and could buy themselves a piece of bread, and so that at least there would be no hungry people. To feed the people—this is now one of my main concerns. I know what it is to be hungry. My father died in the Great Patriotic War. I was very small then. We lived poorly, and there were people around me who were just as poor and hungry.

[Semenchenko] Mr. Abulfaz, two months have passed since the day of the presidential elections. How do you feel in your new role?

[Elchibey] I will not be evasive. It is very difficult today. I have a great responsibility.

First, for Azerbaijan, it was necessary as fast as possible to create the kind of moral, psychological, spiritual, and political conditions for it to pull out of the anarchy and chaos that could lead to civil war. It was not very long ago that outright battles were being waged in the streets of Baku and other cities. People were afraid to go out of their homes in the daytime and to sleep at night. Misfortune could occur at any minute; but we pulled out of this chaos. On the whole, the situation is stabilizing in Azerbaijan (of course, excluding Nagorno-Karabakh, but this is a special subject). At least there will be no civil war, when brother kills brother, on the verge of which Azerbaijan had found itself.

Second, refugees from Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh began to stream into Baku from all sides. Imagine, 200,000 refugees from Armenia into Azerbaijan; moreover, there were 20,000 Russians and 10,000 Kurds from Armenia. In addition, refugees were added from Karabakh—200,000—and 50,000 Meskhetian Turks from Central Asia. A total of about a half million refugees ended up in Azerbaijan. This has been very difficult for the republic. It was necessary to get their lives going somehow: with housing and with food products. We are doing everything at least to ease their life somewhat. And now the situation is gradually stabilizing. Many people have already found work. We will continue to help them in the future as well.

Of late, there has been a decline in all sectors in Azerbaijan: in the economy, in culture, and in the military sphere. It was necessary, first of all, to stop this decline. And we did this.

There was no meat, sugar, and butter in Azerbaijan. Now, when you go into stores, there already is meat and sugar for coupons. We released butter at a free price, but it is very high, and not everyone can buy it; therefore, to put a stop to the high price, it is necessary to give people their guaranteed grams at a low price. Then the free price will not go any higher. That is, in this way, we will institute price regulation. Of course, under conditions of market relations, a protracted regulation of prices is not permissible, but at the present stage, this is a solution. We are working on this right now. During the year, the government plans to issue subsidies for food products, although this is not easy; but then we will ease the life of the people at least a little. And so we will gradually move to market relations.

We carried out several reforms, and we adopted several laws. A reform is going on in education. Until now, everything was moving along according to the old pattern. Bribery and corruption were flourishing in enrollments. Seventy to 80 percent of the students enrolled in a technical secondary school only with the help of bribes. Now, the situation will change. Examinations will be given in the form of tests. The calculation of grades, competition, and enrollment will be accomplished with computers.

[Semenchenko] But were you offered bribes when you were teaching at the university?

[Elchibey] No, never.

[Semenchenko] Why? They knew you would not take them?

[Elchibey] Obviously. Those around me knew very well what I thought of bribes. When I was not yet married and was teaching at the university, I tried to set aside a little for poor students. I had one student who did not even have a raincoat during winter. I helped students like this. I bought things with my own money and gave them as gifts. After all, as the saying goes, I had been in those same shoes myself. In my student days, I did not have a coat or a raincoat for five years.

[Semenchenko] And they accepted this help?

[Elchibey] At first they refused; they were embarrassed. I tried to find the necessary words. But later I persuaded the dean's office to give such students material help from the treasury of the dean's office and the rector's office, or through the trade unions.

[Semenchenko] Do you have shortcomings?

[Elchibey] Of course. But are there really any people without shortcomings? I, for example, am frequently rebuked that I am too soft.

[Semenchenko] Is this really a shortcoming?

[Elchibey] For a leader, yes. I am trustful; therefore, it is easy to deceive me. It is easier for me to trust and then be deceived than to express my distrust to someone and thus insult a person who subsequently proves to be very honest. Life itself will judge who is right and who is not. And a bad person, sooner or later, will be punished by life itself.

[Semenchenko] Tell me, Mr. Abulfaz, are you superstitious?

[Elchibey] Superstitious? No. My favorite number is 13. I adore black cats, even when they cross my path, and I do not believe in spilled salt, nor in empty pails.

[Semenchenko] But what do you believe? Maybe in love, "flying saucers," a life hereafter, the "abominable snowman"?

[Elchibey] Well, "flying saucers" and "abominable snowmen" belong, in my opinion, in the category of journalistic sensations. As for an afterlife, or what is associated with the cosmos, then man, who over so many centuries has tried to delve into the unknown, the incomprehensible, and the mysterious simply has a need for some kind of superstition; in any case, about 15-30 percent of his brain specifically needs it. If there are no "flying saucers" tomorrow, we will come up with something else. For example, that trees walk at night, and a meteorite that landed from outer space was transformed into a horrible monster. Everything depends on fantasy.

[Semenchenko] And in horoscopes?

[Elchibey] That is another picture. Astrology relies on hypotheses that in turn are based on scientific knowledge. But, after all, out of 10 hypotheses, two to four are true. There is nothing amazing in the fact that horoscope predictions of many people come true. And, then, who compiles them? Primarily people who know astronomy very well, and who have a very well developed, as it is usual to say, sixth sense, and it is true that astrologists call it something else.

[Semenchenko] What astrological sign are you?

[Elchibey] Cancer. I was born in the Year of the Tiger.

[Semenchenko] If one believes the horoscope, you are a brilliant person. Robespierre, Louis XIV, Agatha Christie, and Beethoven were Tigers. Astrologist Pavel Globa has predicted: This year will not be easy for Cancer; he will have to endure difficult opposition, a struggle, and changes in his personal life. In general, there will be many kinds of dramatic situations. But Cancer will survive everything and will come out the victor. In my opinion, a lot has come true for you.

[Elchibey] Well, thanks to Globa.

[Semenchenko] You have the fingers of a musician. Incidentally, do you play any kind of instrument?

[Elchibey] A little. The tar. This is a native instrument, a type of guitar. I tried the piano, but I did not turn out to be a pianist.

[Semenchenko] Mr. Abulfaz, are you not afraid that at some time you will undergo a metamorphosis, which frequently happens with people of high rank: That is, after getting to power, after a certain time they forget why they are sitting in their chair, and are transformed into tyrants, or into a weapon of tyrants?

[Elchibey] I am not afraid. I have defined my path clearly, and I have set a clear goal—the freedom of Azerbaijan, a democratic Azerbaijan. And I will achieve this goal. But I will never start to defend my chair with weapon in hand, if the people are disappointed in me (not a small group of conspirators, but the people of Azerbaijan). Questions like this have to be resolved in a democratic way, as it is done in civilized countries.

[Semenchenko] Are you a happy person?

[Elchibey] Yes. Much for which I have fought and about which I dreamed has been realized.

[Semenchenko] Then why do you smile so rarely? And why do you look so gloomy on television? After all, you are not like this in life at all. There is, it seems, an entire science dealing with how and when state leaders should smile. It is thought that a smiling president is liked by the voters more. Look at Reagan, Bush, Kohl—the impression is that they completed courses on Hollywood smiles. Even Yeltsin smiles.

[Elchibey] It is not the time for smiling. Every day, 10-15 persons perish in Azerbaijan. A fratricidal war that is not needed by anyone and in which no one will win has been going on with the Armenians for five years. After several years, people will begin to wonder: Why have we been killing each other? Like in the Iran-Iraq war. They fought for 10 years, but they cannot tell exactly why even now. And Moldova? And Yugoslavia? And Georgia? How many more "hot spots" will there be like this? When will we come to our senses? Whole nations can perish because of the shortsightedness of some politicians. It is necessary to endeavor somehow to correct today's situation and to direct it into peaceful channels. Otherwise, our progeny will not forgive us.

But, when peace arrives, then we will learn how to smile.

[Semenchenko] By the way, what do you think of Mutalibov's statement that he wants to return to Azerbaijan?

[Elchibey] Yes, he wants to return to Azerbaijan as a common citizen. But, in my opinion, there will be no Azerbaijan for him. For the reason that he will have to answer for his actions. For the tragedy of Khodzhalay and for the Baku massacre. He did a lot of harm to Azerbaijan in the last two years.

[Semenchenko] You spent some time in prison for your own democratic convictions. Was it not terrible?

[Elchibey] Terrible? No; after all, I was not the only one who ended up there. And then, for the democrats in those years, prison was the same as "chicken pox" (do you know this children's disease?): All you have to do is go through it, and you immediately build up an immunity.

[Semenchenko] Which of the current politicians do you sympathize with?

[Elchibey] I understand Snegur's difficulties, I appreciate Kravchuk's mind, and Yeltsin is a powerful politician and a talented person. I sympathize with ex-president Gamsakhurdia, because it is precisely he, a former dissident, who began to build democracy in Georgia. Of the foreign leaders, Bush, Reagan, and Kissinger—intelligent, benevolent, and pleasant in contacts with people.

...

Our conversation was interrupted by the telephone. And while the president was talking, State Secretary of the Republic Panakh Guseynov, who half an hour ago had received two Baku residents who had returned from Barcelona with gold Olympic medals—judoist Nazim Guseynov and gymnast Valeriy Belenko—now joined our conversation; he explained: "There is news from the front. One more Azerbaijani village has been liberated."

Panakh Guseynov was one of the creators and leaders of the People's Front of Azerbaijan. Therefore, he and Elchibey are bound by a lot of things.

[Guseynov] You will not believe, after all, before meeting Mr. Abulfaz in 1986, I was one of the most orthodox and inveterate monumental Marxists. Before enrolling in the history faculty of the university in 1975, do you know what I did? I wrote a letter to the government with a request to send me to Vietnam to fight for communism. But then, later, after I became a student, I heard a lot about Mr. Abulfaz from the boys and about his persecution, but I was skeptical about his idea concerning the freedom of Azerbaijan. And only then, later, after meeting him, did I realize how greatly mistaken I had been. Incidentally, after meeting Elchibey, many people changed their views on life.

"Ah, who has not made a mistake in his youth?" laughed the president, who had already completed his telephone conversation, and I noticed for the first time how a smile suited him. Our interview was also coming to an end. While scheduled for half an hour, we had talked for a whole hour, and could have talked even longer, but... the president had a tight schedule and many more meetings for the day. And then I asked him the final question.

[Semenchenko] What does your name, Abulfaz, mean, and why did you choose precisely the pseudonym Elchibey; after all, your real name is Aliyev.

[Elchibey] Abulfaz is an Arab name, and it translates into "the father of science and prosperity." But Elchibey—El is people, elchi is loving, favorite of the people.



ambassador of the people, and bey is a respectful particle. It can be translated as a person speaking on behalf of the people, expressing their interests.

[Semenchenko] Thank you, Mr. Abulfaz, for the interview. And may everything that your have planned that is good and right come true.

[Elchibey] And I in turn want to wish the residents of the Kuban and all of Russia peace and prosperity. We have always been friends. May it be that way in the future as well.

And with these words, the president presented the newspaper VSYAKAYA VSYACHINA and its readers with his autograph.

## GEORGIA

### Abashidze Interviewed Before Elections

93US0068A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 17 Oct 92 p 3

[Interview with Arslan Abashidze, chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Autonomous Republic of Ajaria, conducted by Akakiy Mikadze prior to the parliamentary elections in Georgia: "Abolition of the Autonomy Would Be Tantamount to Catastrophe"]

[Text]

[Mikadze] You and the bulk of the Ajaria parliament are considered Gamsakhurdia's stooges.

[Abashidze] It is not the first time that this question has been put to me. Yes, I became the leader of Ajaria under the ex-president, but had held important office before this also. I was minister of consumer services here and subsequently first deputy minister of this sector in Tbilisi. It is an astonishing fact that it is to me that this question is put everywhere when the president's stooges are still working in their former places. The present leadership of the Republic of Georgia, for example. The difference between us is that they moved toward confrontation with him, and their ways parted, and then they once again returned to power with the aid of force. The unequivocal interpretation of Gamsakhurdia's personality has done much harm to everyone, even his supporters. It is essential to look for the reasons for the split in the political forces of the Round Table itself, which led to the division of the whole nation. It is said that our parliament is made up of "Round Table supporters," but what was it previously in Tbilisi—of the same people also.

[Mikadze] So what, for all that, were the reasons for the split in the political forces and all of society?

[Abashidze] It is often said that empires collapse. The disintegration of the Soviet Union could not have failed to have evoked cataclysms. The floodgates were opened, and the stream swept together each and everything.

Georgia had tremendous shortages in the business of administration of the state. Switching from street meetings to deputy's and ministerial chairs without the appropriate professional skills is the equivalent of putting a man from the street at the controls of an airplane. There were moments when my intervention in emergency situations bore fruit. In the Emergency Committee period I took part in the negotiations with General Shevelev, Yazov's deputy at that time, who had that same day publicly declared here in Tbilisi that Georgia would be brought to its knees unless it submitted to the demands of the Emergency Committee people. We managed to persuade him at that time not to use force, and tanks were not brought onto the streets of Tbilisi. In parliament at that time everyone was thinking first and foremost about the importance of his person, not about the interests of the state. It was clear that people were gathered here with one purpose: to shout one another down. I did everything not to attend, not to participate in this masquerade of idle talk.

[Mikadze] The authorities have changed, but you do not, as before, visit Tbilisi and do not participate in the work of the State Council.

[Abashidze] While criticizing imperial methods of leadership, we are unthinkingly adopting them ourselves. This will have unpredictable consequences. Failing to take account of our place in the constellation of states, we are making mistakes step by step. We have not brought in our representatives to the State Council for a long time because there is no proper mechanism there necessary for extrication from the situation in which the country has found itself. Collective administration of the state is the equivalent of a situation where all passengers grab hold of the single steering wheel of a bus. Of course, the State Council is a step forward from a military council, but it cannot be said that it holds the reins of government. The decisions of the ministerial cabinet are in the majority of cases nonsynchronous with the activity of the State Council. Considering the situation, we need to summon up the courage and find forms concentrating all power in one pair of hands. One man should today assume responsibility to history and the people's destiny. Otherwise a long drawn-out night with an unknown outcome awaits us.

[Mikadze] It is being noted in Georgia and outside that, fortunately, the civil war has not affected the territory of Ajaria.

[Abashidze] It was extraordinarily important to shift the public emphasis onto creation, onto the solution of social problems. We have created an effective executive body, which has aimed at the solution of these questions. It is in this period, when Georgia has been divided into two camps, that we have exempted all districts from the payment of agricultural taxes and payment for land and home ownership, and three highland areas, from payment for electricity and transportation services. Having replenished the budget thanks to the use of new mechanisms, we have begun to spend money prudently. There

have been investments from outside. Certain currency receipts have come from the Batumi customs house. We have begun to pay allowances to handicapped children, single mothers, the elderly, students, and orphans. The public has seen that there is a government which is involved in a solution of its problems. We have declared clearly: We will live as our forefathers used to lived, regardless of national affiliation. It never occurred to anyone throughout past years to present television and radio programs in Russian. Today the Russian editorial office broadcasts daily and is the equivalent of Georgian. There is a desire to begin broadcasting in other languages—Armenian and Greek. Civilized relations with the army have performed a role of considerable importance. In defiance of Tbilisi, we jointly celebrated 9 May, 23 February, Border Guards' Day and so forth.

[Mikadze] Nonetheless, many people in Tbilisi are accusing you of dictatorship and calling you a feudal lord and pasha even. What is the crux of the matter, in your view?

[Abashidze] Do I need dictatorship? We have the full support of the public here. It is predominantly those who have been removed from their positions and people who had in the past engaged in embezzling or those who would like to impose narrow party interests who are the malcontents. Yes, I am a supporter of dictatorship, but dictatorship of the law and legality and a firm authority defending the people's interests. I have said to my opponents repeatedly and do so now: Here is a specific sector for you—choose and work—but I have been turned down, as a rule. Demolishing and criticizing is easier than creating, evidently.

[Mikadze] You are also accused of having armed the populace and that you are in league with reactionary forces in Moscow, with the military leadership.

[Abashidze] When danger on account of an orgy of illegal armed formations, and among them, criminal elements, in the main, hung over all of Georgia, the idea of finding a mechanism of protection of the people ripened. The administrative authorities had become so enfeebled that they were failing to cope with the functions entrusted to them. I then declared on television: "If there is a threat to the population of Ajaria, I will authorize the bearing of arms." This came as a bolt from the blue—many people had weapons as it was. We formed volunteer groups of reservists to assist the militia and distributed weapons to some. As far as the question of where they came from is concerned, I will say that on a couple of occasions we intercepted the shipment of a large consignment of weapons across our territory, and the bulk of them were handed over to the militia. Today the people are together with the militia themselves covering the approaches to the villages and defending themselves. The weapons which have been distributed, meanwhile, have never been turned against our neighbor. We have a far more stable crime situation than anywhere else in Georgia.

[Mikadze] The splash of religious revival has not bypassed Ajaria either. Until recently Islam was semi-dormant here, today it is beginning to actively awake. And you are being accused of stimulating this process.

[Abashidze] I am happy that not one person can cite a specific fact. The confrontation has no religious factor, this is an invention. We returned to the local Armenians for the first time the Gregorian Church, to the Jews, the synagogue. The building of an Orthodox church is planned since the Orthodox do not have one. They conduct their rituals in the Roman Catholic church. Some people would very much like to play the religious card here, creating confrontation to ignite local preference. They would like to set the Christian Gurians against some Muslim Ajaris.

It is said that Abkhazia should be an example for Ajaria. I am aware that the issue: "Let's have done with Ajaria at the same time," has been raised.

Were some people to take it into their heads to raise an armed hand against us, this would be a force purposefully destroying the integrity of Georgia and acting according to the instructions of outside forces with an interest in creating chaos. It would be a colossal explosion with far more tragic consequences than we have in the Caucasus as a whole. The question is raised: Is our system of autonomies ideal? No, but it has performed a tremendous role in the history and in the preservation of the integrity of Georgia. Talk about abolition of the autonomy is tantamount to catastrophe. In April of last year a rumor was spread concerning abolition of Ajaria's autonomous republic status, and 10,000 angry people came here immediately. Unarmed at that time.

[Mikadze] How do you forecast the development of events in Abkhazia?

[Abashidze] The statement of the Georgian leadership on the commitment of forces to Abkhazia for the purpose of protecting supply lines may be justified since the losses from robberies had been colossal. Shevardnadze had formerly attempted to organize protection of the main line in conjunction with the Russian military, but it declined. This should have been done by MVD forces and the internal troops. In this case the repercussions would have been different, and we would have protected the population against confrontation with the army. We should primordialy preserve the authority of the army as a symbol defending the state. But it is more important today to talk not about who is to blame but about how to get out of the situation. We should act such as to look around not only at ourselves but considering also the interests of other states and our geopolitical position. May my ancestors forgive me, but they did not always pursue a sound policy, and this brought harm to the people. When the interests of the countries of the Transcaucasus intersect, Russia will inevitably be present. Wisdom consists of studying these interests and of a search for modes and forms of their settlement on a

mutually beneficial basis without wars and confrontation. Without this, there will be no internal stability here. A wise man never enters a labyrinth from which it is difficult to emerge.

[Mikadze] How, in your opinion, should relations between Georgia and Russia be built? What has your republic gained or lost by not being a part of the CIS?

[Abashidze] I see no gain. Had it not been for the enormous factor of Shevardnadze's prestige, we would not have been admitted to the United Nations and would not have been recognized as quickly by the world community. I am told frequently that I am pursuing a pro-Russia policy. I want to be friends with everyone, not to fight. If tomorrow Russia cuts off all revenue, who will tackle the problems of our society? No one. The West's declarations of assistance have not saturated us as yet. I do not have a troop-withdrawal complex. In addition to the enormous potential, time, not to mention the creation of training institutions, is also needed for the creation of our own armed forces.

#### Party Structure of New Parliament Detailed

93US0068B Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 21 Oct 92 p 3

[Article by Nodar Broladze and Guga Lolishvili: "A Constructive Opposition Is a Vital Necessity," Rusudan Beridze, Chief Counselor of the State Council for Elections, Believes"]

[Text] The State Council of Georgia, the last session of which was held at the end of last week, is prepared to give way to the newly elected parliament. The whole question is whether it can really lay claim to the role of strong legislature and confront its speaker, the factor of whose personality will undoubtedly be reflected in the will of the deputies. As far, on the other hand, as the composition of the present parliament is concerned, the seats therein have, as was to have been expected, been shared by the biggest blocs and best-known parties. Twenty-nine seats went to the Mshviboda ("Peace") bloc of political parties. It was on its lists, incidentally, that the name of the head of the State Council formerly stood, which afforded the leadership of the party bloc even after Shevardnadze's withdrawal an opportunity to use his name—the bloc's election appeal was: "Vote for Mshviboda and Eduard Shevardnadze!" The second party bloc, "11 October," has 18 seats. It unites the Christian Democratic Union, the People's Front, the Republican Party, and the Dasi organization. Fourteen seats enabled the Ertoba ("Unity") bloc, whose members include the well-known producer Eldar Shengelaya and also Aleksandr Kavsadze, vice premier of Georgia, to occupy the third rung. As anticipated, the National Democratic Party has many seats. If, incidentally, the first three places were occupied by party blocs, the National Democratic Party was ahead of all individual organizations—it has 13 seats. Eleven seats were obtained by the Green Party, which has enjoyed popularity in Georgia of late

since its leader, Zurab Zhvania, assigns a large place, besides social programs, to the fight against organized crime and the introduction of order in the law enforcement authorities of the republic, which is particularly urgent at this time, under the conditions of the orgy of crime.

The Democratic Party and Charter 91, headed by Tedo Paataashvili, who was one of the first in the former parliament to quit Gamsakhurdia's camp and switch to the opposition, obtained 10 and nine seats respectively. The remainder of the spread is as follows: the Ilya Chavchavadze Society and the Traditionalists Party, seven seats each, the Merab Kostava Society, five, the National Harmony and Revival Union, four, the National Independence Party, four, and the Socialist Workers Party, which consists of orthodox communists, in the main, three seats. The remaining parties obtained one seat each. Eleven parties failed to gain a seat in parliament. All told, candidates elected per party lists have occupied 154 seats, and 84 seats have been obtained by independent candidates elected by the simple-majority system. So there are in the Georgian parliament, including the chairman, 235 seats.

"The former communist functionaries who ran for election by district obtained quite a large number of seats per the majority lists," Rusudan Beridze, chief counselor of the State Council for preparation and organization of the parliamentary elections, commented on the results of the voting. "This fact is food for thought. Destructive processes have been occurring in the country in recent years, which has definitely undermined confidence in the radical wing of the national movement. The forces of the movement which enjoy society's respect will have to draw the conclusions from this. The time of radicalism is past."

Practically everyone is unhappy with the results of the elections, Beridze said, since the hopes were for a far larger number of seats. The National Democratic Party headed by Georgiy Chanturiya, say, was expecting 30 percent of the seats on the party list, but obtained 13 seats, and a further four representatives were elected by majority-system constituency. The Mshviboda bloc, which had united incompatible organizations, it might have seemed: the Democratic Union and the Monarchist-Conservative Party, was expecting more also. But 29 seats do not give it a decisive preponderance in parliament, and the potential "governing" bloc will be forced to accede to a coalition with other parties.

Shevardnadze said at a session of the State Council that he prefers decisions adopted on the basis of consensus. But parliament will hardly avoid delicate situations. In addition, serenity would be undesirable, Rusudan Beridze believes. In a self-respecting parliament a constructive opposition is a vital necessity.

An unpleasant and unexpected outcome of the elections was the fact that certain members of the State Council who had distinguished themselves in recent months did



not get elected to parliament. Eduard Shevardnadze expressed regret in this connection, but said that fitting employment should be found for their capabilities in the future structures.

In a radio interview on 19 October Eduard Shevardnadze declared the need for the creation in parallel with parliament of strong authorities. A priority task of parliament, in the speaker's opinion, is the enactment of an election law. Of course, much will now depend on the determination of parliament's relations with its chairman and also with the executive. Many observers believe that the absence of a constitution and the corresponding laws will complicate this process. When it is a question of Shevardnadze's relations with parliament, it should be borne in mind that there is among the deputies at the present time a certain dualism on this issue. An endeavor to support Shevardnadze in every possible way and to endow him with particular authority, in the solution of priority questions included, may be observed among some parties and blocs. Another part of parliament, on the contrary, will obviously endeavor to avoid pressure on the part of the speaker. The absence for Shevardnadze, at this stage, in any event, of a clear intraparlimentary opposition would seem very important, what is more. Nonetheless, there are certain contradictions, which were expressed at the last session of the State Council, when some members complained of a violation of the election law in the course of the voting by party list and demanded an investigation of the activity of the Central Electoral Commission.

#### **Chikvaidze on Relations With Moscow**

93US0080A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 28 Oct 92 p 3

[Article by Nodar Broladze: "I Would Not Recommend Insisting On the Troops' Withdrawal"]

[Text] "I would not recommend insisting on the troops' withdrawal," Shevardnadze said in response to demands to withdraw the Russian army from Georgia.

"We will take the city of Gagra back very soon; this is my public and official statement," said Tamaz Nadareishvili, first deputy of the Abkhaz Supreme Soviet Chairman, in an appearance on Georgian TV. Speaking of the return of refugees to the city, he said: "Hired barbarians are doing all they can to close the road to Gagra to the Georgian people forever. They are using the most ruthless and inhuman methods to drive the people away, including gunning them down and burning their homes. For this reason, I understand people who do not want to return to Abkhazia, but they must do so." Nadareishvili meant primarily male refugees who should "take weapons in their hands, defend their land with their own efforts, and drive the enemy out." According to him, special headquarters have already been set up in Sukhumi which are organizing the return of refugees.

Observers estimate that the chances of a political settlement in the Abkhaz conflict have become even more

ethereal after Andrey Kozyrev, Russian minister of foreign affairs, postponed his visit to Tbilisi. But Aleksandr Chikvaidze, head of the Georgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, made an encouraging statement: "The meeting was postponed, but not canceled. A joint task force whose task is to do everything possible to bring the positions of the two sides closer continues to work in Moscow." Political circles in Georgia tried to link the suspension of the visit with the situation in the Russian parliament, but Chikvaidze rejected such speculations and remarked that the position of Russia in the Abkhaz conflict seemed rather indefinite at that time. "We would like Russia to maintain its equal status in the negotiating process," he said openly, "and we do not intend to link the entire spectrum of Georgian-Russian relations with the conflict in Abkhazia, because in reality it is considerably larger." The minister emphasized the fact that both sides were preparing a comprehensive Russian-Georgian agreement which would include basic political and trade and economic agreements as well as documents on cultural cooperation. Chikvaidze regards Yeltsin and Shevardnadze failing to meet as unthinkable; in his opinion, both sides understand the necessity of strengthening their links and desire to achieve political partnership. "But this should be a true partnership and not interference in the political processes that are taking place in our republic," said the minister, who also rebutted journalists' speculations about Ardzinba's pressure on Kozyrev.

The Tbilisi administration still wants to settle the conflict by political means even though, as they examine the situation from a realistic point of view, they are leaning more and more toward the idea of inevitable military measures. As one justification for such measures, Eduard Shevardnadze mentions his concern for the thousands of peaceful citizens left without jobs, homes, or any means of existence.

On Sunday a rally took place in front of the former Transcaucasian Military District (now the Southern Group of Troops) headquarters building. At the rally people demanded that the Russian military units be withdrawn from Georgia and an end to all interference in its internal affairs. Nodar Natadze, People's Front chairman, and Georgiy Chanturiya, National Democratic Party leader, took an uncompromising stance with respect to Russia's military presence in Georgia. Shevardnadze described their speeches as short-sighted and insufficiently rational. "When we protest against any interference of the generals acting in Abkhazia, I am together with everyone," said the parliament chairman, "but I would not recommend insisting on the withdrawal of Russian troops." Shevardnadze had a simple explanation for everything: This will lead to the dismantling of the air defense system, and Georgia will remain totally defenseless under conditions when the threat to make Tbilisi a disaster area has already been proclaimed in the North Caucasus. "We cannot ask all of them to leave but keep their air defense system here; it would not be tactful," said Shevardnadze, "it is a step-by-step, gradual process. There is a time for everything."



**Gamsakhurdia on Activity in Exile**

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[Article by S. Frolov: "Z. Gamsakhurdia: 'The Mafia Rules in Georgia'"]

[Text] From Z. Gamsakhurdia's letter to B. Yeltsin: "....The example of Georgia may become quite contagious. The Russian leadership is faced with the same problems at present, i.e., the possibility of a government coup."

"Just do not call me 'ex-president,'" asked Zviad Gamsakhurdia immediately. "You invented this term out of journalistic ignorance. I am not an 'ex-president,' I am a president in exile."

The rather elegant exile appeared in the building of Chechen President Dudayev's office in the company of two bodyguards, his wife, the proud beauty Manana Archvadze, Prime Minister Vissarion Gugushvili, and temporary speaker of the parliament in exile Merab Kiknadze. There are quite a few exiled presidents in world history, but the case of Georgia has no precedent because a large part of the Georgian parliament went to Chechnya together with Gamsakhurdia. It can still gather a quorum in order to make some decisions.

When asked about his opinion on the 11 October elections in Georgia, Gamsakhurdia responded:

"There were no elections. Georgia went through a farce of illegitimate and anticonstitutional elections, while even those took place in only a few Tbilisi rayons and in some other cities. Voting was not secret and was conducted at gunpoint. Considering that the Georgian constitution does not allow for any elections without a parliamentary decision, it bore some semblance of the communist pseudo-elections."

Gamsakhurdia is a human paradox: a minute after decrying the elections in his own country, he declared that Estonia had "truly democratic elections," even though 40 percent of its population were not invited to participate in them. Speaking of his supporters in

Georgia, he mentioned "honest working people and intellectuals," but 10 minutes later he declared that "Georgia had no real intellectuals, it only had criminal intelligentsia like the movie mafia."

Here is what the president in exile said about his relations with the opposition:

"There used to be three types of opposition in Georgia: parliamentary, street, and criminal. Later they all merged together in order to overthrow the legitimate power; this was no longer an opposition."

About his relations with Shevardnadze:

"He was the KGB chief and I was a dissident. What kind of relations could we have? He kept arresting me, and when I was free he kept me under constant surveillance: up to 30 cars used to follow me. I challenged him in an open letter to a TV debate but he has been evading it ever since."

About his activity in exile:

"I continue my presidential work: I write decrees, I appoint people, I write appeals, I meet journalists and politicians; but the main thing is that I denounce the criminal regime of Shevardnadze and his gang."

About Chechnya:

"Russia can only benefit from recognizing its former colonies. When they say that Georgia is also colonizing Abkhazia and Ossetia, it is not true: Historically, these lands always belonged to Georgia, but Chechnya was colonized by Russia during the last century."

About the mafia:

"If the Russian mafia is the fifth power, after the press, in Georgia it is the only one. Shevardnadze has created a unique government of criminals and mafiosi. He himself is a member of the international criminal structure."

About relations with Russia:

"I did not ruin these relations. Russia is the most natural ally for Georgia and a lot depends on it still. The Caucasus has not yet been completely lost for Russia."

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